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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 704th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to convey a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and my own behalf, to Ambassador Munir Akram, who, as the new representative of Pakistan, is with us for the first time today. Ambassador Akram is no stranger to arms control and disarmament. Throughout his diplomatic career, he has been involved in the multilateral disarmament issues on our agenda and was an active participant in the work of this Conference at its inception. I wish to assure him of our full cooperation.

With your indulgence, I should also like to make some opening remarks as I begin my term as President of the Conference.

I have the honour and duty to convey to you the warmest greetings and best wishes of the Government and people of Kenya. His Excellency President Daniel T. Arap Moi and his Government attach great importance to the work of this Conference and take very seriously the CD's presidency which Kenya occupies from today and will hold in the coming months, including in particular during the period of the NPT review and extension Conference planned in New York for 17 April through 12 May 1995. My Government very much hopes that our efforts will be fruitful and meritorious, and that we shall make valuable contributions to the success of the NPT Conference.

My predecessor, Her Excellency Madam Kurokochi, has done a superb job. The competent manner with which she has directed the work of the Conference has been amazing. She arrived in Geneva probably on a weekend, and the following week, she assumed the presidency of CD. I can only admire such expertise so reminiscent of the alacrity of Japanese culture, and thank Ambassador Kurokochi for what she has done. If Caesar were among us today, he would, with admiration, have proclaimed "venit, vidit et sumpsit" - she came, she saw and she took charge.

Let me also thank His Excellency Ambassador Vattani of Italy for having started the work of the CD so well during this year and for the leadership that he provided us, especially during the difficult consultations which he conducted at the beginning of this session of the Conference.

(continued in Italian)

I know your country well, having been Ambassador to Italy for five years. The country gave birth to Cicerone, Marcus Aurelius and Caesar. I could not have more wonderful memories of any other country in the world.

(continued in English)

Yes, Ambassador, I have wonderful memories of Italy.

Obviously, the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil, China, Morocco and Myanmar have also been with us for a relatively short period of time and I look forward to working closely with them and with all of you, Excellencies and distinguished delegates. For, though I may be the captain of the ship, all of us have our respective roles to play; all of us are on the same stage, with our respective entrances and exits. I am particularly thankful to the interpreters who facilitate our understanding of each other, and of one another. I recognize the presence of the observers and thank them for being here to participate in the great undertaking we are engaged in, for the cause of humanity. I wish to pay a special tribute to Reverend Father Peter Henry, the distinguished observer for the Holy See, who never misses to attend the plenary meetings of the Conference. Father Henry knows my country very well and has made valuable contributions to it through missionary work. Thanks also to Mr. V. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference and special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Mr. A. Bensmail and their secretariat, for the invaluable services they render to this Conference.

1995 is indeed a memorable year, for a variety of events, some fruitful and others destructive, have been shaping the year since 1 January, and it is evident that many other nasty and pleasant events will continue to shape our planet throughout 1995. This year marks the golden jubilee of the founding of the United Nations, and important activities have been planned to celebrate the occasion. Some of the international conferences and meetings held so far, or planned for later in the year, are quite historic in nature and substance, and they include the NPT review and extension Conference which is to be held on the threshold of the twenty-first century, and will go down in the history of the CD as having been one of the most important disarmament conferences of this decade, also partly because it will be the first major world disarmament conference to be held in the post-cold-war era of the new world order, expected to be safer and freer of nuclear arsenals than the cold war period had been.

This new era, however, though devoid of East-West confrontation, is nonetheless, and paradoxically, fraught with local wars, clashes and all kinds of other conflicts in some of the world's hot spots. These territorial conflicts and clashes have adverse effects beyond their borders, and sooner or later result in destabilizing and negative consequences on international peace, stability and security. As one of the beloved Presidents of the United States may be paraphrased, perpetual fear of all these occurrences may turn out to be our gravest tormentor. For, judging from the prevailing problems and conflicts, the local confrontations and wars that are so common in the world's trouble spots seem to open up more avenues for easier access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction than they did in the cold war period.

The greatest danger, then, that we face today is that easy access to and lucrative trade in nuclear weapons, fissile materials and other weapons of mass destruction could, if allowed to prosper, lead to a more rapid spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism after the disappearance of the West-East confrontation. Such a trend could, if left unchecked, in turn lead to explosive global consequences, and gravely menace world peace and security.

This paradoxical situation of the post-cold-war era could also result in graver local, regional and even global destabilization in the infant new world order.

It is essential, therefore, that we bear these ironies in mind as we prepare for the NPT review Conference. We, the individual representatives of the 37 Governments and States members of the CD, bear the primary responsibility of determining the future cause of general and complete disarmament. This Conference is charged with the high responsibility of negotiating and attaining nuclear and other forms of disarmament. We thus cannot afford to fail in this crucial undertaking, especially now that we have started on a countdown on the twenty-first century, and the NPT review and extension Conference is to occur in exactly three weeks' time. One hopes that we can prepare the world community to enter the next century free of nuclear proliferation. As interested partners mandated to negotiate nuclear disarmament for the survival of humankind and prevention of annihilation of the human race from the face of the Earth, we all recognize the value of the NPT as the global cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation, and the main international instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

The challenges facing the international community in the field of nuclear disarmament are thus many and varied, and known to all of us. Nevertheless and based on the foregoing remarks, I would regard the following observations and conclusions as being logical and pertinent at this point in time of my statement.

First, any possession of nuclear weapons nowadays is prompted by a far broader scope of reasons than mere military, security, political or even strategic reasons. Aspects of morality, law, prestige and economics have assumed greater significance than in the past. And what would be better, in this connection, and in the post-cold-war era, than creating, for example, a clear and lasting interconnection between disarmament and development?

Second, for the non-proliferation regime to be lasting and comprehensive on a global scale, it must be effected by measures calling for the enactment of non-proliferation laws, agreements and policies at the national, international, bilateral and multilateral levels.

Third, in the post-cold-war world, nuclear-weapon States perhaps bear much heavier responsibility than ever before for the attainment of global security. A re-examination of their commitment under the NPT, especially under its article VI, might hence be most worthwhile in order to look into the most effective and globally acceptable ways and means of assuring total nuclear disarmament. In like manner, the security needs of the non-nuclear States are much greater today than those of the nuclear Powers. Therefore, the best way to prevent further acquisition, or temptations to acquire nuclear weapons, is to abolish the existing ones. As we all know, however, the declared nuclear-weapon States have made commendable declarations of security assurances. But the non-nuclear-weapon States very much desire that these declarations be transformed into a legally binding instrument. Such action would definitely reaffirm the responsibility of the nuclear Powers toward achieving nuclear disarmament and recommit these States to attain that goal. A legally binding document would be helpful, as it would remove all the fears that declarations are not binding. The latest offer by the nuclear Powers of negative security assurances to the Security Council is particularly noteworthy, and raises an enormous appetite for a big surprise at the NPT Conference. One hopes that this appetite can be satisfied.

Fourth, and as for the non-nuclear-weapon States of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, many of them have indeed signed the NPT. They thus firmly argue that they deserve to receive security assurances for protection against the use, attack, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the NPT want, it is clear, to have access to the transfer of science and technology for peaceful purposes, under the IAEA safeguards. Those States of the non-nuclear-weapons category which have not yet ratified the NPT obviously have concerns which are well known to this Conference, and have been taken note of. These States should nonetheless be encouraged to re-examine the value of the NPT as a most crucial and obvious contributor to global security.

Fifth, and in order to facilitate the negotiating process within CD, it would be best, I think, to exercise our political will to agree on a package of issues and measures to be taken within the CD's mandate.

If I may now speak on my own behalf, and as an interested participant in the work of this Conference and in a successful outcome of the NPT review Conference, I would expect that Conference to achieve at least the following. Firstly, extend the NPT, which is an invaluable instrument for global security. Secondly, encourage the nuclear Powers to continue their efforts toward achieving nuclear disarmament. Thirdly, encourage the CD, if the CTBT is not, as it appears, ready before the NPT Conference, to continue its efforts toward the conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT. Such a treaty would augur very well for the nuclear disarmament process permanently and comprehensively banning all nuclear tests everywhere. Real hard work is under way, and one hopes that agreement can be reached as soon as practicable. In this connection I wish to recognize the valuable contributions made by Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and his successor, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, to the test ban process. What a pity Ambassador Marín Bosch will be leaving us so soon. He reminds me of the late legend García Robles, and when I think of Ambassador García Robles, I am reminded of my maiden speech in the then Committee on Disarmament in the spring session of 1982.

Fourthly, the review Conference should encourage the revitalization, or creation as appropriate, of the necessary institutional mechanisms for the negotiation of the issues before the CD, which mechanisms would assist, facilitate and advance the negotiating process. The questions of CD expansion, improved and effective functioning, fissile material cut-off, agenda and status of negotiations within the CD, and the appointment or reappointment of special coordinators, coordinators or Friends of the Chair and the like, should be looked into very seriously. Those mechanisms which

(The President)

have been revitalized and are working have my fullest support and encouragement; and now that the Conference has agreed, on 23 March 1995, to create a new ad hoc committee on "cut-off" with a mandate as read out by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, I urge the CD to accelerate the consultative process so that the Chairman of the Committee can be appointed and start tackling, among others, and I underline among others, the problems of stocks and use of fissile materials, both of which are critical aspects of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. I congratulate Ambassador Shannon on his tireless efforts that have resulted in the consensus and thank him and the entire membership of the Conference for this welcome achievement.

Fifthly, the NPT review Conference should aim at achieving nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

As regards expansion in the CD's membership, Ambassador O'Sullivan's list of 23 new member States offers a good basis for a consensus which, I hope, will be achieved soon.

Before I conclude my statement, I should like to say something about the place and role of the mighty continent of Africa in the field of nuclear disarmament. Africa's contribution to the NPT Conference should not be underestimated. The contribution toward the non-proliferation regime is being made regionally through the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is noteworthy that out of the 54 African countries, 50 have already ratified the NPT. They include of course my own country, Kenya, which ratified the Treaty on Thursday, 11 June 1970. Furthermore, a large number of African States have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, as required under the NPT. Thus, Africa will be a crucial factor in the decision-making process during the NPT Conference in New York, given the large number of 50 States which have ratified the Treaty including all the African member States of this very Conference.

On the African front also, progress is being made at two levels: a text on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone has been drafted and the text will be considered and finalized at the next meeting of the Group of Experts set up jointly by OAU and the United Nations. The meeting will be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 29 May to 2 June 1995. And the expert Group will arrange for the treaty to be submitted to the OAU summit to be held in Adis Ababa in June of this year.

Given the great importance Africa attaches to this treaty, I believe that it will receive very serious consideration by the African heads of State or Government. And once endorsed by OAU, the treaty could be regarded as Africa's major contribution to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.

Thus, Your Excellencies and distinguished delegates, we have a formidable international agenda and challenging tasks lying ahead of us, on the eve of the NPT review Conference. I very much hope that you will do me the honour of being the proud President of this august body, under whose stewardship, it will be recorded, that consensus was reached within CD, and on the crucial issues before the NPT Conference. All of us, I repeat, individually and collectively, and the mighty Governments that we represent, and all the other relevant entities and personalities, have a duty to make the NPT Conference a resounding success. We are condemned to succeed, I believe, and as President of this Conference, I would very much prefer that we work out an honest, fair and meaningful package consensus on the issues and activities of the CD mandate which we could brag about at the NPT Conference, and beyond.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Cuba and Brazil and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr President, distinguished colleagues, it is a pleasure for me to take the floor before this Conference at a time when it is being chaired by yourself, with whom we have maintained close and effective relations of cooperation within the United Nations. I wish you every success in your present duties. I would also like to express appreciation to your predecessors for their performance in the Chair.

Last September our delegation to this Conference announced the decision taken by the Cuban Government to sign the treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Today, I have pleasure in reporting that, in pursuance of the commitment entered into by President Fidel Castro Ruz on the occasion of the first Ibero-American summit in Guadalajara, the Cuban Government signed the above-mentioned Treaty on 25 March. On that occasion the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba made the following statement:

> "The Government of the Republic of Cuba declares that the obstacles which have thereto prevented full participation by the Republic of Cuba in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean still obtain and continue to affect Cuban security seriously. The only nuclear Power in this part of the world, the United States of America, is maintaining a policy of hostility against Cuba; it is stepping up its economic, trade and financial blockade; it is reinforcing its campaign against the country and perpetuating, by force and contrary to the will of our people, the illegal occupation of part of our national territory, through which its vessels transit bearing nuclear weapons, a problem whose solution will have to be regarded in the future as a precondition for our country's continued participation in the Treaty."

Cuba has always spoken out against all weapons of mass extermination. No country or group of countries should have a monopoly of such weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, which in our world bring about a privileged status which is in flagrant breach of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. We advocate the total disappearance of nuclear weapons as the sole means of embarking irrevocably on a path leading to lasting peace and security for all on an equal footing. Cuba, which has neither the resources, the technology nor the wish to develop such weapons, did not sign the Treaty of

Tlatelolco earlier for strictly moral reasons and because for many years it found itself in a regional context from which, with the honourable exception of Mexico, attempts were made to isolate it.

Today the situation is different. Major changes have come about on the continent. At present, not only do we have excellent relations with practically all the countries that belong to it, but these relations are becoming closer and more diversified and form an important part of the pattern of changes under way within our country. The remaining Latin American countries, which had not signed the Treaty until recently, have now done so, and as we stated, this fact was a further significant element in the adoption of our decision. It was these considerations which brought about and explain our decision to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. What was an act of unilateral renunciation in another age, in exchange for which we encountered only incomprehension, hostility and threats, now forms part of a qualitatively different regional context.

This gesture by Cuba should therefore be construed as a further expression of my country's determination to become fully integrated in the Latin American and Caribbean community, and confirmation of our confidence in the future of a united Latin America. It is also the reaffirmation by the Government of the Republic of Cuba of the genuinely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We also consider that the verification of the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers under Protocols I and II to this instrument would strengthen confidence that the region is indeed free from nuclear weapons, because renunciation of the nuclear option is not only an obligation on those countries which do not belong to the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Saboia.

Mr. SABOIA (Brazil): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to express my delegation's warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a great pleasure to see in such high office an illustrious representative of Kenya, a country with which Brazil enjoys a long tradition of friendly relations. We have only to benefit from your well-known diplomatic dexterity and commitment to the lofty goals of this Conference in the discharge of your duties. Be assured of the Brazilian delegation's full support in these endeavours. Let me also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi, whose deft handling of the complex issues before this body was further highlighted by the fact that she took up the presidential incumbency only days after assuming her new responsibilities in Geneva as the representative of Japan to the Conference. Ambassador Vattani of Italy also deserves our gratitude and appreciation for his effective leadership in conducting the initial phase of this session. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan as he takes part for the first time at the current session of the CD.

As we near the conclusion of the first part of the 1995 CD session, the Brazilian delegation feels it appropriate to share with members of and participants in the CD our opinion and reflections on certain points and issues which have occupied us for the greater part of the past two months. Before doing so, I wish to take this opportunity to highlight a recent event that my Government finds of particular significance. I refer to the adherence by Cuba to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean - the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Together with the recent decisions on the part of Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and Nevis to join Tlatelolco, the Cuban adherence means the Treaty and its protocols now apply to the whole Latin American and Caribbean region, rendering it in effect a nuclear-weapon-free zone subject to legally binding negative security assurances on the part of the five nuclear-weapon States. Since Brazil was the first country, back in the early 1960s, to propose to the United Nations General Assembly that our region be free of such weapons, it is for us especially gratifying to now witness the fulfilment of that ideal. We thus take great pleasure in congratulating the Cuban delegation for its Government's decision, and in welcoming that nation as a full party to the Treaty.

With regard to issues before the CD, I would first of all like to stress my delegation's satisfaction at the decision taken during our last plenary meeting whereby the Conference established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - the "cut-off" treaty. We owe this historic decision to Ambassador Gerald Shannon's untiring efforts as Special Coordinator for this issue, and no less to his skill, experience and boldness. The very fact that the CD is now in agreement to undertake negotiations on a cut-off treaty has by itself a deep political significance. It is heartening for the international community to know that this body is willing and able to move forward in banning the production of fissile material. However, for all our contentment with what was achieved last week, we must not lose sight of the sobering fact that the treaty's real effectiveness for international disarmament and non-proliferation will be determined by how it will deal not only with future production of fissile material, but also with the existing stockpiles of such material. It is the continued unchecked holdings of large quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that poses the greatest horizontal and vertical proliferation risks. Moreover, how is one to effectively verify compliance with a ban on new production without adequate knowledge of the amounts already in existence? We believe these to be genuine concerns that bear directly upon the scope of the future treaty and therefore merit to be properly considered in the newly established ad hoc committee.

By the very action of establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, this Conference has succeeded in sending a positive message with regard to tackling one fundamental issue subsumed under item 2 of its agenda. Such forthrightness, however, stands in stark contrast to what the CD has been able to achieve so far this session with regard to the establishment of other ad hoc committees or the appointment of special coordinators to deal with equally pressing issues on its agenda. We fail to understand why the decision to re-establish the ad hoc committees on prevention of a nuclear arms race in outer space and on negative security assurances, for which consensus seems secure, has so far not been brought before the Conference to take, or why those issues which - regrettably - may not command consensus at this stage, such as the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments or the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, have not been entrusted to special coordinators. We must also continue to strive for an urgent and appropriate solution to the problem of expansion. Those are questions and responsibilities this Conference and its presidency should not shirk from.

Amidst the frustration of watching this part of the session go by without decisions on many of these issues, we should nevertheless take heart in the prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - indeed a fitting attitude, given the high expectations held by the international community that such a long overdue treaty might finally be within grasp. These expectations were reflected in the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/70, which called upon the CD to proceed to a new phase of negotiation, and through which all CD members, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, were urged to negotiate intensively and to conclude such a treaty. We see the CTB treaty as essentially a political instrument. Commitment to its fundamental objectives and to its early conclusion, particularly on the part of the States with the capacity to test, is thus indispensable for progress to be achieved in the current negotiations. Continued leadership is instrumental in this regard. It has been encouraging to begin this year's session learning of the decisions by the United States to extend its moratorium on testing, to drop its earlier proposal of a special withdrawal provision, and to suggest inter-sessional work. We also welcome President Clinton's repeated calls for achieving a CTB treaty at the earliest possible time.

We believe useful work has overall been achieved this session up to now on the draft CTBT. The coming publication of a revised rolling text should help us gauge progress in terms of brackets removed and of newly drafted or revised text. We owe much of what was achieved to Ambassadors Ludwik Dembinski, Lars Norberg and Jaap Ramaker for the professional and efficient manner in which they have been fulfilling their duties as chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and of the two working groups. We are also indebted to the numerous colleagues who have assisted them as Friends of the Chair or convenors for specific topics. Notwithstanding all these efforts, however, certain positions with regard to key articles being negotiated continue to give rise to concern. On the question of the scope of the treaty, for instance, it seems clear that proposals either to excessively broaden the extent of the ban or to introduce exceptions and limitations to it simply will not command general support, not to speak of the disquieting fact that some of them run counter to the very mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Insistence on such proposals is indeed a worrisome development at this stage. Its only practical effect is that of stalling the whole negotiation, given the fundamental nature of the scope provisions. We believe the way forward on scope is best reflected in document CD/NTB/WP.222, circulated by the Australian delegation, whom we commend for this useful and timely initiative.

Another key element of the treaty is its article on entry into force. It is clear that the credibility and effectiveness of the treaty is contingent upon its universality, or at least upon its acceptance among testing-capable States. The question here is to reconcile this reality with our equally imperative needs to keep the treaty non-discriminatory. We shall be examining carefully all proposals recently put forward which attend to these considerations.

As regards verification, we would first of all like to thank the experts led by Dr. Peter Marshall for all their efforts and for the reports they have recently issued on the results of their work. Even though it was not possible for the expert Group to achieve consensus on a single international monitoring system design as required under the mandate, we nevertheless believe their technical input to be useful for progress in the rolling text. Their reports no doubt provide a solid technical repository which can be drawn upon for the political decisions that are now needed for further drafting progress in the verification provisions of the rolling text. Until such decisions are made we see no reason for further technical discussions on the envisaged verification technologies. With regard to the characteristics of the IMS, we stand by our position that a sophisticated mechanism based on the four technologies such as the one contemplated must provide a solid basis for subsequent technical assessment of the nature of the events it detects, and that the organization must have access to all the required expertise and analytical capability at hand to carry out such an assessment.

It is clear that to make significant strides on issues such as the future CTBT organization, we will need to have a more precise idea on the treaty's verification regime, as well as on the basic undertakings States will be willing to make in articles such as scope and entry into force. For our part, Brazil favours a small, treaty-specific organization which would make full use of existing national or international technical capabilities and would work in close association with other international organizations or agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, by means of specific contracts or agreements. We believe this to be the most advantageous, efficient and cost-effective framework for the future organization.

Our overall assessment of the current first part of this year's session is that it has been encouraging in some respects but deeply disturbing in others. It is our conviction, though, that the negotiating opportunities are there to take. It would be unwise for us to let them pass by. The international community expects no less of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Group's progress report on its fortieth session. This report is contained in document CD/1296.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group held from 20 February to 3 March 1995, with the participation of experts and representatives from 32 countries. The progress report of the meeting is contained in document CD/1296, which has

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

been distributed. I would from the outset like to acknowledge the eminent services by the secretariat that the Group has enjoyed throughout its session. We are truly satisfied at the way it handles our most technical material. The Ad Hoc Group's secretary, Ms. Mackby, has also been instrumental in facilitating increased participation in the Group's experiment through contacts with CD delegations.

The Ad Hoc Group meeting was devoted to reviewing the initial results of the large-scale technical test, usually referred to as GSETT-3, which started its full-scale phase on 1 January 1995. This test is an unprecedented effort to develop, test and evaluate new concepts for an experimental international seismic monitoring system.

I am pleased to report to you that the initial phase of this full-scale operation has started successfully. A fairly large system, containing globally distributed seismological stations, national data centres and an International Data Centre in Arlington, Virginia, United States of America, is up and running. The system is achieving its basic objectives of acquiring, storing, analysing and disseminating data. Bulletins containing the results of the analysis have also been regularly distributed from the International Data Centre to participating national data centres.

The successful start of the experiment is due to the dedicated efforts of hundreds of scientists and technicians at stations and national data centres around the world who have worked very hard to establish and to put their facilities into operation in a coordinated way. Particularly noteworthy is the successful effort to get the International Data Centre into a smooth on-line operation on time.

It is still too early to draw any definite conclusions on the results of GSETT-3 as it has just started. The GSE has established, as you may recall, a working group to continuously evaluate the test as it progresses and the results it produces. The elaborations during the Ad Hoc Group's meeting were based on a preliminary report from this working group and on similar reports from the working groups on planning and operations. A summary of these reports is annexed to the progress report.

The Group of Scientific Experts envisages a network of 60 primary or alpha stations for GSETT-3. The alpha stations comprise the basic network that detects the events. Today we have 49 out of these 60 stations committed, meaning that the countries have made a formal commitment to submit data from those stations. I do hope that the Group, with your cooperation, will be able to obtain participation of the remaining 11 stations as well. Not all of the committed stations are, however, today in operation or connected on-line to the International Data Centre, and in some cases substantial technical work remains. The other network is the supplemental network, which we call the beta network. Here the Group of Scientific Experts has not designed any particular station configuration but we anticipate a well-distributed network of some 150 stations. Today we have 95 such stations committed. Most of these stations are, however, located in Europe and North America, which means that a fair amount of additional beta stations are still needed to obtain adequate geographical coverage. Efforts are still under way to obtain commitments for more such stations, primarily in the southern hemisphere.

When it comes to actual operation, GSETT-3 had by 1 March 76 stations which were actually reporting data on line. An annex to the progress report contains a map showing the locations of the stations. Thirty-two of these stations are alpha stations and 44 are beta stations. The alpha stations are reporting continuously to the International Data Centre, whereas data from the beta stations are automatically requested by the International Data Centres when needed. Quite a substantial amount of information goes into the International Data Centre; it corresponds to about 1 million pages of information every day. The system detects on an average some 60 seismic events every day. Nature has, however, already tested the system by providing more than 200 earthquakes in one single day following a large quake off the coast of New Zealand.

The basic idea with this system and in particular with the International Data Centre is to draw information important for CTBT verification out of this huge amount of reported original data and to condense this information down to something that is manageable - a couple of pages per day. The International Data Centre has been doing an excellent job in actually achieving that. It has managed to cope with this large data flow and to produce bulletins as scheduled. An automatic report is going out within one hour after the occurrence of an event and a more comprehensive bulletin, which is based on analysis by experts, goes out after two days. This information is distributed to the national data centres for their evaluation and assessment.

The International Data Centre is also offering custom-made bulletins that contain just the information that is of interest to a particular participant. The GSETT-3 International Data Centre is not providing identification of detected seismic events, but will soon calculate and compile agreed parameters, which characterize the observed signals and which may assist participating countries in identifying the source of the event.

The International Data Centre, which is a key facility for GSETT-3, has presently a staff of 47 people; 10 of these are internationally recruited for limited time. The Group is most satisfied to have this international staffing of the Centre, which contributes to the spreading of knowledge about International Data Centre operations to many countries. The operation at the International Data Centre is continuously expanding and improving as more and more stations are coming on line. I am also pleased to report that the communication system that used to be a bottleneck is now functioning very well and we now have on-line computer-to-computer connections between essentially all the participants in the experiment.

In setting up such a large experiment as GSETT-3 you need extensive documentation to advise the various operators in the system at the stations, the International Data Centre and the national data centres on what they should do. The Group has developed extended documentation that could also be a good basis for establishing the operational manuals to guide the practical operation of the IMS system that you finally decide to establish.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The system being tested during GSETT-3 is evolutionary in nature. Additional stations, improved instrumentation and new processing methods are expected to be incorporated as the test progresses. The GSE is conducting ongoing assessment of various system components during GSETT-3. Results will be continually incorporated into the system to improve its performance so that the system will be capable of providing the Conference on Disarmament with information and experience relevant to the establishment and operation of a future system for monitoring a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Group of Scientific Experts considers that the GSETT-3 system is already providing an infrastructure in the form of technical facilities, including education and training of personnel, which would facilitate the implementation of a monitoring system. GSETT-3 is also providing experience with data services that will be needed by the national verification programmes of the participating States.

GSETT-3 has proven to be useful for the work conducted by the International Monitoring System Expert Group in evaluating options for a future seismic monitoring system. While the scope of GSETT-3 is limited to seismic monitoring, the GSETT-3 system design is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data also from non-seismic techniques such as radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound.

The Group also discussed its future plans for GSETT-3. The Group agreed that continuation of GSETT-3 for an extended period of time along the operational plans outlined in CD/1254 would be important to progressively modify the system to meet the international monitoring system (IMS) design, as decisions are made by the CD on the seismic component of a future IMS. This would also ensure continued training of an international staff and continued provision of practical advice to the CD. In addition, the GSE could cooperate in experiments to demonstrate the synergy between the seismic IMS and other non-seismic IMS components, if requested by the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their national facilities and communications links at least through 1996.

It was noted that a technical upgrade is needed for some of the stations envisioned as part of the GSETT-3 monitoring network (CD/1254). It is also of great importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission from existing stations and for the establishment and operation of new stations in areas where the GSETT-3 coverage today is inadequate. Countries are encouraged to support by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

As to the interaction with the nuclear test ban Committee, the Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of its Working Group on Verification. Upon invitation by the Chairman, I gave a presentation to the Working Group on the GSETT-3 experiment.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 7 to 18 August 1995. The main task during the next session will be to review and evaluate results from the full-scale phase of GSETT-3. The Group is prepared to meet during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament if so requested by the CD in view of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Dahlman for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. With regard to the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of document CD/1296 to the effect that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group will be held from 7 to 18 August 1995, these dates will have to be agreed to by the Conference and it is my intention to ask for such a decision to be taken at the plenary next Thursday, 6 April.

I do not have any more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor in my capacity as representative of the depositary Government for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). But before doing so allow me to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference and to extend to you the wholehearted cooperation of the Mexican delegation. We wish to place on record our appreciation for the way in which the distinguished representative of Japan presided over our work in the past four weeks. We welcome the colleagues who have recently arrived, including of course Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, who took his place in this room this morning.

We listened with particular satisfaction this morning to the statement by the distinguished representative of Cuba, our friend Ambassador José Pérez Novoa. We welcome the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by Cuba on 25 March, on the very eve of the fourteenth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), which is taking place this week in Viña del Mar in Chile. This completes the cycle which began in 1967 with the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region. As the Treaty now comes into full effect for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and with the accession last week by Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia, the zone of application of the Treaty covers 25 million square kilometres inhabited by more than 450 million human beings. Mexico welcomed this event of particular significance for our entire region in the person of my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, José Angel Gurría, at the signing ceremony in Havana. In the words of the Foreign Minister, "Mexico values Cuba's accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a renewed demonstration of Cuba's willingness to subscribe to the consensus positions reached by Latin America and the Caribbean", and he added that this was "clear proof of Cuba's resolve to stress dialogue and negotiation as essential elements of international coexistence".

For more than 30 years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been convinced that military denuclearization is the right path for achieving a truly secure world. The consolidation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our region is the clearest evidence of our rejection of a concept of peace which is based on an alleged nuclear balance or a threat of mutual annihilation. We congratulate the Cuban Government on its decision to join an authentic and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons. Our region has practised what it preaches. Alfonso García Robles would be very pleased.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. BISHOP (Canada): Mr. President, my delegation would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the CD presidency at this important period and to assure you of my delegation's full support throughout your presidency. I would also like to pay tribute to the effective and productive way in which your predecessor, Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, undertook her duties over the last month, especially as a newcomer here. My delegation would also like to thank both you and Ambassador Saboia for the kind remarks directed towards Ambassador Shannon and assure you both that they will, of course, be conveyed to him.

The purpose of my asking for the floor today is simply to take the opportunity to announce that my delegation is in the process of having distributed the papers from the Toronto Cut-off Workshop which took place from 16 to 19 January 1995. They are presented with the particular attention of allowing those who could not be present to benefit from the results of the Workshop. The Canadian Government would like to express special thanks to those here who presented papers at the Workshop and otherwise contributed to the success there.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. This completes the list of speakers for today.

As delegations are aware, despite the measure of progress already achieved in the Conference so far, there remain a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session. These pending issues continue to be the subject of intensive consultations and I am sure that with further effort and good will the Conference will succeed in resolving them.

The secretariat has, at my request, circulated a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference during next week, which will also be the last week of the first part of its 1995 session. This was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is tentative and subject to change, if necessary. On this basis, may I consider that the timetable is acceptable to the Conference? This seems to be the case.

The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 April 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.705
6 April 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 705th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner, who will be our first speaker today. His long experience in multilateral diplomacy is well known both as a representative of his country to the United Nations in Geneva and New York as well as his long and high-level association with the United Nations Secretariat. I am all the more happy to welcome Ambassador Wyzner as I had the privilege of serving my own country as Ambassador in Poland and I can also speak some Polish. I am sure that we are all looking forward to Ambassador Wyzner's statement with great interest.

I also have on my list of speakers the representatives of Egypt, Kazakhstan, Morocco, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, China, India, the Russian Federation and Nigeria, and I understand that Myanmar will speak on behalf of the Group of 21.

Before giving the floor to the speakers inscribed today, please allow me to say a few words of farewell to one of our most distinguished colleagues. As you are aware, this is the last time that Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico will be among us, as he has been called to other, important duties by his Government after five years as Mexico's representative to the Conference. I do not need to dwell on the impact that, together with his delegation, he has had on this Conference. His commitment to the cause of disarmament has never wavered and is well known to all of us. This forum has benefited considerably from the depth and candour of his contributions to our work. Ambassador Marín Bosch was instrumental in bringing about the Conference's long-held objective of establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a negotiating mandate for the first time. As Chairman of that Committee, he brought a high degree of dedication and dynamism which has provided a good foundation on which the negotiations are now proceeding. I am sure I interpret the sentiments of all of you when I say that we will miss his forthrightness, his humour and his warmth. I should like to extend to Ambassador Marín Bosch and his family all our best wishes for the future.

It now gives me great pleasure to give the floor to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner.

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): Mr. President, I am indeed most grateful for your kind words of welcome. Dziękuję bardzo, Panie Przewodniczący (Thank you very much, Mr. President). Let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is good to know that at this important time the CD can rely for leadership on a skilled negotiator and a distinguished representative of Kenya, a country known for its dedication to the cause of disarmament. For us it is especially satisfying to see the helm of this body in the hands of a good friend of Poland and a fluent speaker of Polish. May I also associate this delegation with the words of appreciation expressed to your distinguished predecessor, the Ambassador of Japan, Her Excellency Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi, for the competent and courteous manner in which she discharged her Presidential responsibilities last month? I would also like to associate myself with your words addressed to Ambassador Marín Bosch, with whom I had the distinguished pleasure to work in this Conference many years ago in the 1970s.

My warm greetings go also to an old friend and a former colleague, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, as well as to the Deputy Secretary-General of the CD, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

To strike a personal note, I am indeed delighted to be back at the CD, after years of service as Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I deem it a privilege to be able to address the Conference on Disarmament at a moment in time when yet another highly productive CTBT negotiating session is coming to an end. It is also a time when our minds increasingly turn to another crucially important occasion - the NTP review and extension Conference. That its positive outcome will have important implications for the future of the Treaty, for non-proliferation and for nuclear disarmament at large, is beyond question. I am sure that its significance for the ultimate success of the CTBT negotiating process will not escape any member of this venerable body either. My country is honoured by the challenging role in that process which the Conference on Disarmament has entrusted to Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski. We are fully conscious of the demands and responsibilities which go with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Polish delegation shall spare no effort to live up to the confidence bestowed upon it.

Poland's consistent support of the NPT stems from our considered view that it is a bulwark of the non-proliferation regime which has stood the test of time and that it represents a crucial factor of global security. Like many other States parties we, therefore, consider that the Treaty deserves to be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. Failure to do so would erode the Treaty's credibility and lead to uncertainty and apprehensions about the future of non-proliferation. International security, be it global or regional, would not be more stable today if no Treaty had been concluded 25 years ago. By the same token, the world's political and security environment in the days ahead will not improve, and the globe will not become a safer place, if the Treaty fails to emerge from the review process significantly strengthened.

It is true, though regrettable, that a number of important States are still staying away from the NPT. Indeed, we urge them to reconsider their stance and accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Thanks to the recent accessions of Ukraine, Algeria and Argentina, to mention just a few, this accord has become one of the most universally embraced international instruments. In our view, there are good security reasons underlying this near-universality of the NPT. They go far beyond NPT's intrinsic merits.

Poland has welcomed with particular satisfaction the adherence of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear State party. Notwithstanding the obvious implications of this act for stability and security in Europe, and particularly in our immediate neighbourhood, it has broader, global significance. It is generally believed, for instance, that the ratification will enable the entry into force of START I, thus paving the way for early ratification and the subsequent entry into force of START II. Recent official indications from Moscow and Washington suggest, moreover, that once START II is ratified, the United States and Russia would address the possibility of additional reductions and limitations on remaining nuclear forces.

These two unprecedented nuclear disarmament treaties manifest most eloquently that the commitments undertaken in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty are being fulfilled in good faith. They prove that the nuclear arms race, once mind-boggling, has not only ceased but has been reversed. It was, therefore, quite appropriate for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to state in his message to the Conference on Disarmament that "further progress in the reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation is no longer beyond the reach of reality". In the Secretary-General's view, such progress would enable other nuclear-weapon States to move forward the process of nuclear disarmament, thus making yet another contribution to the establishment of a safer world.

The Conference on Disarmament has been focusing its attention on the question of a comprehensive test ban. Let me dwell briefly on this critically important endeavour. The opening of the multilateral negotiations on a CTBT last year testifies to the determination of the five declared nuclear States to control the nuclear genie in the face of growing threats it poses. The joint political resolve of these States to seek a comprehensive test ban as the top priority in disarmament agenda reflects their readiness to engage in a multilateral, cooperative effort to enhance the global security environment, consistent with commitments contracted under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament must not miss and, indeed, it is not missing the window of opportunity thus created. As the first part of the CD session comes to a close, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban can take well-deserved credit for important headway made in its negotiating effort. While it is clear from the revised rolling text of the draft treaty that some of the fundamental and sensitive issues are yet to be agreed upon, the results obtained are positive. At least one dividend from the negotiations pursued in the CD is already there - the nuclear test sites, or almost all of them, have been inactive under standing test moratoria. Hopefully, by the time the 1995 session comes to an end, the Conference on Disarmament will have elaborated an agreed draft CTBT text that will render all such test sites inactive forever.

Early progress towards this goal will certainly call for determination, good will and flexibility on the part of all negotiating delegations. Without the necessary spirit of compromise and accommodation, it may be next to impossible to cleanse the CTBT rolling text where it is still heavily bracketed. Flexibility, good will and political resolve are especially critical when it comes to issues that are pivotal to the future treaty - the provisions on scope, duration, entry into force, verification and institutional arrangements.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

Poland is on record as a consistent supporter of a good treaty, rather than a quick one. In our view, the future CTBT must be comprehensive and goal-specific. It must ban all nuclear tests, everywhere and for all time, in a manner that leaves no loopholes whatsoever. No more, no less. These criteria would certainly not be met if an omnibus accord were sought in the expectation that it could provide a cure-all remedy for all disarmament ills. We deem it neither appropriate nor possible for the treaty prohibitions to apply to activities which are not verifiable, such as computer simulations, or ones which are either vaguely defined or hypothetical. Such a ban could undermine the overall credibility and effectiveness of the treaty.

We look forward to early progress in efforts to work out agreed language on the basic obligations. In this regard the consultations pursued by the nuclear-weapon States are of special importance.

Poland firmly opts for a CTBT of indefinite duration. No short-term nuclear test ban would represent a satisfactory measure as a step to check proliferation of nuclear arms. The withdrawal by the United States of its proposal allowing a comparatively easy exit from the CTBT, in favour of the standard clause invoking "supreme interests", goes in the right direction. We welcome this example of flexibility. We hope that it will be a sustained factor to be emulated by other negotiators.

We are encouraged by the progress made in regard to the entry-into-force formula. Being flexible as to the number of ratifications necessary in order to bring the treaty into effect, Poland is of the view that the possible condition in this case could be ratification by the five nuclear States as well as those States which, according to IAEA, possess nuclear research or power reactors. Here we share the views of those States which favour an early entry into force of the treaty yet insist that care must be taken to prevent even a remote possibility of the treaty being held hostage by any one State or group of States.

We have no doubt that the international monitoring system now being elaborated will enable effective detection of non-compliance. Its technical capabilities, supplemented by procedures for prompt, mandatory on-site inspections, consultation and clarification as well as national implementation measures, will add up to an effective verification system. Cost-effectiveness of the "four-pillar" IMS regime would be an important consideration and an evident asset.

In our view, the future CTBT-implementing organization of a reasonable size, co-located with IAEA in Vienna and enjoying a functional relationship with the Agency, would best correspond to the criteria of an impartial mechanism that is operationally effective and independent, whose costs would keep the financial implications for States parties within a tolerable range. We welcome the offer of the Government of Austria to host the CTBT organization in its capital.

The momentum generated in the CTBT negotiations has created a climate conducive to the pursuit of the broader objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. The Government of Poland is gratified that this momentum has not been lost and that consensus has been reached by the Conference on Disarmament to seek a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thus a step has been made providing conditions in which States parties to the NPT can go on, in good faith, to discharge their responsibilities under article VI of that Treaty.

We commend Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the CD Coordinator on cut-off, for his dedicated efforts in this respect. They led him to work out a mandate that has proved acceptable to all delegations. Based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, it has enabled the Conference to establish an appropriate Ad Hoc Committee. Without in any way prejudging the outcome of negotiations before they could commence, the mandate provides a framework wherein different aspects of the cut-off issue can be addressed. In the meantime this new negotiating process will hopefully encourage self-restraint measures. The welcome precedent in this respect is the recent withdrawal by the United States of 200 tons of fissile materials from its nuclear stockpile.

Like many CD members and observers, we recognize that it is proper and legitimate for this body to focus its attention on arms control and disarmament in the nuclear field. While concentrating on this area the Conference on Disarmament must not, however, lose sight of the other agenda items it dealt with last year: transparency in armaments, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Let me recall, in this connection, that Poland has always believed it important for the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States over their security to be adequately addressed. As a non-nuclear State herself, Poland has a vested interest in urging attention to these concerns. It is, therefore, with great satisfaction that we welcome the unanimous action which the five nuclear States - the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - are about to take. It demonstrates that they are prepared to extend security assurances to States that have forsworn a nuclear arms race under the NPT. We find this action timely and consistent with the letter and spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty.

We believe that a situation emerges in the Conference on Disarmament which should be conducive to bringing balance to its agenda. The terms of reference under which this body operates must reflect better the disarmament realities of the post-cold-war era. In our view, the CD needs to respond to the anxieties generated by the present-day threats to international security, regional conflicts in the first place. My Government believes, that however legitimate our concern over nuclear disarmament may be, nothing can justify continued failure to address conventional arms. Since the nuclear era began half a century ago, conventional arms, from aircraft, tanks, artillery and land-mines down to booby traps, machine-guns, rifles and machetes, have exacted a heavy toll. Death and suffering have been showered on millions of human beings, mainly non-combatant civilians, primarily old and infirm, women and children. The threat posed by conventional arms cannot be ignored any further.

The early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, with an appropriate mandate accommodating all points of view, or any other mode of dealing with the issue, would, therefore, be a step in the right direction. In his message to the CD which I referred to a while ago, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also urged the Conference on Disarmament to continue efforts to develop universal, non-discriminatory, practical means to increase openness and transparency in military matters. In his view - which we fully share - the Conference has not entirely exhausted its potential in the field of TIA. Openness and transparency in the conventional area are the keys to enhanced trust and confidence. Without them, efforts to promote a cooperative security architecture, globally or regionally, are unlikely to inspire confidence.

There is a wealth of ideas and proposals which have been submitted to the TIA Ad Hoc Committee, including those on the possible expansion and improvement of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. They have not been explored in depth, as they should have been. Providing for an early opportunity to address in earnest the broad and varied question of conventional arms by the CD would introduce the indispensable element of balance to its agenda. What is also important, such a step would vindicate the standing of the CD as a time-tested forum for multilateral arms negotiations which is in close touch with present-day realities.

Let me also take this opportunity to refer to an issue actively pursued in Geneva, though not in the CD context. I mean anti-personnel land-mines. Poland attaches particular importance to this issue. For us it has two specific connotations: one of a historic nature, another of a more recent character. The minefields, in Poland a deadly legacy of World War II, are still claiming - as they have for the last 50 years - a toll of killed and maimed, mostly children. The "killing fields" elsewhere are a daily threat to the personnel of the United Nations peace-keeping operations, including its sizeable Polish component. We, therefore, note with satisfaction the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Pending successful conclusion of these efforts, we see a pressing need for much wider ratification of the Convention and its three protocols. An immediate improvement of the situation can result from moratoria imposed on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. Like some other countries Poland has observed such a moratorium in practice for the last two years and shall introduce in the near future an appropriate legal act to that effect.

In a few weeks the future of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty will be determined. This year may also witness the implementation of START I and the ratification of START II, the treaties that will reduce by two thirds the inventory of strategic warheads deployed at the end of the cold war. The year 1995 may, moreover, see the chemical weapons Convention go into effect as a result of the growing rate of ratifications. In their number will soon be the instrument of ratification submitted by my country. Efforts will also continue to enhance the effectiveness of the biological weapons Convention by providing it with a legally binding compliance verification mechanism, a goal to which Poland is strongly committed. It is evident, then, that the current year will be one of important events in the area of international security, arms control and disarmament. For Poland their significance is unmistakable and fully consonant with our stated intention to seek integration with the Atlantic Alliance - the principal factor of stability and security in Europe.

To conclude, let me express the conviction that the successful elaboration of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the productive pursuit of a fissionable material cut-off agreement will come as further confirmation of the important role which this body has been playing and will have to play in the years ahead. I am confident that the Conference on Disarmament will go on discharging its role in that respect most commendably.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland for his statement and for his kind words to me. Bardzo dziękuję za bardzo ważny statement (Thank you very much for the very important statement).

We have a long list of speakers for this morning. As of now, the list stands at 15 or 16 and may grow. This means that we should be prepared to meet again this afternoon if need be, which would be at 3.30 p.m., but as I said, if need be. So let us wait and see how the situation will be by 1 p.m.

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, let me start by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am gratified to see a fellow African occupying such an important position. You personally, Ambassador Don Nanjira, have played an important role, inter alia, in the preparations for the World Conference on Human Rights, the coordination of African positions in WIPO and the Trade and Development Board, until last week, and at other events. You also come from a fraternal African State with which Egypt has links of cooperation and lasting friendship. It is now your turn to make your contribution in the field of disarmament as President of the Conference. I wish you every success in your mission and I can promise you full cooperation from the Egyptian delegation. I would be remiss if I did not also thank Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan for her commendable endeavours during her term of office. We also wish to welcome most warmly among us Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, with whom we have cooperated in the past, and whose presence here at the Conference on Disarmament will surely enrich our deliberations.

Before dealing with the subject-matter that this statement is essentially devoted to, I would like to express our satisfaction at the recent adherence of Cuba to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty and its protocols henceforth apply throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. For Egypt, such a development is all the more significant given the ongoing efforts made by Egypt and other countries to establish, in the Middle East, a zone free from nuclear weapons and indeed from all weapons of mass destruction. We hope that these efforts will soon bear fruit and that positive progress will be achieved towards the creation of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the decision taken by the African summit held in Cairo in 1964. We are now on the eve of the Conference to review and extend the non-proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

It is, we feel, timely to put on record Egypt's position with respect to the decision by the Conference on Disarmament, in its plenary of 23 March, to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the outset, it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge with appreciation the role played by Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, whose tireless efforts in this regard have finally been crowned with success. Nevertheless a long road lies before us, and much work will need to be done if we are to achieve the objective for which that Committee was established.

After the Conference on Disarmament adopted the report submitted by Ambassador Shannon, a number of delegations felt it necessary to set forth, for the record, their understanding of the circumstances which made it possible for the Conference on Disarmament to adopt, by consensus, his report on this issue. The Egyptian delegation for its part views the report presented by Ambassador Shannon as a comprehensive and integrated document. Thus, the three points quoted from the text of resolution 48/75 L cannot be viewed in isolation from the three paragraphs that immediately follow, or from those that precede them. Plainly, the report of Ambassador Shannon as a whole represents, in our view, the mandate of the said Ad Hoc Committee.

The Egyptian delegation joined the consensus on Ambassador Shannon's report notwithstanding the fact that it does not reflect, in the clearest of terms, our main preoccupations and concerns. We are well aware of the fact that some other delegations also joined the consensus in a spirit of compromise. We are hopeful that the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee will, given the necessary political will and commitment, allow for a convergence of views which, in turn, will translate into rapid progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

I would like at this stage to outline, in general terms, what it is that Egypt expects from the Ad Hoc Committee on a fissile material ban, which will carry out its work, as we understand it, under item 2 of the Conference on Disarmament agenda currently entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". We view the issue of a fissile material ban from both a disarmament and a non-proliferation perspective. We aspire to a result from our work which will not merely freeze an existing situation but will go beyond such a laudable, though modest objective. A ban encompassing only future production of weapons-usable fissile materials (i.e. a strictly non-proliferation approach to the issue) would clearly imply that existing stocks are perceived by those who own them as having a role to play in the future. Such an implication does not reassure those who feel threatened by nuclear weapons and who would like to see them banned. This is not new, this is in compliance with the objective of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, excluding stocks from the scope of the Ad Hoc Committee's deliberations would be tantamount to consolidating the status quo for nuclear-weapon States and rewarding undeclared nuclear-weapon States. The latter, who have remained outside the NPT, will legitimately conclude, yet again, that it is ultimately their interests which are being served and safeguarded, and not those of countries which have renounced the nuclear option and which joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, faithfully abiding by their obligations deriving from that Treaty and accepting international supervision.

It is worthwhile in this respect to recall that General Assembly resolution 48/75 L recommended the negotiation of a "treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". It did not use the word "future" to qualify the term "production" and it is for this reason that we, together with others, voted in favour of that resolution. A ban which would cover both past as well as future production (i.e. the disarmament approach) would not only indicate that there is a clear and unequivocal commitment from all States to engage in meaningful nuclear disarmament, but would also avoid giving the impression that it is advantageous to remain outside the NPT and to pursue, in all impunity, a clandestine, extremely dangerous and sometimes purposefully ambiguous nuclear programme.

It is clear from the above that we view the scope of a fissile material ban as a comprehensive and all-encompassing one which must address production and cover stockpiles as well, because, as mentioned above, it was in that spirit and on that understanding that we joined the consensus on resolution 48/75 L in 1993.

During the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee we will also have to agree on what exactly is meant by "fissile material", and we will also have to determine whether or not a clear distinction can always be made between so-called "civilian" fissile materials on the one hand and "military" fissile materials on the other. It is our view that the Ad Hoc Committee on a fissile material ban will have to address all fissile materials which could be used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Special attention will have to be given to the question of dual-use materials such as plutonium and uranium. The objective we should aim for is to prohibit comprehensively all fissile materials capable of being used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

Verification is also a complex issue which will have to be dealt with. In this context it is clear that stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials which exist in many parts of the world will have to be declared and inventoried. Such a step would serve as the basis for any verification regime. In the absence of verifiable inventories of weapons-usable fissile materials there will be no clear-cut way of ascertaining, in cases of doubt or suspicion, whether the fissile materials in question were produced or otherwise acquired (for instance, transferred or purchased) after the entry into force of the projected treaty or whether they had been produced or otherwise acquired prior to that time. Naturally, declarations and detailed inventories of existing fissile materials would represent only the first steps in a series of measures to be agreed which would ultimately result in the placing of all weapons-useable materials under international control. To this end, the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency will need to be enhanced. All fissile materials capable of being used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices should be subjected to an improved comprehensive safeguard mechanism of the Agency. Such a mechanism should include regular monitoring and challenge inspections if necessary, covering all fissile material production and storage facilities in all States and at all times, bearing in mind the importance of full implementation of the provisions of article IV of the NPT, which does permit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

These were some general remarks which reflect our basic thinking on the issue of a fissile material ban and which represent the general framework within which we intend to deal with this important issue. We look forward to hearing the views of others and to engaging in frank dialogue and businesslike negotiations in order to fulfil the Committee's mandate, which the Conference on Disarmament agreed to at its plenary session on 23 March this year. Our views on this issue coincide with those of a considerable number of delegations in the Conference on Disarmament, as most recently reflected in the statement of Ambassador Saboia of Brazil before the CD's plenary on 30 March. They are also in keeping with the letter and spirit of part V of the final document (CD 1261) adopted by consensus at the Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Cairo in 1994, which stated:

> "The Ministers [that is to say the Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement] considered that a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation ..."

For the record, I would also like to state that the start of negotiations on a fissile material ban under item 2 of the Conference on Disarmament agenda should in no way prejudice the Egyptian request, supported by the Group of 21, for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with a separate item on nuclear disarmament. This request remains valid, and if no consensus exists on the establishment of the said ad hoc committee now, then at the very least special coordinators should be appointed without further delay to deal with this issue as well as that of the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, in keeping with Conference practice.

The negotiations currently being conducted by the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear test ban are unfortunately proceeding at a slower pace than we had expected. We are fully aware of the difficulty of the negotiations; however, we also feel very strongly that more progress could have been achieved during the first part of the 1995 CD session in order to give a positive signal on the subject to the NPT review and extension Conference which will start in just a few days now on 17 April. We hope that it will be possible to make up for this delay, that the negotiations will proceed more swiftly during the second part of the session of the CD and that serious inter-sessional work will bring us significantly closer to our objective, namely conclusion of the negotiations on the treaty in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In this respect I wish to highlight one issue which is of particular concern to my delegation and to a considerable number of CD members, namely the scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. A nuclear test ban must be comprehensive in scope and should not allow for any nuclear explosions to take place under any pretext, i.e., whether for peaceful or other purposes. To allow for exceptions would run fundamentally counter to the spirit of our negotiations, and we sincerely hope that those who advocate such exceptions will review their positions so that the necessary political will and the needed good faith can exist in order to achieve a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, thereby substantially strengthening the NPT.

On the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference the issue of security assurances is on everyone's mind. However, no credible and satisfactory assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons yet exist and the political will to provide them is not yet available. What we need is real and not solely formal assurances. We reiterate that the acceptable solution to this problem is the negotiation, on a multilateral basis, of a legally binding international instrument under which those who have renounced the nuclear option would be given comprehensive positive as well as negative security assurances. An even better solution to this question would be nuclear disarmament, total nuclear disarmament, through the full application of article VI of the NPT. We have said this on several occasions. If there is opposition to any amendment of the NPT on the grounds that it is a legally binding internationally negotiated instrument, we could have a protocol which could be negotiated and annexed to the NPT. Several delegations share this view, which was expressed at the last meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, and we also stated this at the third Prepcom prior to the Conference to review and extend the NPT. This continues to be our position on the matter.

As a member of the Group of 21 I cannot end my statement without paying a special tribute to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, the permanent representative of Mexico, who is attending this his last plenary meeting prior to leaving Geneva. Ambassador Bosch's participation in the work of the Conference on Disarmament will be sorely missed. I wish him, his family and his country, Mexico, every success and well-being for the future, and I hope that his country will be able to find a worthy successor to him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan, Ambassador Kabdrakhmanov.

Mr. KABDRAKHMANOV (Kazakhstan) (translated from French): First of all allow me to convey the gratitude of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Conference on Disarmament for the good will shown in solving the question of our country's joining this highly reputed international organization. The presence of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an observer in the Conference on Disarmament is testimony to the ever-growing role of Kazakhstan in consolidating global security. It is at the same time a sufficient appreciation of the efforts made by our country to guarantee the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass extermination and the disarmament process.

Events in the last decade have shown that the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is becoming quite real and continuous and endangers general security. The development and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missile technologies have an influence on the economic, political, social and military aspects of international life today. That is why, since it acquired sovereignty, Kazakhstan has attached a great deal of importance to the work done by the Conference on Disarmament which is a multilateral negotiating body. Kazakhstan has acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It is a party to the Treaty for the reduction and limitation of strategic arms. It has signed the Convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The Republic is also involved in other disarmament processes. Kazakhstan also attaches importance to the signing of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, especially in the light of the international situation during the run-up to the Conference for the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. We support the focusing of negotiations in the context of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in order to conclude a universal and verifiable treaty. There is no doubt that a treaty of this nature could become an effective instrument to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and contribute to nuclear disarmament and thus to the consolidation of peace and overall security.

(continued in Russian)

The voice of a representative of Kazakhstan is being heard here for the first time today at a session of the Conference on Disarmament. That is why I have been brief in my statement. In the future we shall try to live up to the trust placed in us and contribute to solving problems which are of urgent interest for individual regions and for the world community as a whole. Our President, Mr. Nazarbaev, intends to take part in one of the Conference's sessions and deliver an address on these issues.

Kazakhstan considers that it is difficult to overestimate the contribution made by the Conference on Disarmament to the strengthening of international security and stability. Its work covers a wide range of issues including nuclear security guarantees, transparency in armaments and the prevention of an arms race in outer space - practically all the issues of multilateral control over armaments and disarmament. Ample testimony is provided by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention prohibiting environmental modification for military or other hostile purposes, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament will promote the further strengthening of overall security in the interests of the international community.

In conclusion, Sir, I would like to wish you success in your responsible position.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kazakhstan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in your duties. I also would like to take this opportunity to convey my warm thanks and those of my delegation to Ambassador Kurokochi for the patient and effective work she accomplished during her term of office. My wishes for success also go to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

We are also very alive to the significance of the departure of Ambassador Marín Bosch. Of course, I did not have an opportunity to get to know him all that well, but his reputation is there - he played an outstanding role in the work of the Conference, particularly as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Hence our best wishes for success go to him in his new duties and in his personal life. I would also like to take this opportunity to convey a formal welcome to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan.

It is a truism to say nowadays that the Conference on Disarmament is at a crucial point in its existence. Multilateral disarmament issues are more than ever at the centre of attention. The turning-point marked by the holding of the NPT extension Conference is an eloquent example of this and it is in the clear interest of the entire international community to contribute to it, in a spirit of compromise and understanding, in order to ensure the extension of this Treaty. My delegation has always considered that this Treaty played a fundamental role in nuclear non-proliferation. The regime attached to this Treaty must continue to produce its effects and to be applied universally. In our view, and as His Majesty Hassan II has underlined in recent statements, the wisest way of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation is to guarantee its universality, so that the security needs of all States parties are taken into account. To this end, two principles should be taken into consideration. The purpose of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is to ensure that nuclear disarmament becomes an irreversible process. It is a matter of vital importance to all mankind which must therefore be dealt with in a thorough fashion during the New York Conference. The efforts already made by certain nuclear Powers, inter alia through the signing of the START I and START II agreements, are encouraging. These efforts must form part of an overall approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament, the ultimate purpose of which is to dismantle the whole array of existing nuclear arsenals.

In our view the NPT is also intended to permit the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful and exclusively peaceful purposes. That is why we believe that the decisions taken at the Conference for the review and extension of this Treaty should reflect the possibility of further developing cooperation among the parties concerned by this type of cooperation, under the supervision of IAEA, whose safeguards are essential to the entire system. They affect the very credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

I would also like to venture a number of comments on the work of the Conference on Disarmament itself, the success of which partially depends on the outcome of the work on the NPT. Today, after the adoption of the Convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons and the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear test ban, we can only welcome the direction taken by the Conference in a number of areas, despite the obstacles encountered here and there. In this connection, my delegation fully shares the view that the work on the nuclear-test-ban treaty must accentuate the role of a negotiating body that the Conference on Disarmament has been assigned. This text should comprehensively ban all nuclear tests once and for all. Of course, such a prohibition would lack credibility if it were not backed up by verification and monitoring machinery in order to ensure that the treaty is properly applied, satisfying the expectations and concerns of all. Hence we feel that the idea of basing the verification system on methods of detecting seismic events is the most realistic one, in view of the experience already acquired with the use of such methods and its reliability.

With respect to the other planned techniques or so-called non-seismic methods, the gradual approach based on selective use of such methods seems to be the most well-founded, given the urgent need to reduce the total costs of these operations.

The sought-after adoption of the nuclear-test-ban treaty must above all mark a decisive step in the context of nuclear disarmament. This at least is our view of the matter. Indeed, our approach is justified not merely by the expected impact of such a ban in terms of experiments with nuclear weapons, but also the hope which should be aroused for a redefinition of choices by the nuclear Powers. Naturally, we are also very alive to the arguments seeking to make this ban a decisive element in the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The danger of seeing this regime, so vital to international security, weaken, exists, and one cannot underestimate the dangers of proliferation which could result from a failure or any thoughtless delay in the negotiations. That is why the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Dembinski, deserves all our support in his plan to present, within a short deadline, a rolling text which would come as close as possible to the ultimate version we would arrive at.

The question of the provision of security assurances also figures among the priorities on which we should focus our efforts. This is a matter of fundamental importance, since we believe it is closely linked to the outcome of the NPT extension Conference and the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear States. We think that the time has come to end the long debate on this subject and to make practical proposals for the definition and the scope of these guarantees. We have always expressed our preference for a legally binding instrument in this field. We hope to see this objective achieved during the discussions which will deal with the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

By pursuing intensive activities in the areas already mentioned, and soon, we hope, also in that of prohibition of the production of fissile materials, the Conference is demonstrating its credibility and its unique role in multilateral disarmament. The audience it has acquired and the interest it has aroused should steer us towards the adoption of a rapid decision on its expansion. In this respect we continue to view the so-called O'Sullivan proposal as one which is balanced and offers the Conference a highly appropriate membership in the work that awaits us. This matter has gone on only too long, and the time has come for wisdom to prevail and to open the way to a composition of the Conference that properly reflects the new international realities which we cannot disregard. The Conference would therefore be well advised to designate speedily a special coordinator who would continue consultations in order to remove the remaining obstacles to expansion.

My delegation also notes with regret the delay in the resumption of the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a number of items appearing on its agenda. For our part, the Moroccan delegation has energetically supported since the outset the principle of re-establishing all the ad hoc committees dealing with these matters, as well as the commencement of discussions on the review of the agenda and ways of improving the effectiveness of the Conference. We can only express the hope that with the resumption of our present session and after the hopefully satisfactory conclusion of the NPT Conference, we will be in a position to give fresh momentum to our work, refraining - and I think I can emphasize this - refraining from giving undue importance to organizational and procedural matters.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, may I first of all express my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I can assure you the fullest cooperation of my delegation, and I wish you success as we pursue our important work.

Yesterday in Washington, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set forth, on behalf of President Clinton, United States policy on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our policy on security assurances is presented in the form of a declaration by the President.

In view of the Conference on Disarmament's great interest in security assurances, it is my privilege today to place this declaration on the record of the Conference. I begin with the text that the Secretary of State used in introducing the President's declaration.

> "The United States believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international conventions and treaties seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a cornerstone of global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a central element of this regime. 5 March 1995 was the twenty-fifth anniversary of its entry into force, an event commemorated by President Clinton in a speech in Washington on 1 March 1995. A conference to decide on extension of the Treaty will begin in New York City on 17 April 1995. The United States considers the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without conditions as a matter of the highest national priority and will continue to pursue all appropriate efforts designed to achieve that outcome.

> "It is important that all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to this Treaty.
>
> "As a nuclear-weapon State the United States has consistently recognized its responsibilities under the Treaty, and the importance of addressing the special needs of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty with regard to measures that would alleviate their legitimate security concerns. To that end, the President directed that the United States review its policies on security assurances for such non-nuclear-weapon States and that consultations be held with other nuclear-weapon States on this important topic."

Bearing in mind the above considerations the President declared the following - and this is the beginning of the actual security assurance declaration:

> "The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.
>
> "Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression. Any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.
>
> "Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a legitimate desire for assurances that the United Nations Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would act immediately in accordance with the Charter, in the event such non-nuclear-weapon States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

> "The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
>
> "Among the means available to the Security Council for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and to restore international peace and security.
>
> "United Nations Member States should take appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, and the Security Council should consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression.
>
> "The Security Council should recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.
>
> "The United States reaffirms the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

This is the end of the declaration.

Mr. President, this concludes the United States declaration on security assurances. I would ask that this statement today be circulated as a CD document.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. His statement shall be circulated as requested. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mheshimiwa Rais, uniruhusu kukupongeza mwenye wako wa kiti cha halmashauri huyu na kukuondoa shaka ya kila ushirika wa ujumbe wa kiingereza (Mr. President, congratulations on your appointment as President of this Conference. Be assured of the fullest cooperation of the British delegation).

The Government of the United Kingdom believe that universal adherence to and compliance with international agreements seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are vital to the maintenance of world security. We note with appreciation that 175 States have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime which has made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. We are convinced that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions.

We will continue to urge all States that have not done so to become parties to the Treaty.

The Government of the United Kingdom recognize that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. In 1978 we gave such an assurance. Assurances have also been given by the other nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Recognizing the continued concern of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States should be in similar terms, and following consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States, I accordingly give the following undertaking on behalf of my Government.

The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasizes the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty's Government do not regard their assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1968 the United Kingdom declared that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

I, therefore, recall and reaffirm the intention of the United Kingdom, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

This Security Council assistance could include measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security, and appropriate procedures, in response to any request from the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

If a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom would also be prepared to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance.

The United Kingdom reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

I should be grateful if the secretariat would take the necessary steps to register this declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

While I have the floor, I should also like to make a statement concerning the scope of the CTBT. As my delegation has made clear from the outset, our aim is to establish a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons test explosions. We consider that such a ban, effectively verified and commanding universal adherence, would contribute significantly to meeting the international community's objectives of non-proliferation and global security. It would also place severe constraints on the five nuclear-weapons States, but the United Kingdom, in common with the other nuclear-weapon States, will continue to bear the responsibility of ensuring the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. This point was stressed in the statement that I made on behalf of the United Kingdom and France on 8 March 1995 in Working Group 2. At that time, we retained the bracketed reference to exceptional explosions in the draft article on scope. We have listened carefully to the views of other delegations and have taken them into consideration. I am happy to be able to say that we are now prepared to withdraw the phrase on exceptional tests. We would, therefore, agree to this being deleted from the revised version of the rolling text. This decision in no way diminishes our responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. I would like to state for the record that we consider that the "scope" article in the treaty should not be interpreted as prohibiting the United Kingdom, in common with the other nuclear-weapon States, from fulfilling its responsibilities to maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, and I congratulate him on his mastery of Swahili. Asante sana (Thank you very much). I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, my delegation is delighted to see you presiding over the Conference. Your wisdom, experience and authority will be valuable to us in our work. I would also like to convey my greetings to you as the representative of a friendly country and the representative of a continent with which France has so many ties of friendship, cooperation and common destiny. I would also like to pay tribute to the Ambassador of Japan, Mrs. Kurokochi, and the Ambassador of Italy, Ambassador Vattani, your predecessors, for the exemplary way in which they carried out their important functions. I would also like to bid welcome to our new colleague from Pakistan, Ambassador Akram. And, finally, I sincerely regret the departure from the Conference of my friend Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, whose breadth of vision and firm positions, even if they did not correspond to ours, always made a major contribution for our Conference and were a spur for my own delegation. There are friendships based on shared convictions; there are others, no less strong and no less durable, which are forged in mutual respect and the complicity arising from cordial disagreement. I will maintain that kind of friendship with Miguel Marín Bosch. I extend the warmest wishes to him, his family, and every success in his new task.

The question of security assurances given by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear States is a major issue for my delegation, firstly because it corresponds to a real expectation on the part of the non-nuclear countries, particularly those which, in signing the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), have renounced the goal of acquiring atomic weapons, secondly because our special responsibilities as a nuclear Power are at stake, and lastly because this issue has taken on new significance since the end of the cold war, as awareness has grown of the threat posed to all by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is in order to respond to this expectation, to shoulder its responsibilities and to make a contribution to efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that France has decided to adopt the following measures.

First, it wishes to clarify and reaffirm the negative security assurances it gave in 1982. Specifically, France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on it, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State, in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State.

In our view it is natural that the beneficiaries of these assurances should be the signatories to the NPT - that is, the vast majority of the countries of the world - since they have entered into a formal commitment to non-proliferation.

In response to the requests made by a large number of countries, France has also sought to harmonize the content of its negative assurances to the maximum extent possible with those of the other nuclear Powers. We are happy that this effort has succeeded. The declarations concerning negative security assurances made by France, the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, are now practically identical.

Secondly, France has decided for the first time to give positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. This decision became both possible and desirable following France's accession to the NPT. Consequently, France considers that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would threaten international peace and security. France recognizes that it is legitimate for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to be assured that the international community, and first and foremost the United Nations Security Council, would react immediately in accordance with the obligations under the Charter in the event that they were victims of or threatened with aggression using nuclear weapons.

Bearing these considerations in mind, France makes the following declaration:

France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, undertakes in the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT to bring the matter before the Security Council without delay and to work within the Council to ensure that the Council takes immediate steps to provide the requisite assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to a State that is the victim of an act of aggression or the threat thereof.

France reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

In this field too we welcome the fact that the content of these positive assurances was the subject of close consultation with the other nuclear Powers.

Thirdly, together with the four other nuclear Powers, France has decided to put before the United Nations Security Council a draft resolution which is pathbreaking in many respects, and which reflects our resolve to respond to the expectations of the international community in a comprehensive, collective and concrete manner. Comprehensive, because for the first time, a draft resolution encompasses both negative assurances and positive assurances. Collective, because the five nuclear Powers are co-sponsoring such a resolution for the first time. Concrete, because for the first time a

Security Council resolution spells out the steps that the Security Council might take in the event of aggression, in particular as regards dispute settlement, humanitarian assistance and compensation to victims.

The draft resolution formally reaffirms the need for all States parties to the NPT to respect their obligations fully. This is not a case of petitio principii, but the reiteration of a fundamental rule. The draft also emphasizes the desirability of universal accession to the NPT.

The decisions I have just announced reflect our determination to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and especially the NPT, of which it is the keystone. It is our hope and firm conviction that the initiatives we have taken will help to achieve that end.

I would be grateful to you, Sir, if you would take the necessary steps to ensure that this document is recorded and distributed as an official document of the Conference.

I would now like to make the following statement on behalf of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and my own country, in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty Conference.

We wish to express our continuing strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is our desire that the forthcoming review and extension Conference in New York should decide on its indefinite and unconditional continuation in force. We express our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those in article VI.

We welcome the fact that the nuclear arms race has ceased. We hail the fact that, in parallel with the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, important steps have been taken towards nuclear disarmament, as a result of the agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America as well as the significant reductions made by France and the United Kingdom in their nuclear-weapon programmes.

We welcome the important progress made at the Conference on Disarmament in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to which our four countries are contributing actively.

We also welcome the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes or other explosive purposes. We urge that the negotiations begin forthwith.

We underline the importance of the harmonized security assurances which we have given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use of nuclear weapons. We also underline the importance of the commitments as regards the provision of appropriate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon

State party to the NPT victim of aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. We believe that these decisions strengthen international peace and security.

We solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as stated in article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

We reaffirm our determination to negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We pledge our support for its conclusion without delay.

We call upon all States parties to the NPT to make the Treaty permanent, which will be crucial for the full realization of the goals set out in article VI of the Treaty.

We call upon all States that are not parties to the NPT to accede to it rapidly, thereby contributing to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

A truly universal and fully implemented Treaty is in the interests of all.

Mr. President, the delegations on whose behalf I have just spoken would be grateful if you could have this statement recorded and distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, and his request shall be carried out accordingly. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, although I cannot address you in Swahili, I would like to extend my warm felicitations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in a language which is common and learnt from those who have learnt your language and, I suspect, mine. I am confident that the work of the Conference will benefit greatly from your long experience and able leadership. My delegation will make every effort to facilitate your task by extending its wholehearted cooperation and support. I would also like to express our admiration for the highly skilled and competent manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan, guided the deliberations of this body.

I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude for the warm words of welcome which have been addressed to me by yourself, Mr. President, and by so many other colleagues and friends. It is good to be back in this important body and especially to see so many old friends who remain intensely engaged in the endeavour for disarmament. It will be my endeavour to work in close cooperation with all our distinguished colleagues within the Conference on

Disarmament. My one regret is that I will be denied the opportunity to work together with Ambassador Marín Bosch, who is leaving us. We bid him well and wish him all the best for the future.

This first part of the 1995 session of the Conference has been held in the shadow of the forthcoming NPT review and extension Conference. This has perhaps coloured the positions taken here on some of the substantive and procedural issues under consideration.

As my Foreign Minister stated in this Conference on 14 February last, "The NPT does not respond to Pakistan's security concerns and we deplore its discriminatory character. However, we favour the extension of the Treaty because we acknowledge that a breakdown in the NPT consensus would have negative implications for international stability". It is our fear however that the fragile NPT consensus could unravel if the Treaty is seen by its sponsors as a means to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. The NPT was supposed to be a transitional arrangement to enable the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in article VI of the Treaty. It was not designed to create in perpetuity two categories of states - nuclear and non-nuclear.

The first 20 years after the adoption of the NPT saw a massive build-up of nuclear arsenals specially by the two super-Powers. We have welcomed the START I and START II agreements under which these huge nuclear arsenals are to be drastically reduced. These are indeed important achievements. We consider, however, that the 3,000 nuclear warheads which each side will retain after these reductions are out of proportion to any conceivable security requirement of these States. Indeed, the size of these nuclear arsenals after implementation of START I and II will be as large as if not larger than when the NPT came into force.

We are also deeply concerned that although the confrontation of the cold war has ended, there is as yet no clear commitment on the part of the majority of the nuclear-weapon States to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. The resistance to opening negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this body is a clear signal of this.

The discussions so far on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have produced mixed results. While a revised rolling text will indicate a measure of progress, agreement on key issues has proved to be elusive. A central aim of a CTBT has always been to halt the further development of nuclear weapons and to eventually render nuclear arsenals ineffective and redundant. The CTBT was to be an instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation and to facilitate nuclear disarmament. The desire expressed in our negotiations to maintain the so-called credibility of nuclear arsenals through exceptional measures is, in our view, incompatible with the purposes of the CTBT. If these exceptions are accepted the CTBT will become merely an instrument of selective horizontal non-proliferation. Nevertheless, I would like to reiterate the commitment of my delegation to continue to work energetically for the early conclusion of a meaningful and comprehensive and effective CTBT.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

Our endeavours to commence consideration of the fissile materials convention have been bedevilled by the underlying divergence in our view as regards the purpose and scope of the proposed treaty. The historical record will show that the objective of the international community has always been to halt the production of fissile materials and to reduce the stockpiles of such materials. The object was never to freeze fissile material stocks at their current grossly unequal levels.

Despite our serious concerns, the Pakistan delegation agreed to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the basis of Ambassador Shannon's report. The report makes it clear that no delegation will be precluded from addressing the issue of the appropriate scope of the proposed treaty during the negotiations.

This session of the CD will end without any work having been done on a number of important issues on its agenda. We are disappointed at our failure to establish ad hoc committees on the prevention of a nuclear arms race in outer space, transparency in armaments and negative security assurances. A deadlock also exists on the appointment of special coordinators on the issues of the agenda, expansion of the CD and improved and effective functioning. We must seriously consider whether the linkages that were created between various issues constitute a precedent or a practice that will advance the work of this Conference in future.

It was Pakistan's desire to establish ad hoc committees and commence negotiations on all the items of our agenda. We are most disappointed, in particular, that the Conference could not re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, an item which has been of long-standing interest for Pakistan. This is all the more regrettable since we have learnt that the nuclear-weapon States have devoted considerable effort in recent weeks to developing their positions on both so-called "positive" and "negative" assurances to non-nuclear States, at least to those which are parties to the NPT.

Let me recall that before resolution 255 was submitted for adoption to the Security Council in the form of a joint draft resolution, it was originally submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States (document DC/230, annex II). It would be strange if the Conference on Disarmament - the "single negotiating body" on disarmament - were precluded from the consideration of a matter of such vital interest to international security as the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is, of course, premature for my delegation to comment on the substance of the "positive" assurances being formulated, or the negative assurances expressed in the statements made here today. I will however recall that while commenting on resolution 255 in the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan stated:

> "Perfect security for all States against the peril of nuclear weapons will not of course be possible until, as the representative of France has pointed out, there is complete nuclear disarmament and

destruction of nuclear weapons. We must perforce accept a security system which is less than perfect and short of the ideal. At the same time, if we ignore the other facts of life we do so at our own peril. As long as nuclear stockpiles are not physically dismantled, as long as the non-proliferation Treaty is not universally adhered to, the possibility of a treaty breach will always remain, of the emergence of other Powers which will have acquired nuclear weapons, and even, in the unforeseeable future, of an existing nuclear Power changing its policies. It is such possibilities, which are more than theoretical, that we need to guard against."

If a resolution of the Security Council is to genuinely enhance international security it would need to address these problems.

Moreover, any decision on security assurances should not, in any way, prejudice the provisions of the United Nations Charter or international law. The right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter is available to every State. It is not restricted to non-nuclear States party to the NPT. The Charter provides an assurance of help to all States through and outside the Security Council in case they are subjected to the use of force or aggression. This assurance is available whether this aggression takes place with nuclear or other weapons. In any event, the credibility of an assurance through the Security Council of help against the use of nuclear weapons requires a leap of faith. How can the Council act if a nuclear aggression is already under way? And what if this aggression is being perpetrated by one of those States which wield the veto in the Security Council?

In a statement issued on 14 April 1982 (CD/280), the Group of 21 set out certain "principles" regarding what are called "negative security assurances". Let met quote these "principles". First, the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Second, non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Third, such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention. Fourth, a common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21. Fifth, the agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan delegation looks forward to the close consideration of these views of the Group of 21 when the CD resumes late next month and re-establishes the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances.

Pakistan shares the view that the CD has an important role to play in promoting arms control and disarmament in the conventional field. We have no problem with the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. However, we feel that an approach to conventional arms control which is based only on a supply-side strategy is bound to create further distortions in the already wide asymmetries in the possession, production and transfer of conventional armaments.

We need to move beyond the truisms expressed in some discussions on conventional arms control. We should come to grips with the real and practical issues in the area of conventional arms control. Today, arms races in various parts of the world are not fuelled by global disputes but rather by regional discord between States that are in actual, or potential, adversarial roles. Therefore, conventional arms control measures should be pursued at the regional and subregional levels.

The General Assembly, in a resolution entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels", has asked the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of guidelines and principles which can provide a framework for regional agreements for controlling conventional weapons. We hope that the Conference will soon undertake work on this importance issue.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I again assure you that the Pakistan delegation looks forward keenly to working with you and other delegations on the entire range of issues before the Conference?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, please allow me to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation would like to pledge to you that as always it will make every effort in rendering full cooperation to you and to all the other delegations for the cause of promoting peace, security and disarmament. I wish also to take this opportunity to thank Her Excellency Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi, the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, for her outstanding contribution during her tenure of the presidency of the CD last month. Furthermore, I would like to tell the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, how sorry we are to see him leave. As the representative of Mexico and as a colleague in our Conference, he has made major contributions to the cause of the work of the CD. I would also like to extend a welcome to the newly appointed Ambassador of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram. With his rich experience in the field of multilateral diplomacy and on the basis of the outstanding work done by his able predecessor Ambassador Kamal, he will certainly contribute new achievements to the work of the CD.

Upon the instructions of the Chinese Government, I hereby deliver the national statement of China on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, which was made yesterday in Beijing by the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The full text is as follows:

> "For the purpose of enhancing international peace, security and stability and facilitating the realization of the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China hereby declares its position on security assurances as follows:
>
> "1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.
>
> "2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices.
>
> "3. China has always held that pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. China strongly calls for the early conclusion of an international convention banning the first use of nuclear weapons as well as an international legal instrument on assuring non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
>
> "4. China, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action within the Council in order that the Council can take appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and to impose strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. This commitment naturally applies to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any non-nuclear-weapon State that has undertaken any comparable international binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, in the event of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against the State.
>
> "5. The 'positive security assurance' provided by China, as contained in paragraph 4, does not in any way compromise China's position as contained in paragraph 3 and shall not in any way be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons."

(Mr. Sha, China)

The above statement by the Chinese Government once again reiterated the solemn unconditional undertaking by China not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The statement also strongly called on all the other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same security assurances. The "positive security assurances" contained in the statement represent a new obligation undertaken for the first time by China.

Mr. President, I would be grateful if you would arrange for the distribution of the above statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

In 10 days' time we shall convene the review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As China is a nuclear-weapon State, I now wish to take this opportunity to elaborate on some basic positions on issues related to the NPT.

China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and consistently upholds the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and all other types of weapons of mass destruction. In order to realize this objective and maintain international peace, security and stability, and in response to the aspiration and request of the non-nuclear-weapon States, China joined the NPT on 9 March 1992. As a State party, China has since strictly abided by the Treaty and fulfilled in real earnest the obligations set out in the NPT.

As a nuclear-weapon State, China resolutely supports the three main objectives of the NPT. In the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation, China pursues the policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in nuclear-weapon proliferation and not assisting any State in the development of such weapons, and, proceeding from this policy, has formulated a strict and effective nuclear export control regime of her own. In the field of nuclear disarmament, China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of weapons of mass destruction worldwide, including nuclear weapons. China has made specific proposals in this regard. In the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, China, subject to the international safeguards, has carried out to the best of her abilities equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation with various countries, the developing countries in particular.

It is China's firm belief that pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, efforts for the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation are beneficial to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such efforts are therefore of great significance. At the same time, China also believes that nuclear non-proliferation is not the ultimate objective by itself, but, rather, a necessary measure and step in the process of realizing the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

As a State party to the NPT, China supports a smooth extension of the Treaty. In the meantime, China is of the view that the mere extension of th Treaty is far from sufficient. What is more important is to conclude a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, like the BWC and CWC, so as to bring about a genuine nuclear-weapon-free world and provide the fundamental assurance for mankind to rid itself of the threat of nuclear war. For this ultimate goal, China stands for the following.

First, all nuclear-weapon-possessing States should declare that they undertake unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they will negotiate and sign a treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The international community should support the efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In this respect, the Conference on Disarmament should immediately commence relevant negotiations so as to conclude legally binding international instruments.

Second, the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its negotiations and strive to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. It should also begin at an early date the negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes.

Third, all nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To this end, they are duty-bound to participate in the negotiations on a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, and to sign and implement such a convention under effective international supervision. In this regard, the major nuclear-weapon States should implement their existing nuclear disarmament treaties to schedule and proceed to further drastic cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Fourth, alongside their efforts for nuclear-weapon non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, all countries should actively promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The above interrelated elements make up an integrated process of nuclear disarmament. China believes that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to participate fully in that process. By making their best endeavours in this direction, the nuclear-weapon States will also be fulfilling by actual deeds their obligations provided for in article VI of the NPT.

Since mankind has been able to make nuclear weapons and tap nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the twentieth century, it will certainly be able to comprehensively ban and destroy nuclear weapons and fully harness nuclear energy to enhance its own well-being in the twenty-first century. China wishes to work together with other nuclear-weapon and all non-nuclear-weapon States and make its own contribution for the ultimate realization of this lofty goal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): At the outset, since this is the first time I am speaking under your presidency, on behalf of the Indian delegation, I would like to congratulate you on assumption of this important office. My delegation is particularly happy to see you in the Chair because of the very close links between our two countries and because of your qualities of leadership and dynamism. I assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation in all your endeavours. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank your predecessor Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi, Ambassador of Japan to the CD, for presiding over this august body in an exemplary manner, and to welcome Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan.

I have asked the floor initially to speak in my capacity as the Coordinator of G-21 on NTB.

The Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1995, made in CD/1292.

In this context, the Group of 21 had noted with disappointment the stand taken by some nuclear-weapon States on the fundamental article on "scope" in the rolling text - CD/1273/Rev.1. Their continued support to "exceptions" to nuclear tests has resulted in little progress on this fundamental article. It raises the question about their commitment to the CTBT and goes against the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB. Furthermore, elaborating too vast a verification network also raises serious doubts about the direction and purpose of the present negotiations. It is obvious that the verification of a future CTBT should be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of the treaty.

On the scope of a CTBT, the Group of 21 had made it clear that the CTBT should be for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all times. The ban should be comprehensive and no tests should be carried out under any pretext for any reason or justification.

The G-21 is studying the contribution of the international monitoring system (IMS) Expert Group presented in WP.224 and WP.225 as it is a valuable input for the negotiations. The G-21 has also noted the key political and technical issues raised by the Expert Group. The G-21 feels that the vast technical material already prepared by the experts on this subject in the past two years is a sufficient basis for delegations to take political decisions. The Group, therefore, feels that given the slow pace of the negotiations in Working Group 1, there does not appear to be much merit in holding more expert sessions. The experts could be a part of their national delegations. The time has now come to take political decisions in order to achieve progress in textual form in the rolling text.

The Group had made it clear in its earlier working papers that the verification system under the future CTBT should be cost-effective. The cost of the organization's activities including verification should be borne by the States parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the

United Nations and the organization of a CTBT. Like the entire treaty, the verification system should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and guarantee equal access to all States. Therefore, in view of the elaborate IMS system being proposed, the Group does not agree with the emphasis placed by some delegations on their "national technical means" to judge an ambiguous event. Hence, the Group reiterates its earlier position in CD/1266 that the technical secretariat should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing the data received from the IMS. The organization should be responsible for judgement in this regard. Therefore, the organization of a future CTBT should exchange and analyse all IMS and on-site-inspection (OSI) data with this aim.

It is the Group's hope that the CTBT should be able to attract universal adherence. The entry into force (EIF) should not be complicated to delay the process. Entry into force made contingent upon ratification by the nuclear-weapon States would make the CTBT hostage to them as well as a discriminatory treaty. The expansion of CD membership should also not be utilized as a pretext to delay the entry into force.

In conclusion, the Group is concerned about the slow pace of the negotiations so far. The Group hopes that the pace of negotiations will be accelerated by an exhibition of political will by all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, especially on the "scope", so that a CTBT can be concluded in 1995. I may add that we would need to get back to the Group with the statement of Ambassador Weston of the United Kingdom delivered earlier today on "scope".

I now speak on behalf of my own delegation. I have listened carefully to the statements made today on the security assurances and note the moves for a draft Security Council resolution on security assurances. The issue of effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is of utmost importance since it is linked to the fundamental security of all States. India has consistently taken the position that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. We, however, recognize that complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue. Accordingly, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapons States provide unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States irrespective of whether or not they are NPT signatories, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding form i.e. universal and without any qualification or discrimination. It is unfortunate that the new draft resolution of the United Nations Security Council does not meet this objective. Indeed, it appears to be weaker than the earlier United Nations Security Council resolution 255 which required categorical and immediate action by the United Nations Security Council, in case of aggression involving nuclear weapons or threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State, irrespective of whether or not it was a party to the NPT. Moreover, the provisions in the draft resolution relating to the security assurances have been left vague, and are open to interpretation.

Finally, I would be remiss in not availing of this opportunity to place on record our deepest appreciation for the outstanding all-round contribution of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico to the work of the CD. While he will always be admired for the exemplary manner in which he carried out his duties as the first Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate on NTB, his role extended to all aspects of disarmament and many delegations like mine drew heavily upon his expertise and fund of knowledge. We will miss him and wish him all the very best in his new assignment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Sir, I should like to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I would also express words of gratitude to the previous President of the CD, Ambassador H. Kurokochi of Japan, for her successful work in the Chair. It also gives me pleasure to welcome Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, who has recently arrived in Geneva, and to wish him success in work in the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to wish all the best to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marín Bosch, who is soon going to be leaving his post at the Conference on Disarmament, and to thank him for the major contribution he has made to the work of the CD, including the work he did as Chairman of the CTBT Committee in 1994.

I have been instructed to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament the following text of a declaration made by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Bearing in mind the fundamental significance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, respectful of the legitimate desire of States parties to the Treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and taking into account the provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, has been instructed to make the following declaration:

> "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

In addition, we should like to emphasize that, as proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, efforts have been made to reach agreement on an updated resolution of the United Nations Security Council on security assurances for non-nuclear States. The draft of a resolution on this subject, prepared with the participation of Russian representatives, is being presented to the Security Council for consideration. The thrust of the draft is as follows.

In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the permanent members of the Security Council - the nuclear-weapon States - will immediately bring the matter before the Council and will seek action by the Council to provide the necessary assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State that is a victim of an act of, or the object of the threat of, aggression.

Provision is also made for the possibility of taking appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from the victim of aggression, and also compensation from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained by the State which is the victim of such an act of aggression as a result of the aggression.

We expect that the adoption of a resolution on this subject by the Security Council will be welcomed with satisfaction by the non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that it will promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, international security and world stability.

Mr. President, I would ask you to take steps to have this declaration distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Fasehun.

Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria): It is a great pleasure for me to address the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this afternoon. It is also gratifying to see you, the distinguished Ambassador of Kenya, preside over the CD at this historical period in the discussion of non-proliferation issues. Nigeria maintains excellent relations with your country and shares with great Kenya membership of the Organization of African Unity.

I wish also to extend the sincere appreciation of the Nigerian delegation to your predecessors who have steered the work of the CD in the early days of this session. We note in particular the excellent contributions of Her Excellency Ambassador Madam Kurokochi of Japan, who presided over the work of the Conference a few days after her arrival in Geneva.

We take this opportunity to welcome to the CD also the eminent Ambassadors of China, Morocco, Pakistan and Myanmar.

We would like to extend our appreciation to the secretariat of the CD under Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the CD at the head of the United Nations Office in Geneva, to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the CD, and all other staff members of the Centre for Disarmament for their assistance in facilitating our work.

This is a momentous period. We will in a few months be marking the half-century of the existence of the United Nations, the longest surviving global political-security organization. In two weeks also, States parties to the NPT will meet to review and decide on the length of extension of the Treaty. Both anniversaries are, of course, coincidental. But the coincidence offers an opportunity to reflect not only on the quarter-century of non-proliferation efforts but to take a total stock of political-security situations globally.

The world is certainly a less dangerous place. This is due to the end of the cold war and the ideological conflict which spurred that war. But at the regional levels, the world is not any less dangerous than the period of the cold war. Conflicts arising out of the quest to assert old or new identities are the bane of the new world disorder. Old international structures have proved inadequate also to cope with these conflicts. And there is as yet no new structure to solve the problems arising out of the new world disorder.

In the realm of disarmament, there has been slight progress. The world has moved boldly to establish the norm of non-proliferation in the areas of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is indeed at the core of nuclear non-proliferation. Nigeria supports the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and was, after the Republic of Ireland, the second State globally to ratify the Treaty. Nigeria's nuclear research facilities are under effective safeguards. Adherence to IAEA safeguards reflects our commitment to non-proliferation obligations.

The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is the third leg in the tripod of global non-proliferation measures, supporting and indeed complementing as it should be biological and chemical weapons. In its 25 years of existence, the NPT has proved useful in restraining horizontal proliferation but less so in containing vertical proliferation. Some of its provisions have been selectively applied. Thus, some States parties, contrary to their commitments, have transferred and/or received technologies for the weaponization of nuclear programmes. Nuclear disarmament measures anticipated in the NPT were for a long time ignored. Whilst welcoming the important steps undertaken in the START I and II process, more and accelerated nuclear disarmament measures are needed. All nuclear-weapon States should reduce significantly their holdings prior to the elimination of such weapons.

When the NPT was negotiated, a few non-proliferation measures were anticipated. Briefly, these were a comprehensive test-ban treaty, fissile material cut-off and security assurances. Twenty-five years later, none of these measures is in place. Except for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone which could be proclaimed by African leaders in Addis Ababa in June 1995, there is no prospect of adding another nuclear-weapon-free zone to the existing ones in Latin America and the Caribbean and the South Pacific soon. Whilst recognizing that discussion had been taking place in the Security Council declaration on security assurances, the latter as well as the former steps appear to be driven by the fever of the NPT review and extension Conference.

We have listened attentively to the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. We shall study the statements and react accordingly. However, we note in passing that the CD has not been involved in any way in the statements and that further efforts are needed to commence multilateral negotiation of universal and legally binding negative security assurances.

The meeting in New York in two weeks offers the opportunity to critically review the NPT. In reviewing the Treaty, we should identify its strengths and its weaknesses. Our objective should be the strengthening of the Treaty to serve the goal of non-proliferation. As a transition instrument to complete nuclear disarmament, the NPT should be succeeded by a treaty on complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If non-proliferation and complete elimination of biological and chemical weapons is good for humanity, so also is non-proliferation and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

As indicated in my delegation's statement last session, Nigeria favours a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning further testing of nuclear weapons for all times and in all environments, including underground, under water, in the atmosphere and outer space. We favour no reservation of any kind, and for whatever purpose.

While we agree that the process of negotiation, particularly for a treaty like the CTB, can be very difficult and painstaking, it is our view that we have entered a crucial stage in our negotiation where major political decisions should be taken on such treaty provisions as the international monitoring system, the procedure for on-site inspection (OSI) and the form and location of an appropriate implementing agency, and the verification protocols.

Early agreement on the scope of the treaty is of vital importance to achieving progress in our work. We request all delegations still having problems with this article to withdraw their reservations. The reservations attached to the scope of the treaty send an unwelcome signal. It gives the impression that the test ban will be cosmetic and that it is being negotiated to satisfy the demands of some non-nuclear-weapon States for a test-ban treaty.

While welcoming the appointment of Mr. Peter Marshall as a Friend of the Chair and the other five volunteers on the gathering of relevant data for the preparation of an inventory on radionuclide stations, we are of the view that no expert work should be undertaken until we have taken major political decisions on the outstanding work. We would like to place on record our preference for a cost-effective verification network comprising the four agreed technologies of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound monitoring system, which should be represented through a world-wide but scientifically located IMS and national technical means network with direct linkage to the international data centre. We are of the view that the determination of suspicious or ambiguous events must be based on the data and analysis of the IDC. While inputs from national technical means might be useful in the determination of an ambiguous event, the technical secretariat must have the sole capacity and responsibility to receive and analyse data from the IMS and on-site inspection team. The secretariat should also be able to pronounce its own independent and scientific conclusion to the executive council for final judgement.

The Conference on Disarmament is unique because it is the sole forum for multilateral negotiation of disarmament agreements. The Conference is also special because of the soberness in which debates are conducted and the CD is special because of the demeanour of its participants. The finest of diplomats have passed through this hall and memorialized their presence with known contributions to disarmament and peace. Today, the Conference will be losing one of its finest and most principled participants due to his transfer out of Geneva. Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, a well-known advocate of nuclear disarmament, an apostle of peace and a leader amongst the Group of 21 and the neutral non-nuclear-weapon States, will be sorely missed in this body. We bid him farewell and will always remember his immense contributions as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban under whose tenure negotiations commenced. It would have been our wish to have concluded negotiations while he is still in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I see that we have only two and a half minutes to 1 p.m. and yet I still have nine speakers. You may wish to take their names down: Myanmar, who will speak on behalf of the Group of 21, Germany, Cuba, Belgium, Italy, Argentina, Morocco, Mexico and, of course, Mr. Petrovsky. That makes nine. Of course, it is time that I said that perhaps (but I will be in the hands of the Conference) we should consider meeting in the afternoon at 3.30 p.m., and I think that now I can reaffirm that. I am fully aware that there are other meetings which have been planned for 3 o'clock, but this is a unique situation and I place myself entirely in your hands. If you want us to meet at 3 p.m., I am prepared to chair the meeting. I am sure that some of you would like to have a break because you might have some appointments which you cannot cancel now. So do I take it that we can adjourn now until 3.30 p.m., or would you like me to suggest otherwise? I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, since this is the first time that my delegation takes the floor in the plenary session of the CD this year, I would first of all like to convey to you the pleasure that I and my delegation have in seeing you in the Chair, and as far as I myself am concerned, the pleasure that I see you back after 10 years in such good spirits here in this hall. I hope that I will have another occasion to express my appreciation for the work of your predecessors this year. I will, however, not have an occasion to bid farewell, as I understand it, to Ambassador Marín Bosch, and therefore I would join with others who have expressed appreciation for the work he has done in the context of the CD as well as in other forums to further the cause of disarmament. I would like to wish him and his family well for the future and his future career.

Mr. President, I indeed have only taken the floor today simply to answer your question on the time that we should reconvene this afternoon. As you mentioned yourself, we have a list of nine speakers this afternoon, and - you could call it a selfish reason, but there is also a meeting foreseen this afternoon of Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB, where a number of important issues will have to be taken up and, therefore, we are a little bit pressed for time. My suggestion would be that we meet again this afternoon at 3 o'clock and not at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for those observations. I now give the floor to Canada.

Mr. SINCLAIR (Canada): Mr. President, just to agree with our Dutch colleague that in view of some of the other activities to which you have already referred, and which have been planned for this afternoon before we were aware of the length of the speakers' list, would it be possible to begin promptly at 3 o'clock?

The PRESIDENT: I take it then that we have agreed to meet in the afternoon, which means that we can adjourn now and come back to start work at 3 o'clock. I would please request you to be on time so that we can start our work and conclude quickly.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye, who will speak on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge our fullest cooperation in the advancement of the work of the CD under your able leadership. I also pay tribute to your predecessor Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan for the excellent work she had done during her tenure of the presidency.

I also welcome to our midst Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, who is no stranger to Geneva and the CD. I am sure we all look forward to working closely with him.

I shall be remiss if I do not also pay tribute to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico for his substantial and substantive contribution to the work of the CD as well as to that of the Group of 21. Although he is leaving us soon, our memory of the time we spent together with him in the CD will remain with us for a long time to come. We wish him every success in his new post.

I shall now make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21. The statement is as follows:

> "There was emerging consensus on the draft Presidential statement circulated to the members of the CD on 5 April. It reads as follows:
>
> > "'Following the adoption of the report of Ambassador Shannon (CD/1299) at the 703rd plenary meeting on 23 March 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was established under agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear

> arms race and nuclear disarmament". Consultations held by my predecessor and myself indicate that there is agreement to appoint Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Committee'.
>
> "The Group of 21 has shown flexibility in agreeing to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. This gesture should be reciprocated by the other country groups.
>
> "The Group of 21 regrets that, despite the flexibility shown by it, the emerging consensus on a draft Presidential statement on the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee was impeded by the inflexible stand of a group of countries. It is the responsibility of that group that progress has not been made on this question.
>
> "The Group of 21 considers that when an ad hoc committee is established, it must be done so under one of the agenda items, and that this Ad Hoc Committee comes under agenda item 2, 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'.
>
> "This has been mentioned in the Presidential statement in January 1994, in the CD annual report of 1994, and the presidential statement contained in CD/1294 of 3 February 1995.
>
> "The rules of procedure of the CD do not preclude the establishment of more than one ad hoc committee under an agenda item. The Group, therefore, places on record its position that this is without prejudice to its request for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament under agenda item 2, as required.
>
> "The Group also takes the view that a satisfactory solution to the question of the re-establishment of the ad hoc committees on negative security assurances and on prevention of an arms race in outer space, respectively, will have direct bearing on the commencement of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices."

I would also like to take this opportunity to make another statement on security assurances on behalf of the Group of 21. The statement is as follows:

> "It has come to the G 21's knowledge that a draft United Nations Security Council resolution on security assurances has been recently circulated in New York. The G 21 has carefully examined the proposals contained in that draft and would like to make the following preliminary observations.
>
> "Neither the Conference on Disarmament, nor any country belonging to the G 21, has been associated with the drafting of the proposal, notwithstanding the fact that the CD is universally recognized as the sole multilateral negotiating disarmament body.

"While taking into consideration the positive aspects of the proposal, the G 21 observes that this resolution does not take into account any of the formal objections made in the past by non-nuclear-weapon States on the restrictive, restrained, uncertain, conditional and discriminatory character of the guarantees already provided.

"The G 21 reiterates its conviction that duly negotiated security assurances are a legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States. In this context, it notes with disappointment that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has not even been re-established during the present session.

"The Group considers that the terms of its declaration of 31 March 1994, as reported in document CD/1256, remain valid and merit serious consideration. It is imperative that an unconditional multilaterally negotiated and legally binding convention on negative security assurances should be drafted and, to this end, all members of the CD should display their political will.

"In this regard, it is worth recalling the great importance that the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries attach to a multilateral and legally binding convention governing this issue, as expressed during their tenth summit in Jakarta, in 1992, and reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo, in May 1994, when they stated that 'security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons' and 'called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention'.

"At the same time, the G 21 considers it necessary that the Security Council gives positive assurances to non-nuclear weapon States that should go beyond a mere reiteration of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"Furthermore, the G 21 reiterates its conviction that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should not be interpreted as legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons.

"The G 21 is deeply convinced that all aspects relating to nuclear weapons issues are interrelated and that the only effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. Pending which, it is for the nuclear-weapon States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally binding form."

I request that the statement of the Group of 21 on security assurances be issued as an official document of the CD.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Thank you, Mr. President. I think the United States would like to speak first.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President and thanks to my German colleague. I would like to very briefly intervene in my capacity as Western Group Coordinator at the present time, in order to respond to the first of the two statements made by my Myanmar colleague, the one relative to cut-off. It appears as though there is a misunderstanding. I and my Group have listened very carefully to this statement and we are particularly focused on the fact that the statement indicates that the Group of 21 is in favour of the appointment of Ambassador Gerald Shannon to be Coordinator of the cut-off group that was established on the 23rd of last month, and since the G.21 statement mentions that the gesture should be reciprocated and seems to say that there is an inflexible stand on the part of my Group, I would like to ask you, Mr. President, right now if you would ascertain whether it is, as we suspect, the case that a consensus does exist now to appoint Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that was established under your predecessor's chairmanship on 23 March. If you could do that right now, I think it would be very encouraging.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. He has asked the question as to whether there is a consensus to appoint Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off. Is there any reaction to that? I give the floor to the representative of Myanmar.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): I regret having to take the floor for the second time, but a question has been posed as to the position of the G.21 regarding the appointment of Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on fissile material "cut-off".

Some ideas have been given to me as the Coordinator of the G.21 yesterday at the Presidential consultations and, of course, I have undertaken to present these new elements to the Group of 21 and my response is based on the meeting we had earlier in the day and on the deliberations we had at the Presidential consultations. If there needs to be any further discussion on this and any stand that we may take on this, I submit that I will have to report this development to the Group of 21 and hopefully come back to you at the next plenary meeting. But that does not preclude anyone from our Group or other Groups from taking the floor on this matter.

The PRESIDENT: I now have the representatives of Pakistan, Morocco and the United States. I hope that the representative of Germany will not mind if I give them the floor. Thank you. The representative of Pakistan has the floor.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): We have a positive attitude in the Group of 21 and I think this is quite evident from the statement that has been made by the distinguished Ambassador of Myanmar. The distinguished Ambassador of the United States has posed a question, or made a proposal, with regard to the appointment of Ambassador Shannon. In the Group of 21, as we are all aware, we had a formulation which was submitted for consideration and consultation of the Group and I think the Ambassador of Myanmar had read out this formulation to the Conference in his statement. This was a text of a possible Presidential draft statement. Do I take it that this would be acceptable to the Conference as a whole? This is the statement which my colleague has read out, and I will read it out again:

> "Following the adoption of the report of Ambassador Shannon (CD/1299) at the 703rd plenary meeting on 23 March 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was established under agenda item 2 entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'. Consultations held by my predecessor and myself indicate that there is agreement to appoint Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Committee".

What I understand is that this is a formulation that is acceptable in the Group of 21 and we hope that this is also acceptable to the rest of the Conference.

Mr. BEJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I think that since I arrived I have been advocating a little transparency, and I think that I will try to apply it to myself today, perhaps in order to start a new era in this field. While my delegation really fully associates itself with the statements made by the Ambassador of Myanmar, speaking as Coordinator of the Group of 21, as regards the substance, namely, that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material should come under item 2 of the agenda of the Conference, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", my delegation nevertheless greatly regrets that this subject was not raised, or at least settled, during the consultations held at the time of the drafting of Ambassador Shannon's report, which was finally adopted and enabled the Committee to be set up. Frankly, we believe that this is a principle which should be observed in all similar circumstances and that the various concerns should be duly voiced at the proper time in order not to thwart the Conference in its work by over-use of procedural devices or the questioning of decisions formally adopted by the Conference. I think such things ought to be said. Finally, I would like to express my delegation's very clear support for the nomination of Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I remain encouraged because we are not seeking consensus on a statement, but this is a meeting on the record. The procès-verbal of this meeting will record all the views that have been expressed, including the statement that was proposed to put into your mouth, Sir, which has now been read out two times. But we are not agreeing on a statement - we are trying to agree on a Chairman, so I repeat my request that you seek a consensus which apparently exists here today on Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Committee that was established by us two weeks ago.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): On the next occasion when my delegation takes the floor this afternoon we shall with all due formality carry out the pleasant duty of repeating our greetings to you, Sir, thanking the Secretary of the Conference and the Deputy Secretary for their good offices and offering Ambassador Marín Bosch our best wishes for the future, while welcoming Ambassador Akram of Pakistan. However, in a somewhat unusual departure from the practice in this Conference, the general debate has, this afternoon, been interrupted to raise a matter which does not fall within the context of the general debate. However, a question has been asked, and that question was answered in an adequate manner both by the Coordinator of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Myanmar, and my delegation thanks him for his explanation, and also by the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco and the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan, and I think that it is quite clear from their three statements that the position of the Group of 21 cannot be taken apart, and it is pointless and irrelevant to the matter before us to insist on attempting to take apart what is the clear position of the Group of 21 with regard to the issue of the terms on which the committee for fissionable material has to be set up and its chairmanship determined. Ambassador Akram of Pakistan read out a text which I could read out for the third time, but I think that this is not necessary, and it is that text which has the full endorsement of the Group of 21. It is not a question of portions of the text, and it is not a question of either the first or the second part or separate and selective aspects of it. It is a question of the proposal which is to be found in that text, and which only a few days ago promised a relatively clear consensus in this Conference. I would therefore ask the remaining distinguished representatives in this forum not to go overboard in their attempts to assail the plenary of the Conference, which are becoming a fairly and perhaps excessively frequent practice, and not to attempt to break up what is the position of the Group of 21. That position is maintained in its entirety on the first page read out by the Coordinator of the Group, the representative of Myanmar, and I would request that there should be no more efforts to try to break up and separate into its individual components that position of the Group of 21. As a last comment, I would venture to repeat the question put by the Ambassador of Pakistan, in other words, I would like to know, Sir, through you, whether at this moment we can actually move to adopt as a formal decision of this Conference the text to be found in the statement by the Group of 21. I hope that delegations will react to this proposal.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): I wish to take the floor on behalf of the Eastern European Group. Our Group has several times discussed the issue of the operation of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off. We also participated in the discussion held at the Presidential consultations yesterday. We understand that there are diverging views concerning the content of the Presidential statement and we wish to be flexible to this end. However, we were of the view that we should stick to the actual history of the development of this question and we should consider the records and the decisions already taken. So for this Group it seems to be quite clear that the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off has been established by the adoption of the report submitted to the plenary by Ambassador Shannon, the then Special Coordinator for this issue. It has also been decided by the presidency that there remains one question open, and this is the appointment of the Chairman of that Committee. Our Group is unanimous in having Ambassador Shannon appointed as the Chairman.

Our Group was also unanimous that the Ad Hoc Committee has been already established and now the question of the Presidential statement - whether or not, and how, a reference should be made to agenda item 2 - was left open and we were flexible in this regard. The only condition on our part was that we should not go against what has already been placed on record and what has been actually already decided, namely, the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee, and that there is only one question remaining open, and this is who should be the Chairman. The reference to agenda item 2 seems to be a legitimate request because it has already been put on record when the Special Coordinator was appointed and this was done, as can be seen from the documents relating to the issue, with explicit reference to item 2, and as a consequence there seemed to be no need by the then President of the CD to repeat it again, that the establishment of the Committee is happening under agenda item 2, since all negotiations and consultations conducted to the end of establishing this Committee have been conducted on the basis of a consensus on item 2. So the view of our Group is that we consider the Committee as established, we wish to have Ambassador Shannon as its President and we are flexible as to the wording of any possible Presidential statement.

The PRESIDENT: If I may also say something myself: you know that you have been briefed on the consultations that took place under the President at the Presidential consultations held yesterday and which were very long and very constructive. At that meeting there was a draft statement that the President had circulated to all of you before yesterday's meeting, the aim of which was to sound your views, without applying any pressure, as to whether we could reach a consensus in the Presidential consultations and then come to report to the plenary this morning, as had been decided upon the week before. It was clear that the draft Presidential statement that I had sent out had had the endorsement of one group; the other group really had no problems with it but wanted to make some amendments to see how we could have consensus. After quite a discussion, we tried to have some texts to see whether some consensus could be reached, and in the end the coordinators agreed to take these texts back to their respective groups with a view to finding consensus. As far as I recollect, everybody had agreed that Ambassador Shannon of Canada was the most qualified within the CD to do the job and be Chairman. As of yesterday, and even as of now, I have not heard about any other candidate. So as far as the Chairman in the person of Ambassador Shannon is concerned, he is unchallenged. I think all of us agreed that he is the one we would like to be the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off. The problem is the Presidential statement appointing him; what should the President say that would command consensus of all the delegations and groups here? It is my understanding that that is where the problem lies, and yet I need consensus so that what I say has to have the support of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, and it appears to me that there isn't consensus because there are two questions that have been asked: Can we now endorse the candidacy of Ambassador Shannon? And can we also endorse the statement that has been made by the G.21 as understanding that this is the Presidential statement that should be read to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off? I take it that there is no consensus on the language of the Presidential statement to be made to appoint the Chairman - that is where the difference is. There is no difference on the person of the Ambassador and the question is: What is the situation? If there is no consensus then I do not think the President can make a statement. I can only make a statement that has the support of all of you, so I would like to ask you in return - you asked me and I am asking you: One, I take it that all of you agree on the candidature of Ambassador Shannon. Two, there is a statement that has been read out by the G.21 - what is the situation? If you have problems with either of the two questions, I would like to hear them, otherwise if there are no problems it means there is consensus; if there are problems it means there is no consensus, in which case I would encourage you to continue consulting so that we can have a consensus on the language of the Presidential statement that I will have to make to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off.

I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, thank you for your analysis, which I think is very helpful. As you accurately recall, when we left your office yesterday afternoon we agreed we were going to take back a proposed Presidential statement - which I did - and it was after a discussion, as you have recalled, that pointed out that the version that had been proposed by the Group of 21 contained an historical inaccuracy. That historical inaccuracy persists in the statement read out by the G.21 Coordinator today. The fact is, as the procès-verbal will verify, that on 23 March 1995 it was not stated that the Committee was established under agenda item 2. We do not argue with the fact that Ambassador Shannon was operating under agenda item 2 - in fact, the document cited by the G.21 is proof of that. We do not argue that point at all, we just argue that historically the record will show that we did not state that we were establishing the Committee under agenda item 2, so we have not had an answer to the undertaking by the G.21 Coordinator that he would bring the latest draft which was put out in your name with the assistance of the Deputy Secretary-General yesterday evening. We have not had an answer from the G.21 on that; they have reverted to an earlier draft on which we spent over an hour in your office, Mr. President, pointing out it had an historical inaccuracy in it. So, far from trying to take apart the position of the Group of 21, we are trying to help them overcome an error which was well discussed yesterday. The statement that we all agreed to take back to our groups, I think you have before you. All the elements in proper historical perspective are there. The fact is that Ambassador Shannon undertook consultations under agenda item 2; the next fact is that the Shannon report was adopted; the next fact is, can we now have agreement on Ambassador Shannon as Chairman?

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): My apologies again for taking the floor for the third time. I would like to assure all delegations present here that this morning the draft Presidential statement just referred to by my friend and colleague was definitely circulated, discussed and considered at the G.21 consultations this morning and our joint response is as it stands in the statement that I have made on behalf of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: What you said would mean that the Group of 21, if this is the explanation, after examining the draft that came out and that you referred to the G.21 - the Presidential proposal was not accepted but that instead it went back to the former one. This is the understanding. If that is the case, then unfortunately there seems to be no consensus.

I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I am sorry to take the floor as the case is being argued very effectively by our Group Coordinator, but I would just ask you to consider whether you have not, in fact, established that there is consensus and it seems to me that a much simpler Presidential statement than that which has been produced so far would be perfectly adequate, would not endanger anyone's position at all, and would enable us to get on with the serious work of the Conference, and that statement would simply be: there is agreement that Ambassador Shannon of Canada should chair the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices established by the Conference on Disarmament on 23 March 1995. That seems to me to be adequate for all our purposes.

The PRESIDENT: You have now heard the simpler statement. Is there any reaction to that? Cuba has the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I would re-emphasize that the content of the discussion we are holding in this plenary this afternoon corresponds more to the Presidential consultations which are customarily held among the coordinators of the groups than the content of a formal plenary of this Conference. Now that the matter has been raised, and we are clearly not going to get out of this so easily, let me say two things. The Group of 21 agreed to the appointment of a special coordinator under item 2 of the Conference's agenda because the Group of 21 feels that this item is not merely a non-proliferation item, but is a topic which also inevitably has to be dealt with from the standpoint of disarmament. Including it in item 2 of the agenda of the Conference gave the item this perspective which the Group of 21 demanded for it. I am not going to spell out the reasons for this insistence, because we all know of the reluctance among some delegations to include in the discussion of this item the problem of stocks and the intention to limit the discussion of its scope solely and exclusively to the problem of future production, which from the standpoint of the security of many countries, including my own, fails to resolve the problems which are of concern to us. It has been said here that the task is to assist the Group of 21 to rectify an historical error. If the Committee on cut-off was established without bearing in mind the fact that this is an item which, by decision of everyone here, was dealt with within the context of article 2 of the Conference's agenda, the error does not lie in adopting a decision now through a Presidential statement saying that cut-off belongs to the general context of the total cessation of the arms race. The mistake was committed on 23 March, and that is why it is now necessary to correct not today's mistake but the mistake made on 23 March.

It was not our intention to raise this situation in view of the progress made in deciding to set up the Committee. But if a mistake was made it was not that of using a decision by the President to place this item in the context from which it should never have been removed, because I emphasize once again that the consideration and the designation of the Special Coordinator on fissionable material were based on the premise that he should be designated within the context of item 2 of the agenda of this Conference. Consequently, if an historical mistake was made it is not one that was made today, it was made on the 23rd, the decision taken on the 23rd. And that error has to be corrected. Consequently, for the reasons which I have just set out, it seems to me that to insist on a Presidential statement which ignores the fact that cut-off is a problem of the article under item 2 of the agenda of the Conference is to insist on disregarding a political decision by the Group of 21, and that in our view is not the way to negotiate nor is it the way to achieve results. Consequently I humbly suggest that at this point you should bring an end to this discussion and that consultations should once again be resumed within the appropriate context so that we can continue with the work of this plenary meeting.

The PRESIDENT: I have Mexico and the United Kingdom who have asked for the floor. However, given the fact that there is a request to resume consultations I will give the floor to Mexico and the United Kingdom and then, if there is no consensus, I suggest that you continue consulting and then we shall go back to the statements. Mexico has the floor - the representative of Morocco has the floor on a point of order.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I would like to make a very small comment. I do not think that this sort of debate is of no use or that it belongs in small committees, small hidden nooks. I think that this kind of debate is quite necessary and quite useful, and hence this discussion is welcome in this context as well and I would like you not to close the list of speakers after the next two speakers. If we have something to say, I think the debate belongs in this forum and not in the hidden corners of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: On the proposal of Morocco, the floor is now open on the discussion of this, so I would like to give the floor first to Mexico, then to the United Kingdom and any other delegation who may wish to take the floor. I give the floor to Mexico.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is of course very much in agreement with the proposal made by the distinguished delegation of Cuba, to the effect that it would be better to conclude our discussions in this forum. Experience has shown us that it is not the most appropriate forum for achieving a solution, but magnifies divergences to such an extent that it is not the most conducive to success in our negotiations. I asked for the floor, however, Sir, to make a number of comments on the consultations we held with you yesterday in the Presidential consultations.

There has been much talk here about historical inexactitude with respect to the Presidential statement on the organization of work. In fact, my delegation feels that it is rather a play on words, which some may choose to construe in a certain way, because in a forum similar to this one in an informal consultation this matter was fully discussed; I remember the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom referred to the fact that his delegation was indeed in agreement with having this matter addressed under item 2 but simply that his delegation preferred the first part of the name of the agenda, that is to say, cessation of the arms race, though others preferred the second part of the name of the agenda. So that in fact what we are dealing with here is the need to provide a framework for the work of the committee which is to be set up, since we have taken the decision to set it up, but in fact the establishment of a committee is when we have the first meeting with its chairman and its mandate and this is not the case we are handling at this moment.

I would also like to make a clarification. The only proposal by the President there is on this matter is the one which was circulated on 5 April, because while my delegation recalls yesterday's consultations, the second version which was circulated with the language of the Presidential statement was a suggestion by the Deputy Secretary-General, but it is by no means the proposal by the President of the Conference and this is how my delegation sees it. But in any case it is very clear to everybody that it is not possible to establish a committee in this Conference without making reference to an agenda item or, failing that, introducing this Committee's topic as an agenda item, which is not the case with the Committee on cut-off. Lastly, I would like to ask what is the urgency for the Committee to be set up on this point if we haven't the time to meet. So these will be my comments.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): If I may be less eloquent and more direct, may I suggest that we simply add to my earlier suggestion: "and that it should operate under agenda item 2"? No one is challenging this fact at all. The only reason that we have to do it this way rather than say that it was established on 23 March 1995 under agenda item 2 is that, unfortunately, it was not, and that was just bad advice, no doubt, by the Deputy Secretary-General. But that is how things stand. May I offer the statement again? "There is agreement that Ambassador Shannon of Canada should chair the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices established on 23 March 1995, and that it should operate under agenda item 2." "Operate" may not be the most elegant word, and our distinguished Deputy Secretary-General may be able to suggest another, but this would be my proposal.

The PRESIDENT: May I say that the text sent to group coordinators by the Deputy Secretary-General was done on my behalf and therefore I bear full responsibility for everything as President. We are really trying to see how we can reach consensus. Please bear in mind that we must have consensus. I now have Algeria on my list, but everybody who wants the floor will be able to take it. It is important that we remember that we operate by consensus. The distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom has made a proposal and he has added the idea of agenda item 2. There have also been some other comments. It is consensus that we are looking for and I would still urge that even if we talk until tomorrow, if there is no consensus then there shall be no Presidential statement. I can only make a statement that commands consensus. So, I will give the floor to Algeria, Egypt and then Hungary. Algeria has the floor.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): I would have taken the floor before the end of this plenary meeting, Mr. President, if only to say how pleased I am at seeing you chairing our work. Nevertheless, the turn the debate has taken is another reason prompting me to take the floor. First of all, I would like to recall what I myself said here on 23 March 1995 at the time of the adoption of Ambassador Shannon's report. I clearly said that Algeria is interested in the question of fissile materials inasmuch as the non-proliferation and disarmament dimensions were covered. My delegation holds to that position and fully agrees with the 21 position as set out just now by the honourable Ambassador of Myanmar. That said, I would like to tell you that my brief experience of this Conference suggests to me that the more we discuss controversial issues in plenary, the more hard and fast our positions become. That is why your suggestion concerning consultations is very wise and I fully support it. I would therefore propose that we return to the general debate and that in the meantime we conduct consultations so that we can possibly come up with a solution before the end of our work this afternoon. The honourable Ambassador of Great Britain has made a proposal. Maybe others also have proposals to make. Let us withdraw into a corner and discuss the matter. Maybe we can come up with a solution before we close. This may be too optimistic, but you have to be optimistic sometimes.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): I did not have the intention to intervene at this stage as I thought that the list of speakers in the plenary had been exhausted. I was engaged in a telephone conversation with my Minister, who is actually in Paris, so I came a little bit late to join you. I am perplexed concerning the state of our discussions regarding the statement read by the distinguished Ambassador of Myanmar on behalf of the Group of 21. I just wanted to place on record here that my delegation endorses this statement completely. If there is any difficulty whatsoever concerning the item under which the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off will work, I think that there is no misunderstanding also on that item and the statement read by the Ambassador of Myanmar on behalf of the Group of 21. That item is item 2. It cannot be any other item, otherwise we would like to hear which item other than item 2 we should place this Ad Hoc Committee under in order to operate. My delegation would also welcome and will support the idea of appointing Ambassador Gerald Shannon to chair this Ad Hoc Committee and to start its work as soon as feasible. The discussions on the wording of the Presidential statement would be very difficult to make during the plenary, but while you continue with the list of speakers, some of us could go outside to look at the language which would command consensus on this issue and we have the time to do that.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): My delegation has nothing against relating the operation of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off to agenda item 2, so for us it would be acceptable in whatever form it is acceptable to all of us, but we cannot accept to go against our own decisions and records, so since it has not been adopted with reference to agenda item 2, we think we have to find another way - either the short solution suggested by the United Kingdom or the version which emerged during our Presidential consultations referring to the conduct of Ambassador Shannon's consultations under agenda item 2. But I would like to make one observation. It has been mentioned that we have to correct the mistake, because it was a mistake to adopt the report and establish the Ad Hoc Committee without reference to agenda item 2. As I understand it, in our rules of procedure nothing is linking the establishment of any subsidiary body of the CD to any specific agenda item. So we would not go against the rules of procedure when we refer to agenda item 2 in another way, and not just by saying that it was adopted under agenda item 2, and I think this is a way of finding a compromise because we understand the interests of the distinguished

Group of 21 to relate the operation of this Committee to agenda item 2, but we cannot do that against a decision already taken by the CD, and if we consider this decision as legitimate, we would not go against the rules of procedure because nowhere in the rules is there the requirement of any linkage of any subsidiary body to any specific agenda item.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I have a very brief proposal to make. I would like to request you to take steps to ensure that the proposal made by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom is put on paper and distributed here in the room. And while this paper is being prepared, we could revert to the statements which are already scheduled, and then take a decision on this document when we have it before us.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for that constructive proposal, which the President endorses, so I suggest that with the assistance of the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom, we can have that proposal typed and circulated and in the meanwhile we will resume our work as we did before. I think this is agreed, and I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Germany.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and, as we have seen today, you lead us with your customary wisdom and we are grateful for this. I also would like to specially welcome our new Pakistani colleague, Ambassador Akram, who is really not a newcomer to this field - my direct opposite number for this month - I can assure him he will have a less colourful time here than I had because Miguel Marín Bosch is leaving us and I am grateful for all that Miguel Marín Bosch did to enlighten me in my endeavours here making our time really more fun and we will miss him.

I find that we are making progress in a way that I would describe as "pole pole" (which means slowly) and I really would have liked to go more swiftly, and these procedural debates we are having today show that the CD really could do better. However, we should not underestimate the statements we heard this morning; I think we had good news this morning and, by the way, this shows already how deeply entrenched in our work Ambassador Akram is, because even before he spoke, apparently he was able to give his thoughts to the mind-reading delegates of France and the United Kingdom because even before he read his speech they already answered some of his points, so I think there is basic understanding in the CD that will really bring us forward. On NSA and PSA we have heard very interesting statements this morning and I am grateful to the delegates who gave them to us; I think this will have a positive impact on the deliberations of the CD as well as on the review process in the NPT Conference later this month. We also had welcome news on the CTBT; we welcome the movement in a key issue as indicated by the delegation of the United Kingdom, namely, the withdrawal of the clause on so-called security tests from the scope article. I also think this is something that will bring our deliberations decisively forward. I would also like to welcome the joint NPT declaration that was presented by France this morning, which contains very helpful elements, and we agree with the aim of unlimited and unconditional extension of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my Ambassador has already had an opportunity to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and thanking the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General for their efforts in ensuring the smooth functioning of the work of this Conference. On behalf of my Ambassador, I would like to take this opportunity to convey best wishes to His Excellency Ambassador Marín Bosch and his family in the future and to welcome the new Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Akram.

I asked for the floor this afternoon to make my country's position clear with respect to the problem of negative security assurances. This consists in, first: these negative security assurances must be unconditional, that is to say they must not be dependent on membership of the non-proliferation Treaty. Like many other third world countries, my country's security interests are not covered or reflected in the non-proliferation Treaty. Secondly, we have always considered that security assurances must be the result of multilateral negotiations, preferably within the Conference on Disarmament, which, as everybody acknowledges, is the sole multilateral negotiating body on this matter. Security assurances for non-nuclear countries must also be comprehensive, that is to say they should not create exceptions or impose restrictions by means of qualifications. Lastly, it is also our position that these negative security assurances should not contain discriminatory elements.

This morning we listened very carefully to the addresses delivered on this subject. My capital is carefully studying the draft Security Council resolution published in New York City on 23 March, and if you will allow me a digression, Sir, this is perhaps the explanation for the statement by the delegation of Pakistan and not the fact that Ambassador Akram is able to read delegations' minds. But digressions apart, I wanted to say that on the appropriate occasion we shall respond formally to the text presented in New York. However, the elements constituting our position, which I listed at the outset, are not to be found in the draft which is circulating, despite the fact that our position is a position shared and reiterated by many countries in the third world. If the present draft resolution had been negotiated in the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, which this Conference has not been able to re-establish this year, we are sure that the resulting text would have the advantage of being much more representative of the interests of the non-nuclear countries, particularly the interests of those non-nuclear nations which are not protected under the umbrella of the only existing military alliance. As advocates of nuclear disarmament, we note with a degree of concern the way in which the draft resolution presented in New York, to which I have already referred, seems to sanctify the link that exists between the possession of nuclear weapons and permanent membership of the Security Council. For the rest, and as I have said, we shall be returning to this matter at the appropriate time and place. It only remains for us to associate ourselves fully with the statement made by the Coordinator of the Group of 21 this morning on this subject.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, Sir, I would like to tell you how pleased we are to see you in the Chair. I am sure that under your leadership the state of our work will make great strides forward. The task will not be easy, as we have seen just a few moments ago during the exchanges on cut-off. I would also like to bid a welcome in this forum to the new representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram, who certainly came straight to the point.

I am taking the floor today not in order to paint a full picture of the work of the first session of the Conference, but simply to express satisfaction at the way in which the work has proceeded. We believe that the Ad Hoc CTBT Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Dembinski, and the working groups under the chairmanship of Ambassadors Ramaker and Norberg, as well as the Friends of the Chair and special leaders, have done excellent work. If we compare the way things stood at the beginning of the year and the point we have reached now, whether it be in verification or in the legal and institutional field, true progress has been made and we are now going to be producing a revised rolling text which is more than encouraging. Serious obstacles have also been overcome, such as the American reservation providing for a withdrawal clause after 10 years had elapsed. This is a source of pleasure because the reservation cast unwelcome suspicion over our negotiations. In the same vein we note the decision announced today by the British, and endorsed by France, that so-called security tests would be abandoned. We are fully aware that this cannot have been an easy decision to take, so I wish to say publicly how much we appreciate it.

I also wanted to react to the recent statements made on the subject of security assurances. You are aware that Belgium, having chaired the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances last year in this forum, has a special interest in the subject. We have kept a close eye on all these negotiations conducted in Geneva on the fringes of the Ad Hoc Committee, and hence we now pay tribute to the efforts made by the negotiators from the five nuclear Powers. This was certainly not an easy task, but I think that today the commitment they have undertaken constitutes a very important step in the right direction and that we should all welcome it. Not only have they managed to a great extent to harmonize their security assurances, but they are also jointly tabling a draft resolution in the Security Council. Furthermore, as far as substance is concerned, I think we have to emphasize the innovation in the major commitments as regards positive assurances for States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

With good results concerning the CTBT, these commitments in the field of security assurances, to which we must add the statement just made by France on behalf of the four nuclear Powers relating to article VI of the NPT, we have proof that the responsible countries today are really convinced of the need to make progress in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. This augurs very well for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty review and extension Conference which will begin in New York in a week or so.

Lastly, I would not like to conclude without paying tribute to our colleague Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, who is bowing out today. Over the years we have appreciated not only his professional approach but also his personal qualities. There is no doubt that the Conference will feel the loss. We wholeheartedly wish him and his family every success and happiness in his new position.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Vattani.

Mr. VATTANI (Italy): Signor Presidente, innanzi tutto, mi consenta di esprimerle un augurio affettuoso. Lei è un grande amico dell'Italia e dà prova di saggezza romana in questi dibattiti. (First of all, allow me to convey friendly greetings to you. You are a great friend of Italy and have displayed Roman wisdom in these debates). I would like also to welcome here Ambassador Akram of Pakistan and wish our friend Miguel Marín Bosch success for the future.

I asked for the floor to express the deep satisfaction of my Government for the fact that after long and difficult negotiations the five States to whom the Treaty on non-proliferation recognizes the possession of nuclear weapons have reached an agreement upon a document on security assurances which is now the object of a Security Council resolution. The Italian Government deems of particular importance the fact that for the first time the five nuclear States have promoted a common initiative on this important issue so as to meet the expectations of several countries. We do hope that the process which, on the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference, allowed this first positive outcome, will continue in the future. We believe that the strengthening of security assurances represents a positive contribution to international peace and security for the benefit first of all of those countries which are parties to the NPT and are in compliance with its obligations. We wish to stress the political value of the fact that for the first time both negative and positive security assurances are contained in a single document, thus meeting the request of many members of the international community.

Although it was not possible to harmonize the specific unilateral commitments of the five States as to the non-use of nuclear weapons, we have considered with deep interest the unilateral declarations made public and we consider of high significance the simultaneous announcement of these declarations. We appreciate the new elements contained in the resolution with regard to the assistance to be provided in case of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We also believe that these documents will contribute to the establishment of a positive climate conducive to a decision at the forthcoming conference in New York on the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. The resolution joins in fact the important results registered in the past years in the field of nuclear disarmament whereas START I and START II are the main, although not the unique, evidences. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize the fact that the resolution represents an outcome which is to be added to the encouraging developments we are assisting here in Geneva in the field of prohibition of nuclear tests and I hope for a ban on production of fissile material for military purposes.

(continued in French)

Allow me, in the light of the discussion that has taken place today, on what you might call a historic day, to make a few observations on what has been said regarding developments in our negotiations on a CTBT. I fully share the feelings that have been expressed by the representatives of Germany and Belgium concerning the progress which, during this first part of the Conference, has been made towards drafting a text which is a good text for preventing nuclear tests. I would like to express our great gratitude to the men who have made these achievements possible. First of all the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski, but also the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassadors Norberg and Ramaker, and the dynamic Dr. Peter Marshall, and all the experts and other Friends of the Chair who made it possible during these first 10 weeks of the Conference to have a readable rolling text containing the basic elements of the future convention. We are also encouraged by the statements we have heard this morning from Sir Michael Weston, which are of fundamental significance as regards the purposes of the convention, that is, the elimination of this clause that the delegation of Great Britain had advocated, on this security test which has now been set aside; the statements which our friend Ambassador Errera made on the unlimited nature of the CTBT are also extremely encouraging. We hope that thanks to your énergy, Sir, it will be possible before the end of the day also to succeed in appointing the Chairman of the cut-off Committee, so that we will truly be able to say that today was a red-letter day.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

Mr. BENITEZ (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I will begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the post of President of this Conference on Disarmament, and wishing you every success in your duties. We would also like to express appreciation for the excellent work done by your predecessors, Ambassador Kurokochi and Ambassador Vattani in particular. We would also like to endorse the cordial words of farewell we have heard this morning for Ambassador Marín Bosch and the words of welcome for the Ambassadors of Pakistan, Morocco and Myanmar.

My Government notes with satisfaction the declaration on security assurances we have heard this morning from the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia. As you will remember, in our earlier statement before the plenary on 25 February last we pointed out the need felt by the non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to have additional security assurances and that these could be provided by the nuclear-weapon-possessing member States through the Security Council. We believe that such guarantees are consistent with the commitments which the non-nuclear-weapon States have entered into within the context of the non-proliferation Treaty, so that they meet our expectations in this respect. We have observed in the course of today, and I fear we will continue to see, that a number of delegations are not equally satisfied. But we also very much appreciate the significance of those security assurances as political commitments and we are aware of the efforts which were necessary to achieve them. We believe, therefore, that they represent a major step forward for global security and one of practical importance which is encouraging for future progress on other fronts of common interest, particularly at the forthcoming Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty. We also endorse the joint statement on the non-proliferation Treaty made this morning by Ambassador Errera in all its aspects. In a different vein, we wish to express our appreciation for the statements made by the United Kingdom and France when they referred to the scope of the CTBT and their willingness to withdraw the phrase relating to special tests, which of course takes into account the views expressed by various delegations in this matter.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I certainly did not ask for the floor to refer to the various proposals and unilateral statements presented today. My Government will be studying them together with the draft resolution which the five permanent members of the Security Council presented a fortnight ago. I asked for the floor really to express very sincere thanks for the kind and more than generous words which you uttered this morning, Mr. President, at the already distant start of this meeting. I also wish to express my thanks for the kind words expressed by a number of colleagues in the course of this long day.

In a few days I will be leaving the post of Permanent Representative of Mexico in this city and in a few months I will take up new duties. For some this may come as good news. The bad news for them is that I am still going to be accompanying them to New York to attend to the work of the NPT review and extension Conference.

For years now I have gone to the cinema very infrequently. This is because it seems rather pointless to go to watch a movie which a few days later I will have almost completely forgotten. I cannot recall the plot, let alone the names of the actors. However, the movie of the Conference on Disarmament is not one I forget. And I well remember the actors, and perhaps this is due to the fact that I have seen this particular film on three separate occasions.

When I sat down in this chamber for the first time, 25 years ago, our numbers had risen from 18 to 26. There were so few of us that there were two seats at the table for each delegation. And I had the great honour of sitting beside Ambassador Alfonso García Robles and Ambassador Jorge Castañeda. The Conference on Disarmament was presided over jointly by the United States and the then Soviet Union. Those two countries took the decisions on matters of substance and drew up the annual report to the General Assembly. In order to give the rest of us something to do, and perhaps to impart a semblance of democracy to the proceedings, the co-Chairmen allowed us to "chair" the plenaries on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Each delegation took turns to occupy the Chair every 25 plenaries, that is to say every four months. Consequently, within each year we moved around this table several times. However, though we may have moved a great deal physically, when it came to questions of substance we scarcely budged at all. Now we do not move about very much physically - barely one place every four weeks - but I think that we make more progress on the items on our agenda.

As a result of the very welcome changes introduced in 1978, each delegation now occupies the Chair for a month, and therefore more than six years go by before its turn comes round again. When I came to Geneva for the third time, more than five years ago now, Mexico had just served as president. And now I am leaving on the eve of our next term. Close, but no cigar, as they say.

During my first term here, the Group of 21 was the Group of 12 and met without interpretation in room I. At those meetings one could learn a lot, particularly from Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who in 1982 was to share the Nobel Peace Prize with Ambassador García Robles. But there were many other teachers. And now I realize how much they taught me. I also realize how much I have aged, because one of my colleagues in the early 1970s was the father of one of our Egyptian colleagues now.

The movie I watched in Geneva in this chamber between 1971 and 1975 was not very different from the film which ran between 1977 and 1978 or between 1990 and 1995. In all three there were various scenes of collective navel-gazing concerning the future role of the Conference. In 1971 the NPT and the sea-bed Treaty had been concluded and there were many questions concerning what the Conference was going to do. The most important agenda item concerned a joint ban on chemical and biological weapons. But there were some who did not yet wish to ban chemical weapons, and the Conference focused solely on eliminating the latter. Hence the 1972 Convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

In 1977 and 1978 we could not decide what to do and there was also a great deal of thinking, particularly concerning what was to be the first special session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to disarmament. And now, during my third term, we have found ourselves wondering whether there is life for the CD after the chemical weapons Convention. Last year, by embarking on negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, we managed to give a positive answer to that question.

You all know that the CTBT is a subject which is very dear to me. Carlos Fuentes tells an anecdote which reflects well what is going on in connection with this item, but could also apply to other matters on our agenda. Lost in some remote corner of the Mexican countryside, a couple of tourists stop their car to ask a peasant how to reach their destination. The peasant looks up at the midday sun and replies: "If you had set out earlier you'd be there by now".

Let us try to follow that advice. We have an obligation to be honest not merely with ourselves but with our other colleagues, and above all with those outside this chamber. First and foremost we are human beings and as such we must watch out for the welfare of our neighbours even though this may sometimes mean going counter to alleged "national interests". And this brings us to one of the main problems besetting multilateral negotiations here and in other forums: the nation State. We are here, of course, because we represent governments. That is our starting-point, but we must not turn it into an end in itself. We can, or rather we must, try to lay the foundations for progress in our task of disarmament. We are a kind of guild and we must continue to strengthen this feeling, this sense of collegiality.

I have been fortunate enough to represent a country whose foreign policy in general and disarmament policy in particular it is an honour to uphold. In that branch of national affairs, on est bien dans sa peau au Mexique. Our policy in this forum is such that at times we are mistaken for a non-governmental organization. And I feel rather proud about that because I have a great deal of respect and appreciation for many such organizations. They have so much to offer to our debates.

The role of the Conference secretariat is also important, and could and should be expanded. I thank all its members - those with visible roles and those behind the scenes - for the assistance they have given us.

And in conclusion, during my six years in Geneva I have participated in many meetings and specialized agencies based in this city. But I must confess that of the many tracks which are in operation simultaneously here, the Conference on Disarmament track has been by far my favourite.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, may I express the satisfaction of the Romanian delegation at seeing you in the Chair? I would also like to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, and express our regret that Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico is leaving us.

I would like to make a short statement with respect to the NSA and PSA declarations of China, Great Britain, France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. We would like, first of all, to pay due tribute for the efforts made by the five nuclear Powers to come to a common agreement on granting major both positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. These guarantees are consistent with the obligations undertaken by the nuclear Powers under the NPT. Romania welcomes this major step in the right direction. We especially appreciate the fact that this agreement of the five nuclear Powers comes just days before the opening of the NPT Conference in New York. This decision, we hope, is a good omen for the success of the Conference in New York in taking smoothly the decision for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. You are the last speaker and, as promised, we can now turn to the text that has been circulated as requested by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation and prepared by the United Kingdom. I would have a proposal to make. You have studied the text; it was put to you in order to see whether a consensus could be reached. If there is no consensus I shall not entertain discussion of this matter any more. So either you say you have a consensus on this or I would request you to go back and continue consulting. I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for having been able to give us this language as requested by the distinguished Ambassador of the Russian Federation; you have now read it, as it has been on the table for 20 minutes or more, so the question is: is there consensus? If there is no consensus there shall be no discussion of this item any more and I would request you to continue consultations and in the meanwhile we can go on with the business of the work. Silence means what? I give the floor to the representative of Myanmar.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): I myself have studied this text in detail and I am sure that my colleagues in the Group of 21 have done likewise. Others in other groups have also studied this text and may have some comments to make on it, but as the Coordinator of the Group of 21, I find myself unable to convey to you that the G.21 does have consensus on this. Having said that, however, we have heard various suggestions from you and from the floor. If we agree to adjourn for a while and then come back later in the hope that there will be consensus on this draft or an alternate proposal, then I am all for it. However, I think we stand for a ruling from the Chair, but this does not preclude anyone from the G.21 from taking the floor on this item at this time.

The PRESIDENT: So you are saying that you would see no consensus and you are suggesting that we should adjourn to discuss this? I give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco): I think that, if I may interpret what my colleague Ambassador Zahran of Egypt said a few minutes ago, it was that we could adjourn for a few minutes and then return. This means that maybe the Group of 21 should get together to discuss the draft and then come back in, say, 15 or 30 minutes. That is my understanding of what he said; maybe I am wrong, but I am giving my interpretation.

The PRESIDENT: It would appear that there is a request to adjourn for 15 minutes or so, to consider this. If this is the case, I would ask that we accept this on the understanding that in 15 minutes you can come and tell us what you have decided.

The meeting was suspended at 4.50 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I am sure that you have had enough time to consult on the text proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom, and reports reaching me indicate that there is no consensus, so I would suggest that we spend no more time on this item. I therefore request you to continue consulting and in the meanwhile we can proceed with other business.

I give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco): I am sorry to take the floor. I would simply like to register on the record that my delegation on its part would have been very happy to work on this proposal, to amend it or to give you a counter-proposal to try to have this Ad Hoc Committee started, but it seems that some others will not have it that way, so I will leave it at that.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, on behalf of the Western Group, we would like to ask under what time-frame we should continue to consult. Are we talking about continuing to consult to report back to you in early June? Or to continue consulting now in the hope that you could - if we were successful - call a very brief plenary session, perhaps tomorrow morning?

The PRESIDENT: You have heard the proposal. May I be honest with you? Obviously it is the intention of the Conference to meet tomorrow in plenary and - if this can be arranged - I personally would have no problem, but if this is not possible then it would mean that you would have to come back to report to us at the end of May because it is at the end of May that the Conference will reconvene to start the second part of the session. However, if there is consensus - and subject to confirmation that arrangements can be made to meet tomorrow morning in plenary - then, of course, I am in your hands, so this being the case you could continue consulting between now and 10 a.m. tomorrow morning. Should this not be possible, then there will be no other meeting until after the break. So here we have two possibilities.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): This is just in response to this new element that has been raised just now. I have had some consultations with a few of the delegations in my Group and I think they would find it rather difficult to get a definitive answer by tomorrow.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): As I understand it, a few delegations in the Group of 21 will not address the issue before us until some time six-seven weeks from now, and if that is the case, then on behalf of the Western Group, I would like to express a deep disappointment.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Perhaps I have been misunderstood. I would like to clarify that it was just a few delegations to whom I have talked about the possibility of continuing tomorrow. This is to say that I have not consulted each and every one of the Group of 21, and if I do so, perhaps the situation may be different from the reading that we get from our friend and colleague, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): This morning and early this afternoon, the Coordinator of the Group of 21 set down the position of the Group concerning the draft Presidential statement dated 5 April, and my delegation in its national capacity would like to reiterate its support for, to emphasize, the position taken by the Group of 21 through its Coordinator and also to state for the record our deep regret that this proposed text also failed to achieve the necessary consensus.

The PRESIDENT: It seems there is no consensus on this item, so I would request you to continue consulting. I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I think we are playing procedural games and we should not do this at this juncture. I think that on the substance we all agree around this table. There are two elements to this: one is that we want Ambassador Shannon to head the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, and everybody agrees; the second element is that the work of the Ad-Hoc Committee comes under agenda item 2, and everybody agrees. So therefore it is a simple question of getting this on a piece of paper in a wording that is agreeable to everybody. I think this should be feasible, and I submit to you that you should ask the groups to get together either this evening or tomorrow morning to discuss this matter, and then, under your leadership, have the group coordinators settle this problem and then a 10-minute plenary during the day tomorrow in order to settle this. I think it is simply ridiculous that we cannot establish a functioning Ad Hoc Committee so that it can start working at the beginning of the next session, and it has also some added value because if Ambassador Shannon knows that he is Chairman of this Committee, he can already do some intermediate work. If he hangs in limbo, he will not go around and consult and prepare his meetings. So I think it is absolutely necessary, and we owe it to ourselves, to establish this Committee during this part of the session, and we should make an all-out effort and time should not hinder us.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to find out whether it would be possible for us to have a meeting tomorrow morning, and then to see if this meeting will be acceptable by consensus.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): I would like to say that the Conference has already adopted a tentative timetable which provides for meetings of two working groups and an Ad Hoc Committee, but whatever your decision, the secretariat will be ready to provide all the necessary services. We are at your disposal.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I put what I had suggested on a piece of paper at the request of the distinguished Ambassador of the Russian Federation, and I think that was probably a mistake, because I don't think we need a piece of paper. Surely, with all due respect, you need to ask us two questions. The first is: is there agreement that Ambassador Shannon should chair this Ad Hoc Committee? The second is: is there agreement that it should be under agenda item 2? If the answer to both those questions is "yes" - and I can't for the life of me believe that anyone does not agree with both those propositions - then we are home and dry and we can all go and get on with something more useful.

The PRESIDENT: I have actually asked those questions, and I think I have received a clear answer to the first question: the problem seems to be with the second question. This is what we are trying to find out. I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): I just wanted to support those who have suggested that tomorrow morning first thing, that is, at 10 o'clock, we have another plenary meeting of the Conference, and it would seem to me that we could then use the time between now and 10 o'clock tomorrow morning to see whether we can find a solution. I appreciate the problem my neighbour to my right has that he cannot, in time, have a collective Group position, but I don't think that is needed because we have here a number of delegations who are particularly concerned with this, and I suppose that on the basis of the text which has now been circulated, they should be able to find an agreement on something that - as was suggested - we basically agree. We basically agree who is going to be the Chairman, and we basically agree that this Ad Hoc Committee has to start its work, and I hope that everybody agrees that it will start its work soon and that it is not being linked to other considerations, but I would hope that that is not the case and that, therefore, it should be possible to make such a decision fairly soon. Therefore, I support what previous speakers have said, that tomorrow we hold a plenary meeting and that in the meantime those most concerned find a solution to this, and I think we are only inches away from an agreement.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba - but in your statement, could you please also indicate whether you would be agreeable to having a meeting tomorrow morning, which would mean that between now and tomorrow morning you would consult? Could you address this matter, Madam?

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): When you suspended this plenary to give time for consultations by the Group of 21, you made a ruling, and it was in the light of that ruling that the consultations by the Group of 21 took place. When you made your ruling there was not a single delegation that challenged the ruling you made, that is to say that you would permit time for consultations and if, as a result of those consultations, there was no consensus on the matter, you would not reopen the debate on the item in this plenary. I would ask you, Sir, what is the status of the ruling you made, which was not challenged by anyone, because we are now considering the possibility of meeting again tomorrow. Because, I repeat, the consultations we held were based on the ruling which you made and which was accepted by everyone. Therefore there is a contradiction between your ruling, the acceptance by the Conference and the proposal which is now before us.

The PRESIDENT: Do you realize, the distinguished representative of Cuba, that I may make some rulings but if there is a delegation interested in taking the floor, I cannot prevent that delegation from speaking? Yes, that was my ruling and I would have liked, since there was no consensus, that nobody took the floor. Delegations asked for the floor and I had to give them the floor, unless you want me to rule not to give the floor to anybody else.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I would like to support what you just said, and we are not discussing substance now. We are just discussing the question of how we can come to a decision in an orderly fashion, and I recognize that the Group of 21 has not taken the opportunity to meet during the break but had consultations which were not sufficient to establish a Group view. Therefore, I think we owe it to the Group of 21 to give them the time to come to a Group view and, hopefully, with this Group view, to come, in consultation with the other groups and probably under your leadership, to a joint decision. So I really would propose to give delegations the time to meet tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock for Group consultations, then probably at 10 o'clock you could meet with the group coordinators, then at 11 o'clock we could see whether we need more Group consultations and at 12 o'clock we could have a plenary. This would distract us from some of our other work, but I think it would be worthwhile.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Just to say that I agree with the time schedule except that we also have the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and prior to that we have to do a few other things, so I think we should maybe squeeze it a little bit, but nevertheless I support this approach.

The PRESIDENT: I take it that the proposal by Germany is acceptable to the Conference.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Mexico - I am sorry I did not see you. You have the floor.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I didn't understand what you decided because you didn't give us time to think about what was proposed by the distinguished representative of Germany. But in any case I don't understand. What is the hurry? - could somebody explain to me why the United States is in a hurry, why Germany is in a hurry, why the countries which have spoken are in a hurry? I don't understand it. Ambassador Shannon is not here. We haven't time to meet. We have the whole of the next meeting to do it. Why the rush to take time away from other activities scheduled for tomorrow? We are preparing for a very important conference. Let somebody explain this, because frankly I don't get it. I think it is totally unprecedented to be placed in this situation.

The PRESIDENT: I will now rule from the Chair, as follows. I will be in my office tomorrow from 9 o'clock, so between now and tomorrow I would ask you to consult. If you agree that there is a need for a meeting, please contact me as well as the secretariat so that the meeting can be held. If there is no consensus, it means that we will have to consult between now and the second part of the CD session. We cannot go on like this. So please let me know what you want by tomorrow. If I do not hear from anybody, it means that you have not agreed, and I request you to continue discussing this matter. This is the ruling from the Chair. My list of speakers has now been exhausted.

As I mentioned at our plenary meeting last Thursday, I should now like to turn to the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of document CD/1296 to the effect that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events be held from 7 to 18 August 1995. May I take it that these dates are acceptable to the Conference?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, who wishes to make a short statement in connection with the issuance of the Secretary-General's publication entitled The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): As you just mentioned, Mr. President, I wish to bring to the attention of the Conference the recently issued United Nations publication entitled The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The Secretary-General initiated the project given the utmost importance he attaches to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The publication is part of his Blue Book series, which addresses issues of critical importance to the world community. The fact that the book has been issued just prior to the convening of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not coincidental. The Secretary-General believes the upcoming Conference offers the parties to the Treaty a critical opportunity to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and its bulwark NPT treaty, and thereby promote international peace and security. The Secretary-General stresses that:

> "The NPT's importance cannot be overemphasized ... The NPT remains the vital instrument it has always been. For the nuclear non-proliferation regime to remain effective, the Treaty must remain in force."

The Blue Book provides an in-depth look at the NPT, the cornerstone of efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are available for peaceful purposes.

The Secretary-General also addresses recent progress in nuclear disarmament, stating that "The rapid pace of the present disarmament process is a welcome change from the previous inertia". He cites the INF Treaty, the START I and II treaties and the Lisbon Protocol as examples of such changes.

The Blue Book also contains an extensive and invaluable chronology of important events related to the NPT, as well as the texts of relevant agreements, declarations and resolutions.

Emphasizing the indispensability of the NPT to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Secretary-General writes:

> "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the nuclear non-proliferation regime continue to serve the international community well. Lack of security, real or perceived, and expanded energy needs are the root cause of concerns about proliferation. This dual challenge of peace and prosperity necessitates an integrated approach to disarmament, collective security and economic and scientific cooperation. States parties to the Treaty that have renounced the intention to develop nuclear weapons consider that they should participate fully in the

(Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

> technological, commercial and developmental benefits of nuclear energy. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT or comparable treaties also consider that they should receive satisfactory security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. It is widely agreed that a comprehensive nuclear test ban, one of the highest-priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, should be concluded as soon as possible."
>
> "Efforts that promote means to achieve these ends are worthwhile and should be supported. Threatening to withhold support for a measure that is clearly beneficial in an effort to hasten progress elsewhere is not, I believe, helpful. The NPT is too crucial to be subjected to this type of diplomatic brinkmanship."
>
> "Finally, the NPT does not limit itself to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty's call for 'general and complete disarmament' is an essential provision. The international community has a unique opportunity today to make progress in the regulation of armaments. The United Nations stands ready to help its Member States to fulfil this wish of their people everywhere."

We here at the Conference on Disarmament have an important contribution to make towards cementing further the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Secretary-General emphasized that:

> "Prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons represents a major impediment to their proliferation. Though current technology enables nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons to be developed and manufactured without testing, their reliability would be suspect and this would make them less desirable. A comprehensive ban on testing would inhibit the introduction of new weapons and thus curtail sharply the qualitative development of nuclear weapons."

Mr. President, I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to bring to your attention an issue close to the heart of the Secretary-General as many of you prepare to leave for New York. I hope that this contribution of the United Nations Secretariat will prove a useful resource at the review and extension Conference, as well as at our Conference.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Petrovsky, for your statement. I am sure I speak for all of us here when I say that we highly appreciate the efforts and the initiative of the Secretary-General to issue this book which is a very important reference material and which could be, as you yourself have said, of use to us, both at the Conference on Disarmament and at the NPT review and extension Conference. I wish to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations once more for this valuable contribution.

As you are aware, there are still a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session which are still the subject of intensive consultations. It was my hope that I might have been in a position to report progress on some of these issues. However, it appears that more time is indeed needed. Therefore, I intend to actively pursue my consultations during the inter-sessional period in order to allow the Conference to make a smooth and effective start to the second part of its 1995 session. I hope I can rely on all of you to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a tentative timetable of meetings planned for the first week of the second part of the session, to be held from 29 May to 2 June 1995. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): To agree, even under the "merely indicative" rubric, that this timetable is acceptable would be, for the Western Group, admission of total failure in our attempt to get work started on the fissile/cut-off issue. It also would mean that, once again, the Western proposal for the immediate re-establishment of the ad hoc committees on negative security assurances, outer space and transparency in armaments is rejected and could not be solved. Now, the Western Group is hoping that we will have a plenary tomorrow and we would like to address the issue of the timetable and maybe even the re-establishment of three ad hoc groups and the energizing, under a new chairmanship, of another ad hoc committee either this afternoon or tomorrow morning.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): I think that since we have at least already established one of the ad hoc committees, i.e. the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, we should now provide for its work to begin. Therefore, I think we have to reconsider this timetable which also largely depends on the outcome of the consultations you propose, Mr. President, I think we should come back tomorrow to the timetable and see what we can do because now, as I see it, Monday morning and Friday afternoon are free and then perhaps we would have to reshuffle things, but in any case we already have one committee and we are hopeful to be able to establish three more. I think that at this stage it would be premature to accept this and, as you said yourself, this is always subject to certain amendments, but we can already foresee that we would very likely need more time for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, at least at the beginning.

The PRESIDENT: From the two statements, I think it is clear that there is need for a meeting tomorrow - I think it comes to that. Mexico has the floor.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation had refrained from taking the floor out of a sense of discretion. I think there are very many matters on which we can move forward, as was done by the distinguished representative of the United States. The hour is now rather late. All of us in this room are well aware that at this stage it is not possible to achieve agreement. I do not agree with what was said by the distinguished representative of the United States, that there is a total failure on the question of fissile material. Proof of this is that a decision was taken to establish a committee. That was the objective of the Western Group, to establish a committee, and our Group, even though it had many difficulties, even though the mandate we arrived at for work on this committee is very ambiguous, we were flexible and we agreed that a decision should be taken to establish this committee. That can very well be put on the list of achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament.

At this stage, there is no doubt as to the identity of the person who will fill this post. We have great esteem for, we have a very high opinion of the distinguished Ambassador Shannon, who has shown us the work he is capable of doing. But there is no agreement with respect to form, and this is the truth, because the problem here is not just a question of how to find the words to enable us to appoint Ambassador Shannon - there is a problem of substance which we are not going to resolve in a morning's work. The question of the re-establishment of the three ad hoc committees is a failure because a distinguished Ambassador here took it upon himself to make a link at a certain point, and with that we all went ahead. There is no problem with the re-establishment of the committees on outer space and safety assurances. Nobody has any difficulty at all. There is no problem as regards the need to work on the issue of conventional weapons, no one has any problem, but it wasn't possible to reach agreement on the mandate. On all of these matters, we are not going to be able to resolve anything at all in half a day, and I do not agree that there has been a total failure on any of them. All the positions of each and every one in this Conference are perfectly worthy. It is just the sequence of events which has brought us to this state of affairs. So you have given a ruling, Sir, and I would beseech you to stand by your position and for us to hold consultations in keeping with our practice. Nothing will happen if we have a day not knowing which groups are going to be working at the start of the next session - nothing will happen now, as nothing happened in the past. This is the practice which unfortunately has been followed in this Conference, because failure to resolve matters of substance has led us to focus on questions of form.

The PRESIDENT: From that statement it is clear that the delegation of Mexico is not in favour of having a meeting tomorrow morning. This is what it means. My question was: can we have a meeting tomorrow? - which would mean allowing for the groups and delegations to consult and after consultations, to have a plenary. This is my question. Could you please tell me yes or no to that question for a meeting tomorrow? I want to be guided. I repeat my question, which was whether or not we can have a meeting tomorrow morning which would allow first of all the groups to meet and then later on to have a plenary. Could you let me know what your thinking is on this? I know there are problems; I know we have understood that Ambassador Shannon is the agreed person, but other problems of substance exist, as the delegation of Mexico has said. It is agreed that there is a need for further consultations, but let the President know whether tomorrow group meetings can be held and then a plenary to discuss these matters; if not, please indicate, that is all I am asking. I am aware of the problems, but let me know so that before we leave we know that there will be no meetings tomorrow. I want to know that. Cuba has the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I don't think it is going to be possible to make any progress if at each step we are going to alter the rules. For the second time this afternoon you made a ruling and once again all of us agreed to it. You said that you would be in your office tomorrow morning and that the coordinators should inform you whether or not there was consensus on a morning meeting, and that is the agreement. I don't understand why we should depart from that ruling which - I re-emphasize - you made and we all accepted. Likewise, I don't understand how it is possible to try to sum up what the distinguished delegate of Mexico has just said by saying that Mexico is opposed to a meeting tomorrow. I think you know, Sir, that we share Mexico's views on this. We have spent three months discussing these matters in this Conference and we are not suddenly going to reach a solution tomorrow morning, because that is how things are. The Mexican delegation asked a very relevant question, which has still not been answered: why must we take a decision within 24 hours on these matters that have been under negotiation for three months now? Why? There is no reason to do so. The Mexican delegation's question has gone unanswered, and for that reason I would suggest that you stand by the ruling you have already made and that you keep yourself available to us all tomorrow in your office and await the outcome of the consultations which the coordinators will convey to you as to whether or not there is consensus that we should meet tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT: That is the ruling, and it is so decided. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? - incidentally, not on what I've ruled. The ruling is this: after these discussions here, there is simply no consensus for a meeting. Therefore, I will be in my office tomorrow morning - and the secretariat will also be available - so that you may get in touch as to whether there will be a meeting. If there is any further discussion on this, I will overrule you. Please, we are not going to talk about this any more as otherwise we will be here until tomorrow. There is going to be no progress on this, so if you are taking the floor in order to come back to this question, I will overrule you.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, after what you have just said, I would hardly dare to come back to this question, but I would only like to say something, if indeed this was the last word on the issue of whether or not we are going to have a plenary tomorrow, because after that I would like to make a practical point with regard to poor Working Group 2, over whose heads all of this has happened this afternoon. But I just wanted to be sure that this was the last word on the question of the plenary meeting tomorrow, as otherwise I shall defer making my point; I am in your hands. If there are no other meetings, then of course I would like to make a point on where Working Group 2 stands with its work. According to the clock, it is one minute to six, so Working Group 2 will not meet this afternoon; it will have to meet tomorrow after the decision with regard to the plenary meeting we are talking about now. With regard to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, in tomorrow's timetable, first is a meeting of Working Group 1 followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. I suggest that I get in touch with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to at least reverse the order, so that in the Ad Hoc Committee we can decide that there will be both a Working Group 1 and a Working Group 2 meeting tomorrow, as it is the only solution to the simple fact that we could not find the time this afternoon to have the meeting that was scheduled in my "merely indicative" timetable. My suggestion is that maybe this could be done through you, or through the secretariat, or I could do it myself, that we apprise the Polish delegation - and there is a member of the Polish delegation in the room here - that in our view, tomorrow at 10 o'clock we would start with a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, which would mean a change in this time schedule for the Chairman, and that there we decide how we are going to divide the remaining time between Working Group 1 and Working Group 2.

The PRESIDENT: Maybe we could also consult with the secretariat on this.

Mr. SINCLAIR (Canada): Mr. President, this has, of course, been a disappointing and frustrating afternoon for the Canadian delegation to sit through, but we will be guided by your ruling. I take the floor simply to say that some days ago we had planned another activity as well for this afternoon and I would like to announce to members of the "Mason group" that we will have a short meeting in room I as soon as the plenary has concluded, and we hope to be able to start in a few minutes.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Speaking in my national capacity, I would ask the Chairman of Working Group 2, through you, Mr. President, whether it is not necessary to have an Ad Hoc Committee meeting at the end of the day, and is he proposing that there be first an Ad Hoc Committee meeting simply to divide up the day and then have one or two working groups meet and then the Ad Hoc Committee at the end of the day? Is this the proposal? If so, could it not be compressed a little in order to reach a decision now that he start off first, Working Group 1 following next and that the Ad Hoc Committee is at the end of the day, so that we can register all progress?

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of the United States for his suggestion. Yes, indeed, there also has to be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee as such at the end to adopt whatever has been decided in the two working groups. If we could decide here on an order, that would naturally be the most practical way of doing it, and I am all in favour of that. There is a Working Group 1 meeting scheduled for 10 a.m., and I do not know what the delegation of Sweden thinks of it; however, either way it would be fine - start with Working Group 2 at 10 a.m., followed by Working Group 1. At any rate, I do agree with the Ambassador of the United States that we will also have to have a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at the end.

Mr. LINDGÄRDE (Sweden): I would just like to say that it is fine with the Swedish delegation if the Netherlands and Working Group 2 start at 10 o'clock. It is only very important for Working Group 1 that we get at least one hour tomorrow morning, and if we could have this hour after Working Group 2, that would be fine for us.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Simply to support the proposal which was made by the Ambassador of the United States that we decide here and now that we will meet tomorrow at 10 a.m. starting with Working Group 2, that we will then meet at 11 a.m. with Working Group 1 and following that, if I have understood properly what has just been said by the representative of Sweden, at noon the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear tests.

The PRESIDENT: It is now clear, and action will be taken accordingly. As I said earlier, I will be available in my office from 9 o'clock onwards so that you may tell me what it is that you have decided. In the event that there is no meeting tomorrow, please indicate how you are going to deal with the question of the timetable of meetings for the first week of the second part of the session. If we do not meet tomorrow, it means that there will be no meetings until after the break. Are there any instructions to be given? How do we handle the second part of the session in the event we do not meet? Let me repeat what I read regarding the tentative timetable: "The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a tentative timetable of meetings planned for the first week of the second part of the session, to be held from 29 May to 2 June 1995. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?" "Tentative" means subject to change. Before we leave, we must know what we are going to do after the break, so I think you need to give some instructions on this. We do not know what will happen tomorrow, but in the event that there is no meeting tomorrow, this will be our last meeting during this first part of the session until after the break, so I think that before we adjourn, we need to know what is going to happen, or at least to give some instructions.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco): Mr. President, I apologize for taking the floor once again, but it seems to me that everybody has understood the implications of not adopting this tentative schedule. So be it. If nobody wants to have the first meeting, maybe we will have it at the resumed session. It is my conviction that we will not have any meeting tomorrow, but everybody understands all of that, so if nobody says anything then you have to draw conclusions.

The PRESIDENT: Would the conclusion be that you adopt this for the first week of the second part of the session?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Having adopted this, it means that the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, unless we meet tomorrow, will be held on Thursday, 1 June 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.706
1 June 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President:	Miss C.B. Onyoni	(Kenya)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 706th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As you may be aware, the head of my delegation is unable to chair this meeting today and, therefore, in accordance with rule 10 of the Conference's rules of procedure, I will be replacing him. I am sure I can count on your cooperation and indulgence.

I should like, first of all, to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the newly appointed representatives of Finland, Ambassador Ekblom; of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer; Ambassador Icaza of Mexico; and Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia. I wish to assure them of our full support and cooperation in their new duties.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Japan, Romania, Argentina, the Islamic Republic of Iran, New Zealand and Belgium. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Ekblom.

Mr. EKBLOM (Finland): Madam President, thank you for your kind words of welcome.

The CD is starting its second round of this year's session in the aftermath of the review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Finland welcomes the historic decision to make the NPT permanent. Despite differences in the political and security perspectives between States parties, the Conference was able to reach a consensus decision. The States parties demonstrated their shared interest in the benefits of the Treaty. The global norm was further strengthened. I would like to pay a special tribute in this connection to South Africa. South Africa's innovative ideas for improving the future implementation of the NPT laid the basis for a consensus decision on indefinite extension.

The fact that the NPT is now permanent has thoroughly changed the normative environment in which nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are pursued. This is a new departure. A need to look forward was underlined by the decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as on the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty. Finland supports these decisions as a framework for future non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

We hope that the new environment in multilateral disarmament will encourage a process of regeneration that makes it more responsive to today's - and tomorrow's - needs. That would create better prospects for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Much rests upon the CD, as the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Finland looks forward to rapid progress in a number of areas and is ready to contribute to that end. I would therefore like to take up the following areas that, in our view, deserve immediate attention.

First, review of the agenda and programme of work of the CD. The annual debate about the traditional agenda of the CD should be finally laid to rest.

Instead, the Conference should concentrate, on an annual basis, on operational priorities. This year, the process of establishing ad hoc committees has been far from exemplary. In our view, discussion on this subject should not be prolonged any further. Of the ad hoc committees that have been under discussion, the Committee on Transparency in Armaments is the one that offers new ground for multilateral work. Regrettably, the same cannot be said of the committees dealing with security assurances and outer space. However, new possibilities for a fresh approach could perhaps be found in the discussion of security assurances after the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 - a resolution which we certainly welcome.

We urge the CD to launch the committees now. Above all, we hope that the Committee on the cut-off negotiations could start immediately.

Secondly, review of the procedures of the CD. More efforts should be made to streamline the procedures of the Conference. The value of increased flexibility has become obvious. In this context, I want to raise two specific issues. We believe that all interested States that participate in the work of the Conference, even if not members, should be more effectively involved in the informal work of the Conference, including Presidential consultations and consultations relating to committees as well as - on a case-by-case basis - in group consultations. This would facilitate the participation and the commitment of these countries in the work of the Conference as well as enhance the cooperation between all the participating States in pursuit of global disarmament objectives.

In addition, the practice by which each year several weeks are spent on report-writing should be critically reviewed. In our view, a brief technical report could well replace the existing CD report to the General Assembly. Substantive positions are already reflected in official documents and recorded statements.

Thirdly, review of the composition of the CD. The Conference should finally conclude the endless discussion on the expansion of its membership. Inconclusive talk begins to reflect upon the CD's credibility as a whole. It is simply unacceptable that an objection to one candidate prevents the entry of the rest, including Finland. In our view the Conference could move on this issue by adopting a solution with a qualifying statement to the effect that, for reasons relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security, one new member is subject to international action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Alternatively, the Conference could agree to replace that one country in the proposed list with one or more other candidate countries.

Fourthly, the cut-off negotiations. We hope that the cut-off negotiations will start without further delay. We regard the questions relating to fissile material stockpiles as being of major importance. Nevertheless, calls for inclusion of stockpiles in the negotiations are clearly counterproductive, if the consequence is that the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes is thereby delayed.

In the context of the cut-off, a much closer relationship needs to be developed with the expertise available in Vienna than is the case with the CTBT negotiations.

Fifthly, the CTBT negotiations. The success of the NPT Conference should facilitate the CTBT negotiations. A clear objective has now been established. The CD should complete the negotiations no later than 1996. This clearly means that the participating States must continue intensive negotiations throughout the second half of 1995. Skipping extensive report-writing is a good idea in this context as well.

Finland urges all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from test explosions. It was with deep disappointment that we learned of yet another Chinese nuclear explosion, and only days after the nuclear-weapon States, including China, had pledged to exercise utmost restraint in this regard. Continued nuclear testing does not fit anyone's definition of utmost restraint. It certainly does not fit ours.

A universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT is now within reach. Let us all now work together to finally put an end to the era of nuclear-test explosions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Madam President, at the outset, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Nanjira, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, and his delegation for the devoted efforts toward good and effective management of the Conference which were amply demonstrated during the previous plenary meetings. I am confident that under your able guidance the Conference will be able to work productively and I assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation to that end.

Today I wish to present brief observations on some disarmament issues, in view, in particular, of the achievements of the NPT review and extension Conference held during our inter-sessional period.

Japan is satisfied that there exists a general will in support of the stabilization and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As was stated by Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, immediately after their adoption, Japan welcomes wholeheartedly the decisions taken without a vote at the NPT Conference; namely, a decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, as well as decisions on "strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Minister Kono, who had attended the Conference, had re-emphasized Japan's position to seek the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, based on Japan's experience as a country that suffered the consequences of nuclear bombs, and at the same time, from the stand of clearly renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, had expressed Japan's support for the indefinite extension of the NPT, which played an important role in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, he had expressed his hope that as many States parties as possible share this basic view of Japan, which, it may be argued, turned out to be true.

The document "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" lists in paragraph 4 as the important measures in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty (a) the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996, (b) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention, and (c) the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

With respect to reductions of nuclear weapons, Japan sincerely hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will take it upon themselves to pursue, with determination, systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their elimination, in response to the trust placed in them by non-nuclear-weapon States.

As for the cut-off negotiations, my delegation fully agrees that the negotiations should be commenced immediately here in the CD and efforts should be made for an early conclusion of the negotiations. In this connection, Japan supports Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on this subject.

As is envisaged in the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", we, the CD collectively, should spare no efforts to have the CTBT negotiations concluded as soon as possible but no later than 1996. The work on a CTBT in this second part has already been started. Japan, for its part, is ready to make all possible efforts to that end.

In this connection, the "Principles and objectives" also state that "pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint".

It is extremely regrettable that the People's Republic of China conducted another nuclear test on 15 May, in addition to those in June and October last year, immediately after the NPT Conference had decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely and to strengthen the NPT regime, thereby giving a new hope to the international community on steady promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Japan once again strongly urges China not to repeat nuclear testing, and also appeals to other nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should endeavour to achieve steady progress on arms control and disarmament, so that the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world may come closer to reality.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): It is a great pleasure for me to speak before the Conference on Disarmament in the aftermath of the historic decision taken by the NPT review and extension Conference to make the non-proliferation Treaty permanent. This decision, together with that on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the resolution endorsing the Middle East peace process objectives, including the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, are indeed a valuable outcome and strong foundation for future achievements in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament, an important contribution to the strengthening of international security and stability.

Thus reinforced, the NPT is called to play an improved pivotal role in consolidating nuclear stability, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the disarmament process, as well as in deepening international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Yet we owe ourselves further, unabated work for ensuring the universality the NPT needs in order to achieve its generally commendable goals.

The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely is a crucial event not only for the non-proliferation regime but also because it opened a new, challenging chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. It is now high time for us all to redouble efforts aimed at ridding the world of the threat of mass destruction and to build up a more secure international environment.

Under the permanent NPT the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to play an enhanced role in - at the very least - finalizing the comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996, launching substantive and productive negotiations on a cut-off treaty, and deepening the dialogue on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The first part of this year's session registered encouraging progress in important areas of negotiation on a CTBT. Yet major issues remain to be solved, such as the scope of the treaty and basic obligations, the shape of the international monitoring system, the financing of verification activities, the future CTBT organization.

Romania shares the view that the CTBT must ban all nuclear tests, everywhere and forever. At the same time, it would be unrealistic for the treaty to apply to activities which are not practically verifiable, such as computer simulations and laboratory experiments. What we need is a credible, effective instrument that serves indeed the non-proliferation goals.

The Romanian Government highly appreciates the recent decision taken by the United Kingdom and France to give up the proposal intended to allow test explosions in exceptional circumstances as a major breakthrough in moving towards agreement on the scope article.

We also welcome the progress made so far in the drafting of the treaty articles on the international monitoring system. Such a system, supported by efficient on-site inspections, consultations and clarification procedures, will be able to accurately deter suspect events and possible non-compliance.

Signing the CTB treaty next year is a bold but attainable aim. The accomplishment of this aim requires consistent endeavours by all participating States for preserving and improving the international climate of mutual confidence. We welcome and appreciate the commitment of all the five nuclear-weapon States to embrace a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1996.

Romania was among those countries who have resolutely been supporting the early starting of negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. My Government maintains the view that codifying the cessation of the production of weapons-grade materials in a legally binding instrument would reassure the world community that these materials are not being secretly produced or procured. Furthermore, it would help to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda and constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In our view, at this initial stage the cut-off negotiations should focus mainly on the question of treaty scope and effective verification. We should aim at ensuring its non-discriminatory character and universal adherence to it. The Romanian delegation will be pleased to elaborate further on these important topics in the framework of the respective Ad Hoc Committee, which we hope will start working soon.

Turning to another important issue, namely NSA, I would like to reiterate my country's satisfaction at the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 984 on 11 April 1995 and the individual declarations of the five nuclear-weapon Powers on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and assistance in cases of aggression with such arms. We consider this a major achievement which mirrors the ever-growing international spirit of mutual understanding, as a dividend of the post-cold-war era. This encouraging trend must continue and improve qualitatively. The discussions among the P5 and, perhaps, in the broader framework of the Conference on Disarmament should create the necessary conditions for eventually starting negotiation on a legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States - a long-awaited goal in the overall peace and stability process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): We have asked for the floor merely to draw the Conference's attention to document CD/1314, by means of which we have conveyed to this Conference a statement made on the 23rd of this month by the Argentine Government on the nuclear explosion carried out by the People's Republic of China on 15 May last.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): I am taking the floor this morning to report to this Conference the response of the New Zealand Government and people to the underground nuclear-weapon test conducted by China on 15 May at Lop Nor.

The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement the following day in which he conveyed the sense of extreme shock felt by all New Zealanders at the news of the test. The Minister added that the action should be "strongly condemned" coming as it did immediately after the decision in New York to make the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty permanent.

The New Zealand Government believes that China's failure to declare a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme runs counter to China's responsibility as a major Power and permanent member of the Security Council. There can be no justification for any testing, especially now that China and the other nuclear-weapons States have agreed to a deadline for completion of this Conference's CTBT negotiations no later than 1996.

The strong protest of the New Zealand Government and people has been conveyed directly to the Chinese authorities in both Beijing and Wellington. We urge China to heed the many calls made in relation to this latest test and to announce a permanent moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the conclusion of the CTBT and its entry into force.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wish first to extend my sincere congratulations to Ambassador D.D.C. Don Nanjira for assuming the post of the presidency of this august body. I wish him all success and assure him of the full cooperation of my delegation. I would also thank Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, the outgoing President of the Conference who guided the Conference very efficiently and skilfully during the previous month. I would further express my sincere appreciation to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, for their very valuable contribution to the work of the Conference.

The NPT review and extension Conference and hesitation about its possible outcome had been a major preoccupation for many States for sometime, and lack of consensus on the form of the future life of the Treaty had cast a shadow on disarmament negotiations in various areas.

We were faced with a divided camp. A group including some of the nuclear-weapon States argued that the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and a limited life-span would weaken the resolve to pursue nuclear disarmament. Others had major concern about the selective implementation of the NPT and considered it very difficult to agree on its unconditional and unlimited extension under those circumstances.

This wide and seemingly unbridgeable gap was eventually closed through a renewal of commitments on principles and actions originated from the Treaty and increased accountability through strengthening the review mechanism in exchange for avoiding a vote on an indefinite extension.

Those of us who have been in the Conference would agree, I am sure, that the negotiations in New York were arduous, and at times frustrating; at the same time they were serious and business-like. As the result we had, at the end, a Declaration that enjoyed full consensus with no reservation or variations of interpretations. Some, including us, may have desired, of course, the declaration to be more far-reaching, particularly on nuclear disarmament. But we decided to maintain what we all fully shared and agreed to and avoid what could be subject to further contention and controversy.

It was understood, therefore, that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and those who pursued fervently a permanent treaty, were fully committed to all the principles and actions in the declaration and its faithful implementation. That we should consider a significant achievement. We should also expect that the sense of positiveness that prevailed at the end should now illuminate negotiations in various fields of disarmament.

Here at the Conference on Disarmament we recognize that we have not been off to a good start. The first part of the session has been overwhelmed by disagreement on procedures and organization of work. Despite substantial and devoted efforts of the current and previous Presidents, we were unable to commence or continue negotiations on the issues that we should deal with.

I believe that the commitments in New York should now help the Conference on Disarmament to come to an agreement on its activities for the remainder of the session.

Aside from important agreements on peaceful use, compliance and universality, that relate directly to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, a programme of action was decided at the NPT Conference. That programme includes the conclusion of the CTBT, no later than 1996, immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations on cut-off and systematic and progressive efforts towards reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. A decision was also made to take further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

On this basis, we must pursue, more vigorously, the negotiations on CTBT in order to conclude the treaty before 1996. This requires that we zero in on basic issues involved such as the scope and the verification system and agree on them during this session.

On cut-off we ought to be able now to move quickly to convene the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator under item 2 of our agenda.

On nuclear disarmament we should strive to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. In the case that it does not meet the consensus at this stage, then, as the minimum, a Special Coordinator should be appointed to consult with the members with a view to reaching agreement on the manner in which the determined pursuit and the systematic efforts for nuclear disarmament may be structured.

On negative security assurances the agreement that such assurances could be included in the treaty should now open the way for renewed negotiations at the Ad Hoc Committee leading to a more definite outcome.

It must also be noted that on the important issue of transparency in nuclear armaments, a major point of concern for non-nuclear-weapon States, it was understood that the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA is the most appropriate setting for its consideration. This understanding should now help us in agreeing to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee with an adjusted mandate that will include this issue.

We believe that the agreement on organization of the work could quickly be complemented by agreement on other matters of procedure including the appointment of the chairmen and setting the timetable of the committees, etc.

The Conference on Disarmament is charged with additional responsibility now in the aftermath of the NPT. Its deliberations, and its failures and successes, would be closely examined, inter alia, at the 1997 NPT review and the upcoming 1997 fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Time is short - we need to act quickly. We need to appear and behave, more than ever before, as a united camp. That, I contend, is the earnest desire and the solid resolve of all of us here.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Madam President, allow me first of all to tell you how pleased my country is to see Kenya taking up the Chair of this Conference. We are sure that under your authority we will make clear progress. In any event you can be assured of the full cooperation of my delegation.

On the occasion of the resumption of the work of the CD, my Government would like to say how pleased it is at the success of the review and extension Conference for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has just taken place in New York. We believe that above and beyond the decision taken there to extend the Treaty indefinitely - thus securing the foundations of international security in the future - its success is due to the fact that the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were also adopted. These are designed to serve as guidelines for all our future activities and they also specify that the nuclear Powers should exercise "utmost restraint" with respect to nuclear tests. In the light of these principles, the fact that - on the very day after they were adopted by consensus - China proceeded to conduct a new nuclear test is absolutely shocking and indeed provocative, and my Government cannot but deplore this fact, for it runs truly counter to the spirit of our negotiations. At the same time, I would say that paradoxically this event, far from slowing down negotiations on the CTBT, underlines the urgent need for their completion. While regretting the event, let us therefore at the same time draw the lesson from it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer.

Mr. LAFER (Brazil): Madam President, in its intervention during the 30 April plenary meeting, my delegation had occasion to voice its satisfaction to have a representative of friendly Kenya in the high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am glad to renew these expressions to you today.

I take the floor mainly to thank you for the kind words of welcome you have addressed to me on my assumption of the leadership of the Brazilian delegation to the CD.

Disarmament is a subject I have followed closely and made contributions on both in my academic and in my political life. My dealings with disarmament-related activities at the United Nations have, for instance, included participation in the 1991 Group of Experts that advised then Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on the potential uses of resources allocated to military activities in favour of civilian efforts to promote the environment.

In 1992, as Minister of External Relations of Brazil, I had the pleasure to initiate, in close coordination with other Latin American nations, the amendment process of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which paved the way for the full participation of my country and others in that Treaty's regime and in effect rendering Latin America the first populated nuclear-weapon-free zone of our planet.

Recent international developments and my own previous experience seem to indicate that I have arrived at a particularly critical juncture for the CD, one that encompasses both great difficulties as well as unique opportunities. Important steps could be taken in a fundamental dimension of peace-building - instrumental pacifism - which involves the control and reduction of armaments as the instruments and technical means of war. I am sure this forum will rise to the challenge. Let me assure you that Brazil is ready to carry on giving its contribution to all efforts towards a world progressively deprived of the means to annihilate human civilization and to inflict pain and suffering to peoples, as a country whose credentials in this area include having renounced the possession of nuclear weapons; not having been involved in any armed conflict - with the exception of World War II - in more than a century; maintaining relations of friendship and cooperation with all of its 10 neighbours; and having one of the world's lowest military expenditures in terms of GNP.

Mr. WANG (China) (translated from Chinese): Madam President, I am most pleased to see you presiding over the CD's work. The Chinese delegation would like to assure you of its full cooperation. At the same time, it would also take this opportunity to welcome other new representatives. In view of the contents of the statements made previously on behalf of the Chinese delegation I would like to make the following statement.

The Chinese Government has always exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing. The number of nuclear tests conducted by China is extremely limited.

On 15 May, China conducted an underground nuclear test. Thereafter, a spokesman from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, elaborating once again the consistent position of the Chinese Government on the issues of nuclear tests and security assurances.

Here I would like to reiterate that China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and favours an early conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear test ban within that framework. With this objective in mind, China has given its active support to the CD for its negotiations on the CTBT and has actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the CTBT with a serious, pragmatic and responsible approach. The international community, including China, has generally expressed the hope that the treaty will be concluded at an early date, but no later than 1996. The Chinese Government has stated on many occasions that upon the entry into force of the CTBT, China will abide by the treaty and stop nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: As you are aware, there are still a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session which are still the subject of ongoing consultations. It was my hope that progress could have been achieved on some of these issues during the inter-sessional period, which would have allowed us to make an effective start to the second part of our session. However, it appears that further consultations are needed to overcome remaining difficulties. I therefore urge all delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

At my request, the secretariat has circulated a tentative timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 June 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.707
8 June 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

GE.95-61732 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 707th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is a great honour for me to extend on behalf of all of us in the Conference a warm welcome to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Nursultan Nazarbayev, who will be addressing the plenary meeting today. We are indeed privileged to have with us today a leader who has contributed so much to the pursuit of our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, regional security and stability. It was under the wise and courageous leadership of President Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and took concrete steps in this regard through its adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its ratification of START I and the subsequent dismantlement and removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. We are also aware of President Nazarbayev's untiring efforts in promoting the peaceful settlement of regional disputes and to bring about stability and security in his region.

I should also like to welcome, yet again, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Her Excellency Siri Bjerke. Her presence among us today demonstrates the importance her country attaches to our Conference and Norway's determination to make a meaningful contribution to our endeavours.

I also have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Canada, Australia and Egypt.

I now invite the President of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Nursultan Nazarbayev, to address the Conference.

Mr. NAZARBAYEV (Kazakhstan) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to greet the participants in this regular session of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and I am grateful for this opportunity to address you on behalf of my country.

I see it as highly symbolic that the acceptance of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an observer at the Conference on Disarmament virtually coincided with the destruction in Kazakhstan, at the former Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground, of the last nuclear device still left there after the closure. We didn't know what to do with it, and on 30 May this nuclear device was destroyed.

However, I would not like to limit my statement to a simple enumeration of the steps Kazakhstan has taken in the field of disarmament. They have been welcomed by the leading world Powers and international organizations and are well known to all participants in this session.

Thanks to these efforts, Kazakhstan has received guarantees of its security and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders from the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. A document on this was signed on 5 December last year in Budapest and later on the People's Republic of China and France subscribed to it.

The purpose of my statement to you today is somewhat different. I would like to dwell on the topic of "new challenges and a new vision of the processes of disarmament and global security". Or, in other words, where does the process of worldwide disarmament and global security stand today, in the mid-1990s, and to what new challenges will we have to seek responses by the end of this century?

It is, I believe, quite clear that the goals of disarmament lie beyond the boundaries of the disarmament process. This is obvious. It is a bad thing when a gardener only looks after his flowers. If he does not watch the sky, thunder and hail will catch him unawares. Similarly, the criteria for the effectiveness of the disarmament process are set by society and by the mass of people outside the process - people in the sphere of creation, the sphere of development. The success of the disarmament process is measurable not only by the proportions by which we cut warheads and missiles, tanks and guns, but also by the extent to which life has been made better for ordinary people. Real security is not to be found where the quantity of armaments is decreased, but where more children are being born and where mothers, in giving them birth, have no fear for their future.

The success of the disarmament process is, first and foremost, linked to and defined by the effectiveness of the existing international security systems. Seven years ago, at the third special session on disarmament, in June 1988, it was noted that disarmament is not the exclusive responsibility of a few powerful countries, but the common endeavour of all States. And I would develop this idea in a broader context: the common endeavour of all States is to build an effective global system for international security and disarmament is one of the end results of the activity of this, so to speak, "global joint venture". And if we look at the disarmament process from that standpoint, we will see that even today there are several very serious problems on the horizon.

Problem number one. How effective are the existing international security systems and disarmament processes? If we judge the quality of international security by objective indicator of the world population's anxiety, the number of refugees, for example, then their total has increased several hundredfold over the past 10 years. Whereas in 1983 there were 9 countries in the world from which 50,000 people had fled, 10 years later there were 31 countries and the refugee count was in millions. As we can see, in a mere 10 years, the number of countries affected grew almost threefold.

So, in assessing the effectiveness of the disarmament process and international security, we have to have the courage to admit that in the past few decades the global conflict potential has grown significantly and is now much higher. Today it is becoming clear that this potential is not restricted merely to the traditional factors, to the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on whose reduction the emphasis has been over the past quarter of a century. It is no less obvious either that existing international security systems can hardly be considered effective if they do not stop the process of the escalation of tension.

(Mr. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan)

The processes of disarmament and building of international security systems proved quite successful over the first 40 post-war years. However, as from the middle of the 1980s we started to witness entirely new global processes: the break-up of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and other trends not envisaged when the present international security systems were created. Today, it is becoming more and more obvious that the existing international security systems and the disarmament processes carried out within their framework need to be rethought and fundamentally improved.

The latest confirmation of this can be seen in the ever-more heated conflict in the Balkans. The fires are raging there despite all the efforts of the international security structures. This conflict has long since grown before our very eyes from a local to a regional one, and there are fears that in the very near future it may turn into a conflict on a continental scale. Quite clearly, conflicts of this kind should be quashed in their very earliest stages - at the regional level, and this should be done through effective regional security systems. Then the likelihood of a regional conflict escalating into a continental or global one as we are now seeing happen in the former Yugoslavia would be significantly reduced. It follows that the construction of international security systems and disarmament processes in order to address the known challenges of the 1980s and 1990s requires a new vision.

Problem number two. What will be the trends in the global conflict potential between now and the end of the century? The answer to this question can be found if we recognize that regional, continental and global international security systems and the disarmament processes within them generally arise on the basis of the economic and strategic interests of the States and groups of States taking part in them. History has taught us that international security systems have always been based on an understanding of the common interests of the participating States - first and foremost their economic interests, but their geoeconomic, geofinancial and geostrategic interests too. Hence, the trends in the global conflict potential up to the end of the century will to a significant extent be determined by the world geoeconomic trends of the late 1990s.

It has become clear over the past decade that the global geoeconomic trends are reflected in the formation of three new major economic centres - in North America, Western Europe and South East Asia. The coming century will probably see the awakening of Africa too. The final shaping of the contours of these three centres of global influence will probably be completed somewhere around the end of this century or the beginning of the next. It is quite obvious that this search for a new world balance of economic forces will inevitably lead to a search for a new global strategic balance, including in the sphere of security systems and the armament and disarmament processes within them.

If these trends grow, there is every reason to believe that the global conflict potential will also grow by the end of the century and so set us new challenges. This means that the "global joint venture" to build international security systems and develop disarmament must lose no time in mustering up all its strength to elaborate a new vision of the new challenges of the late 1990s.

Problem number three - the participation of third world countries in disarmament negotiations. It is widely recognized that all the major disarmament negotiations have so far been carried out between the major Powers of the East and West without the participation of third world representatives. How productive would such an approach be at the end of the 1990s?

I would like to dwell on security issues in Europe and Asia as being closest to my country, the Republic of Kazakhstan. We in Kazakhstan, in the centre of Eurasia, can see very well that there is a process under way in the West of building new international security systems based on both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the resources and structures of NATO. In the East and the South-East, Asian countries belonging to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) will apparently be seeking ways of achieving political and military interaction within their own structures.

It is not hard to see that there is a whole vertical row of countries in Eurasia, from Russia in the North to India in the South and including us, the central Asian States of the former Soviet Union, and Iran and Pakistan, which do not as yet belong to either the East or the West. I would call this continuous geopolitical belt of countries along the vertical meridian in the middle of Eurasia "the belt of uncertainty" or "the belt of anticipation". Despite their internal diversity, the countries in this "belt of uncertainty" comprise a relatively homogeneous group from the point of view of their potential to influence not just the balance of forces in Asia or Eurasia but also the global geopolitical balance. Security issues in Europe and especially in Asia and interaction between economic centres in Western Europe and South-East Asia will depend to a large degree on how these countries in the geopolitical "belt of uncertainty" define their positions and orientations. Undoubtedly the biggest and most powerful of these countries is Russia and it is Russia's choice that will largely determine the stability or changes in Eurasia.

In all, Russia has three options. The first is to join West European structures, but for the time being it is not being allowed in. The second is to join East Asian structures, but Russia is not expected there either. And the third is to unite the countries of the "belt of uncertainty", on the basis of equality for all, within a special group - a third security system on the Eurasian continent. The other Asian countries, including my own - the Central Asian countries within the "belt of uncertainty", have just two options: to turn to the East, or to build their own third security system and within it to resolve the issues of disarmament.

The problem of transforming the security and disarmament systems in Eurasia has, since the break-up of the USSR and the dissolution of this Warsaw Pact, taken on yet another aspect which did not exist before. The majority of the newly independent States of the former socialist bloc are today thinking first and foremost of creating their own national security resources. I would call this new factor "new autonomous security" for these countries. It is bound to be accompanied by an increase in armaments in them. It is quite natural to rely first on oneself, on one's own armed forces, and only afterwards on a security system and participation in the disarmament process.

Nor can we rule out the possibility that the disarmament process might be used by some of these countries as a means to modernize their own weapons.

This condition of "new autonomous security" presupposes a totally different pattern for the construction of international security systems. The practice of building such systems from the top down will not work here. Probably, in this case the more acceptable method will be gradual construction of one's own armed forces and then of a regional security system and finally accession to the existing continental or global international security systems and the respective disarmament processes. It follows from this that the new geopolitical situation also means a new role for developing countries, or third world countries, in disarmament processes and the building of international security systems. Present circumstances dictate that the United Nations and other international disarmament and security institutions should put more emphasis on sponsoring and creating first of all effective regional security systems and then on their basis we can transform existing continental international security systems or build new ones.

Study of security issues in the continent of Eurasia shows that third world countries, or developing countries, should be included on an equal footing in all disarmament negotiating processes. This would help to avoid the excessive ideologization of the disarmament process that is characteristic of the major Powers and it might also give rise to a new vision of the new challenges facing the international security and disarmament systems.

On the basis of its own views of the three international security and disarmament issues that I have mentioned, my country, the Republic of Kazakhstan, is participating purposefully and actively in all the processes of construction of security and disarmament systems at all levels of international cooperation in Eurasia. First of all there is our policy of integrating the efforts of three Central Asian States - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan - to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia. Second, there is Kazakhstan's active integrationist policy within the CIS where we have proposed a Eurasian union in the sphere of international security and disarmament. Third, there are Kazakhstan's initiatives in favour of the convening of a conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia, which have been supported by the leadership of the United Nations. We have had several rounds of meetings this year, having set up a working party, and we are preparing for the convening of a conference of heads of external economic departments of almost 25 States in the Asian continent. This is a long-term effort to create modern security and cooperation structures within whose framework it will be possible with time to begin negotiations on disarmament on the Asian continent. Fourth, there is, as you know, Kazakhstan's participation in OSCE activities, in the Partnership for Peace programme, in the NPT, in START I and in the Disarmament Commission.

In all its practical foreign policy actions on international security and disarmament issues the Republic of Kazakhstan proceeds from two principles to which I have already alluded of the new vision: first, "from the comprehension of the new geoeconomic trends, through the improvement of existing international security systems and the construction of new ones, to the search for new approaches to disarmament"; second, "from the construction of regional security systems, through the improvement and transformation of continental security systems, to the search for effective ways to improve the systems for global security". I believe that this kind of approach to the elaboration of a new vision of international security and disarmament will help us to find adequate responses to the new challenges at the end of this century and the beginning of the next. If these general issues are not resolved we shall always come up against barriers, surprises and insoluble problems when trying to address specific practical disarmament issues. I believe that the Conference on Disarmament cannot escape dealing with these issues, which life itself puts before us, and that it will with time find the proper answers to them.

I would like particularly to stress that the practical actions of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the sphere of international security and disarmament are aimed first and foremost at unconditional and full compliance with all the international treaties and agreements in this area that we have signed and to which we are a party. Our actions speak for us. We were, almost five years ago, the first of the CIS countries to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory. Kazakhstan was the first of the parties to the Lisbon Protocol to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State. By one of the first decrees of the first President of our State we closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground, one of the two largest in the world. The removal from the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan of more than 1,200 nuclear warheads for incontinental ballistic missiles was completed in April of last year. Now the soil of Kazakhstan is completely free of nuclear weapons. It is these practical steps by my country and our firm adherence to all the international agreements that have been concluded that allow us to raise the questions how and on what basis the search for new approaches to international security and disarmament can be carried out. It is this firm position of ours that gives me the grounds to put to ourselves and to you the questions that I have just raised.

I fully realize that the resolution of these three issues may go somewhat beyond the boundaries of the competence of the participants in this session and of the Conference on Disarmament in general, but it is precisely this clear realization that prompts me to address you in particular, for I am convinced that real success in the disarmament process depends first and foremost on the personal efforts, the rich experience and the talent of all those present in this hall, of all those who, metaphorically speaking, are the tireless "workers of the global joint venture for security and disarmament". I am also well aware that the raising of these three issues may go somewhat beyond the boundaries of the traditional views on modern disarmament processes, but it is by expanding the vision of disarmament issues in accordance with the new challenges, by stepping outside the traditional framework of understanding of disarmament, by searching for the foundations of a new vision that I have tried to bring out the purpose of my statement to you today.

The new situation born from the profound global changes of the 1980s and 1990s is confronting the Conference on Disarmament with new challenges. In order not to be left defenceless before these new challenges, in order to identify them properly, we must find a new vision of international security and disarmament issues. Hence, in these new conditions disarmament is armament with a new vision of the new challenges. I am sure that we will find the right answer.

We welcome the re-establishment within the Conference of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and we note with satisfaction the commencement of multilateral negotiations in this sphere. There are in Kazakhstan three modern seismograph stations left to us from the former Soviet Union that are capable of recording underground events thousands of kilometres away at any point on the globe. We propose that these stations be included in the global monitoring network, which could be an effective tool for monitoring nuclear explosions small and large. We call upon the nuclear Powers to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing until a test-ban treaty has been signed, and upon those who continue such testing to join the moratorium.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the President of Kazakhstan for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now suspend this meeting for a few minutes in order for the Secretary-General of the Conference and myself to escort President Nazarbayev as he leaves the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 10.55 a.m.

Mrs. BJERKE (Norway): Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate you for your assumption of the presidency of the CD. I would also like to pay my respects to Secretary-General Vladimir Petrovsky and his deputy, Mr. Bensmail, and express our gratitude for the assistance they unfailingly provide members and observers to the CD.

This is the second time I have had the honour of addressing the Conference on Disarmament. When I spoke to you a year ago, I was able to express optimism with regard to global disarmament negotiations. And today I can see that we have indeed made progress. I am pleased that the CD will make an extra effort this year to advance work on the CTB Treaty. It is the hope of my Government that the Conference reach a positive outcome by the end of this year.

Our efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction are being exerted against the background of the very successful outcome of the NPT Conference in New York last month. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, now permanent, forms the most important element in the barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An indefinite extension of the NPT, coupled with the parties' renewed commitments to nuclear disarmament and to a strengthened review process for the Treaty, sends a very strong signal to the ongoing negotiations in the CD. The commitment made by the parties to the NPT to prepare a CTBT at the latest by 1996 should also be made by the Conference on Disarmament. The NPT Conference brought a renewed pledge by the nuclear-weapon States to promote global reduction of nuclear arms, with the ultimate aim of eliminating these weapons. It is now your task to build on the achievements accomplished in New York.

Regrettably, it did not prove possible to secure a final declaration from the NPT Conference on the review of the Treaty. However, many positive elements have emerged from the review exercise. New ground was charted in important areas relating to the supporting role which the IAEA is to play for the NPT. A strengthened role for the IAEA will support the objective of non-proliferation while reducing the risk factors generated by nuclear energy production and research. Agreement was also reached in two of the Main Committees on language concerning safe handling of military as well as civilian nuclear material.

The NPT Conference also provided a welcome impetus to further progress on the issue of security assurances. We believe this issue should continue to be pursued in the CD, with the active cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear weapons no longer have any military value. A policy of de fact no first use is emerging as a result of the transformation of the East-West relationship. The elimination of the most destabilizing nuclear weapon systems and the elimination of convention imbalances have contributed to this development. We would welcome further steps towards reducing the importance and relevance of nuclear weapons in the conduct of international affairs. Such a development should underpin and give substance to the formal assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States. In this respect, we would encourage nuclear-weapon States to exercise maximum transparency and openness with regard to their nuclear arsenals, unilaterally or through an appropriate international framework, as they pursue their nuclear disarmament efforts.

The completion of the CTBT remains the most important task for the CD in the immediate future. Work is progressing steadily, if not rapidly. There are many difficult items of substance to be resolved, some of them of a political nature. This is where we should now build in the momentum created by the NPT. Crucial political decisions, relating, for instance, to the scope of the treaty, could and should now be made without further delay. Once the basic parameters have been laid, the finer details of the treaty text will be easier to slot into place.

My country has been a partner of the CD for many years in the key area of verification of a CTBT. Much of the verification groundwork has been completed, thanks to the untiring efforts of Dr. Peter Marshal and Dr. Ola Dahlman and the GSE.

We note with satisfaction that the global test of a seismic CTBT monitoring system - GSETT-3 - was successfully put into full-scale operation on 1 January this year. Norway is participating in this test by providing data from some of the most advanced seismic array stations in the world. We are pleased to note the active role of Norwegian scientists in the planning and launch of GSETT-3. Furthermore, Norway is providing technical assistance to many countries in order to enable them to take part in this important experiment.

With the encouraging progress of GSETT-3, we consider that developing the seismic component of the future CTBT monitoring system is now well under way. It is now important to begin realistic testing of the other technologies envisaged for the monitoring system so that an operational system can be ready at the earliest possible time. We believe that the GSETT-3 system should be used as a framework for such tests, which must of course be carried out in such a way that they do not detract from the primary purpose of GSETT-3. The overall goal would be to develop and demonstrate the synergies of the different verification technologies in the eventual CTBT monitoring system.

The international verification system should be internationally funded, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of costs. International funding would avoid placing unreasonable economic burdens on countries whose participation is essential in order to provide adequate global coverage. It would facilitate the establishment of new seismic stations at appropriate locations. Furthermore, it would ensure that all stations and communication links could be operated to the required standards, and that the costs of operating the international system could be kept down, without sacrificing quality or efficiency. Perhaps most importantly, international funding is the best guarantee that the monitoring system will remain an effective deterrent against clandestine nuclear testing over the long term. Such financing will ensure that monitoring stations in all participating countries in the future can be maintained to the high standards required, without being dependent on available resources in each individual country.

I must use this opportunity to deplore the most recent nuclear test conducted by China on 15 May, shortly after the end of the NPT Conference which emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint in this regard. All nuclear-weapon States should refrain from further testing.

Once the draft CTBT has been completed, the next priority item on the CD's negotiating agenda should be the draft agreement banning production of weapons-grade fissile material. The NPT Conference brought us a new commitment to expedient negotiations on such a treaty. My delegation looks forward to future negotiations in the CD on a cut-off convention. Although the subject matter is complex, it is our hope that the CD will have the ability to cut through the complexities. The objective is simple, to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes as soon as possible. A universal treaty to this end should be within our grasp by the end of this century.

Norway is particularly concerned about the safe and controlled handling of fissile material that has been used for weapons purposes. As a consequence of nuclear disarmament, spent fissile material is now being released into a non-secure environment. Ways must be devised of accounting for existing stocks of fissile weapons materials within, or parallel to, the future international cut-off regime. In this context, I would like to compliment the United States Government for having decided to let the IAEA inspect a substantial stock of fissile material removed from dismantled nuclear weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, a major triumph for the CD, has been signed by 159 States since it was opened for signature in January 1993. So far only 29 countries have ratified the Convention. This is well short of the 65 ratifications needed for the Convention to enter into force. My Government thinks the CWC is a most important instrument for ensuring regional as well as global stability. It outlaws a category of weapons of mass destruction that are relatively easy to acquire, but which can have devastating effects on civilian populations. We urge all countries that have not already done so to sign and ratify the CWC without delay.

Over the past three years a substantial effort has been made to clarify the possibilities of adding a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. We believe that this work has given favourable indications of the feasibility of verification measures that would strengthen the BWC. These efforts need to be pursued with a view to reaching a conclusion at the next Review Conference in 1996.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction takes on added importance with the restructuring of global security patterns. In the North, the arms build-up caused by the East-West conflict has been replaced by large-scale disarmament. But the excessive accumulation of armaments in the industrialized world in the past is not an example to be emulated by the countries now industrializing. Greater transparency in military matters and the systematic nurturing of confidence among States are key elements in bringing about a more stable, prosperous and better governed world community. Accumulation of conventional armaments can only trigger mutual suspicion and countermeasures. Rivalry involving the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction has a particular potency for edging regional stability out of control.

The CD has a potential role to play in alleviating such concerns. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms performs an important function in increasing international confidence in so far as member nations of the United Nations lend their full support. Obviously, much can still be done to improve the functioning of the Register. The item "Transparency in armaments", which is on the agenda of the CD, offers one opportunity to develop further the concept of greater international openness in the field of conventional armaments.

Today, we need to focus on the accumulation and use of conventional weapons. In numerous conflicts throughout the world, millions of civilians are the innocent victims of wars, fleeing their homes and countries to escape from the devastation caused by conventional arms.

The destruction and upheaval caused by conventional wars, however, do not affect the present situation only. The effects in terms of devastation of habitat, inter alia through the extensive use of mines, will affect many generations to come. An international regime to control the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, with a view to the ultimate elimination of these weapons, would mean a great step forward, above all for the people of the developing world.

It is our firm believe that armed conflicts, internal as well as between States, must and can be avoided. We are daily being reminded of this imperative by news from the former Yugoslavia, from the former Soviet Union, or from the Middle East. Global arms reduction and control, and the banning of the most abhorrent and the most primitive of armaments would help people in all regions. But regional arms control agreements should also be encouraged. In areas where conflict looms, arrangements to curb the flow of arms to the parties can be the most important and effective preventive measure. UNIDIR has initiated an interesting study of disarmament and conflict resolution which may throw new light on the possibilities of using disarmament more actively as a tool for conflict prevention and management.

My country has actively followed the work of the Conference for more than a decade, having applied for membership in 1982. It remains a cause of deep frustration for us and for other observers that we are not able to fully take part in negotiations that are also important to our national interests, that we are not able to take a seat as equal partners in the negotiations on the CTBT, on cut-off and on the other items on your agenda.

There is now broad international agreement on the need for expansion. The General Assembly last year adopted a resolution on this issue. A broader partnership is now needed to advance the cause of disarmament internationally. An enlarged CD is necessary to widen the sense of ownership of disarmament treaties negotiated by the Conference. After all, the aim is to achieve universality for the legal instruments that will form the bulwark against weapons of mass destruction and the excesses of arms accumulation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Norway for her statement and for the kind words addressed to me.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, first of all, allow me to express the satisfaction of the Pakistan delegation for the skilful manner in which you have guided the work of this Conference over the past few weeks.

The presence of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan today in this conference is indeed an honour for this body. Pakistan enjoys close and friendly relations with Kazakhstan, where Prime Minister Bhutto was so warmly received by President Nazarbayev. We have listened with close attention to President Nazarbayev's statement and welcome the bold steps taken by Kazakhstan to promote nuclear disarmament and international security, both regional and global.

Mr. President, we also welcome the State Secretary of Norway amongst us and take note of her important statement.

I would also like to take this opportunity to formally welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Celso Lafer of Brazil, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico.

We have commenced this second part of the Conference on Disarmament's 1995 session with a sense of renewed expectation of progress towards genuine disarmament.

Since the first part of our session adjourned, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely. While the NPT Conference was able to achieve this goal, the manner in which this decision was achieved and the failure of the Conference, for the third time, to adopt an agreed final document reviewing the operation of the Treaty are indications of the fragility of the consensus upon which observance of the Treaty rests. Non-proliferation is, above all, a political objective which must be achieved through the political agreement of the States concerned. It will not be possible to achieve universal or indefinite respect for the Treaty by seeking alibis for some States while coercing others through discriminatory embargoes. Non-proliferation can be fostered by responding to the security concerns of all States; not by steps which exacerbate threats to their security and survival.

Pakistan believes that the NPT is a factor for international stability. We are glad that the Treaty has been extended. This does not imply that we can overlook the discriminatory character of the Treaty. And, in view of our security concerns which arise principally from threats within our region, Pakistan cannot accede to the NPT unilaterally.

The entire Pakistani nation is determined to resist and reverse the unilateral and discriminatory measures to which our country has been subjected for so many years. At the NPT Conference also, some of our friends sought to equate Pakistan's position with that of other countries which have consistently rejected the NPT and brought the spectre of nuclear weapons to their respective regions. Those delegates who pressed for reflection of such false equations in the documents of the Review Conference know full well that Pakistan has worked actively to promote global and regional non-proliferation, that we have actively supported initiatives and proposals made by their own country for non-proliferation measures in South Asia. These initiatives and proposals await determined and even-handed pursuit by its sponsor.

In this context, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference on Disarmament today to the impending threat posed by the planned production and imminent deployment of ballistic missiles against Pakistan. This fateful step, once taken, will transform an already tense situation in South Asia into a hair-trigger security environment. Pakistan will be obliged to take appropriate steps to respond to this new and qualitatively enhanced threat to its security.

It is essential, now that the NPT has been indefinitely extended, to reiterate that the purpose of non-proliferation and of the NPT is, above all, to facilitate realization of the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament, in parallel with a process of conventional arms control. This fundamental premise of non-proliferation cannot be compromised by unilateral regimes which are designed to divide the world permanently into those who retain nuclear weapons and others who are prohibited from doing so. We ask that each of the nuclear Powers affirm during this session of the Conference that the indefinite extension of the NPT will not be construed by it as legitimising the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States.

Now, when the cold war is over, now when the doctrine of mutually assured destruction has, ostensibly, been thrown into the dustbin of history, realization of the goal of complete nuclear disarmament cannot be dismissed as an utopian dream. The five nuclear Powers do not need nuclear weapons to preserve their security either against each other or against the non-nuclear-weapon States. Indeed, we must take advantage of the present window of opportunity, when there are no strategic confrontations between the major Powers to build urgent momentum to nuclear disarmament and the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, analogous to the global prohibition of chemical weapons. In this context, we have noted with concern that the START II Treaty may not be quickly ratified by one or both parties; that the nuclear-weapon States, while quantitatively downsizing their nuclear arsenals, are qualitatively upgrading them; and that these States continue to resist concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this body.

The Pakistan delegation proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. This committee could commence its work with a review of the implementation of the START II agreement, and thereafter, outline the measures required to open negotiations among the five nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament, with a view to adopting a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame.

For almost three decades, the comprehensive test-ban treaty has been viewed as an important instrument in the endeavour to promote nuclear disarmament as well as nuclear non-proliferation. We are not sanguine, however, that this long-standing consensus actually underpins the positions of some States in our negotiations on the CTBT within this Conference. Certain positions taken here by the nuclear-weapon States, asserting a right to continue to conduct nuclear tests on one pretext or another, even after having conducted hundreds and thousands of such tests, raises serious questions about their commitment to give up the continued development of nuclear weapons.

The CTBT should not be turned into another threshold test-ban treaty. Nor should it become merely another instrument against horizontal non-proliferation while allowing the nuclear-weapon States the means to continue nuclear weapons development. At a subsequent meeting, my delegation will present a more detailed analysis of the implications for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation inherent in the positions taken by the nuclear-weapon States on the scope of the CTBT.

In a similar way, the original aims of a ban on fissile materials production are in danger of being compromised. As originally proposed by Canada, and endorsed for years by the General Assembly, a fissile materials treaty was supposed to halt the production of fissile materials and gradually reduce stockpiles, thus serving the goals of both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. A simple cut-off will serve only to freeze the present unequal and, in some regions, dangerous status quo.

Today, the amount of fissile material held by the nuclear-weapon States is more than sufficient to build thousands of additional nuclear weapons. This could further accentuate the asymmetries in their nuclear arsenals. There are many other problems which will remain unanswered by a simple cut-off. All these issues require discussion and clarification as we commence efforts to negotiate a meaningful and universally acceptable fissile materials convention.

In this context, I would like to express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada for the most commendable and fair manner in which he discharged his assignment as Special Coordinator on fissile material. Today, we wish to bid him farewell and to tell him that he will be missed in this Conference as it seeks to grapple with the difficult issue of fissile material.

The General Assembly has for almost 15 years recommended the conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of a binding international instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons States. After many years of sterile discussions, this issue was addressed earlier this year by the nuclear-weapon States in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Four of these States sponsored Security Council resolution 984 offering "positive" assurances of help against nuclear aggressions. It was perhaps no accident that agreement could not be reached within the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances.

Pakistan is concerned that these actions were undertaken outside this Conference, which has been mandated to conclude a binding international instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It has been our consistent position that until comprehensive nuclear disarmament is achieved, the non-nuclear-weapon States are all entitled to receive credible assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Any linkage of security assurances to a State to accession to a particular Treaty, the NPT or any other, constitutes an erosion of the United Nations Charter, specifically of the principle upholding the sovereign equality of States and Article 51 investing each State with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, through or outside the United Nations Security Council.

The Pakistan delegation urges the immediate revival of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances to resume consideration of an international and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The resistance to the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances was justified at an earlier part of our session by the response within the Group of 21 to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Pakistan is not opposed to the creation of this Ad Hoc Committee. We believe, however, that the supply-side approach, reflected by the nomenclature of this Committee, is unlikely to promote the goals of conventional arms control and international stability. One-sided control on the transfer of arms cannot redress the imbalance within sensitive regions of the world. Discriminatory embargoes have in many cases enhanced the threat to peace, accentuated the danger of proliferation and frustrated initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation. Conventional arms control must address the root causes of insecurity, emanating from disputes, conflicts and threat perceptions. Conventional arms control must seek to promote balance and security among all the regional States concerned. My delegation will avail itself of an early opportunity to make a detailed presentation on a possible approach to Conventional arms control which we hope will be actively pursued by this Conference.

The Pakistan delegation will also shortly submit for the consideration of the Conference more detailed views and suggestions with regard to some of the other items on our agenda. Meanwhile, it is our view that this Conference should expeditiously establish ad hoc committees to pursue concrete negotiations on all its agenda items, which should be treated on the basis of equity and non-discrimination.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I should now like to take the opportunity of extending a warm welcome to the newly-appointed representative of Turkey, Ambassador Uluçevik, who is with us for the first time today and I invite him to take the floor.

Mr. ULUÇEVIK (Turkey): Mr. President, at the outset, please allow me to express on behalf of my delegation my appreciation for the outstanding leadership you have displayed in the conduct of the work of the Conference. May I also thank you for the warm words of welcome that you have just kindly addressed to me.

As I today make my first appearance before this important body, I pledge my personal cooperation with all my colleagues as well as with our distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, and his staff in the pursuit and achievement of lofty disarmament goals. I assure them that my delegation will continue to support every effort that this Conference will make with the aim of creating a safer world.

May I also say how proud I am at the fact that my first intervention in the Conference on Disarmament coincided with the important address of H.E. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of brotherly Kazakhstan.

Like all the other States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Turkey attached great importance to a successful outcome of its Review and Extension Conference and tried to contribute to its work to that end. The result that we have all obtained in the extension part of the Conference matches Turkey's expectations, which can be shortly defined as obtaining progress in the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and strengthening hopes for nuclear disarmament.

In fact, the indefinite extension decision emerged without a vote because all the Parties wanted the same result, that is the strongest possible NPT regime. This decision deserves the world's appreciation for approving a permanent constraint on nuclear multiplication. The main objectives of the treaty with regard to strengthening the non-proliferation regime will indeed be better achieved through the permanent NPT. At the same time, we are convinced that the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament will depend on the effective implementation of the Treaty and on full compliance with its provisions.

Another important outcome of the Conference, in conjunction with the extension decision, was the adoption, again without a vote, of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty.

The Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament provide that nuclear disarmament as set out in the NPT should be fulfilled with determination. By adopting this decision, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Moreover they also pledged to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arms. In this context, this decision calls for the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as for the immediate initiation and early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The section on the safeguards issue of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is of crucial importance for Turkey. I am sure it will be recalled that my country was among the first to stress the need for an effective verification mechanism for the NPT. We, therefore, welcome the fact that the Conference has called for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export controls. States should, through vigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear material.

In this regard, we believe that safeguards foreseen in article III of the NPT are designed for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the States Parties to the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In short, we fully support the approach concerning the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system contained in the text of the Principles and objectives decision. We would no doubt have found it even more satisfactory if the elements which were agreed upon in Main Committee II of the Conference on greater access for the IAEA to relevant information and greater physical access to relevant sites as envisaged by the 93 + 2 Programme had been included in the text of the decision.

The decision adopted on strengthening the review process for the Treaty is also welcomed by Turkey. My country will be following the preparatory process and the Review Conferences attentively and will make constructive contributions.

We note with elation that following the cold-war era, concrete and significant progress has been made in the field of disarmament. Yet, at the same time, we are aware of the fact that important tasks still lie ahead of us.

In this context we consider the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as an historic event. We believe this Conference will have positive impacts on efforts towards attaining the universality of the NPT. We therefore wish to call once again on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to the indefinitely extended NPT, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, at the outset, please allow me to express the satisfaction of the Indonesian delegation at seeing you, the representative of Kenya - a country with which Indonesia enjoys excellent relations - chairing the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed it cannot be more fitting that a seasoned diplomat of your calibre should be presiding over our deliberations at this important juncture of the Conference's work in which some pending issues need to be resolved. At the same time, I should also like to state that I am very grateful for the words of welcome you offered to me during the last plenary session. In fact, it was not the first time I was welcomed in this august body, since I also served as head of the Indonesia delegation to the CD from 1987 to 1988. Likewise, my gratitude also goes to your predecessors, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, for the excellent manner with which they conducted our previous deliberations. May I also use this opportunity to warmly welcome the newly-appointed Ambassadors of Brazil, Finland, Mexico and Turkey whose wisdom, in my view, will greatly contribute to the attainment of the Conference's objectives.

I should also like to say how privileged I am to speak in this plenary after listening to the inspiring key-note address from the President of Kazakhstan, the contents of which I consider to be of paramount importance in guiding the Conference to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the international community.

My delegation is also inspired by the statement made by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway.

I could not agree more with the points raised by some speakers who have spoken during the previous plenary and even today to the effect that this second part of the CD annual session will undoubtedly be illuminated by the results of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference during which the State Parties to the Treaty reached decisions on several issues such as the indefinite extension of the NPT, the strengthening of the review mechanism, the establishment of a weapons of mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East and on the objectives and principles to be pursued by the States Parties. There are at least three points which need to be highlighted as far as the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference is concerned. Firstly, the States Parties were in the end unfortunately unable to reach a consensus decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Secondly, the States Parties were also unable to produce any final document at the end of the Conference and thirdly, the decisions taken by the Conference constituted a package. In other words, no decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT would have been possible had the two opposing sides failed to agree that the decision on extension be linked to the other three decisions to which I have referred earlier on.

The failure of the 1995 NPT Conference to command consensus on the extension issue and on the final declaration was too important a phenomenon to be ignored. For it sends a crystal-clear signal to the international community that the NPT remains a most controversial international legal regime, over which the States Parties are still divided when it comes to assessing its implementation. As we are all aware, some of its members consider that they have fully implemented the Treaty, while the majority of member States feel that much remains to be done, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament, before it can be said that the States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States have fully adhered to and complied with the provisions contained therein. One might argue that the failure to produce a final document is not new in the history of the Treaty and hence that it bears no significance for the credibility of the NPT. We do not share this view, for, this time, these occurrences have happened at the most critical juncture of the Treaty's lifespan, during which the review and decision-making processes should have been smoothly carried out if the NPT was to contain no fundamental shortcomings in its implementation. Hence, my delegation considers that the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely was unfortunately somewhat hollow.

It will therefore be no secret if I say that Indonesia was not altogether happy with the results of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. For, judging from the proceedings we have painstakingly gone through, my delegation has come to the conclusion that the States Parties, especially those possessing nuclear weapons, are less committed than previously to achieving one of the overriding objectives of the NPT, which is nuclear disarmament. Even more worrisome, there was some strong opposition demonstrated by the nuclear-weapon States as to their commitment to engage in a full-fledged negotiation on an international legally binding and multilaterally negotiated regime to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which was considered to be one of the main sticking points preventing the Conference from producing a consensus final declaration. One cannot also avoid the impression that much emphasis was put on the extension issue and the non-proliferation aspect of the Treaty, thereby setting aside the nuclear disarmament issue to which non-nuclear-weapon States attach much greater importance in this post cold-war era.

While fully agreeing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, poses serious threats to international peace and security, my delegation continues to believe that nuclear disarmament is still the highest priority on our agenda. For the continued existence of these horrendous weapons will inevitably invite proliferation. In our view, therefore, nuclear disarmament is the sole cure to proliferation and the sooner we achieve it the better. The seeming lack of seriousness and political will from some quarters to pursue negotiations in good faith in this field will undoubtedly lessen the credibility of the NPT, as well as the confidence of the States Parties in the Treaty. My delegation will continuously assess the performance of the Treaty in order to evaluate what proper steps are to be taken should some States Parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, not be able to fully abide by, and faithfully adhere to, the commitments assumed under the NPT. To start with, the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to submit to the collective wisdom of the CD in establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will be the first case in point. After adopting by consensus in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference the objectives and principles to be pursued by the NPT States Parties, my delegation sees no obstacles whatsoever to the establishment of this Committee and therefore hopes that those States will not stand in the way of achieving this consensus. Furthermore, this should be followed by the establishment of another subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to which the Group of 21 also attaches great importance.

Unfortunately, over-emphasis on the non-proliferation aspect of weapons of mass destruction has also been apparent in the CD, especially if we candidly evaluate the conduct of negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty and cut-off treaty. On CTBT there is a strong wish on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to formulate the scope of the treaty, which would only be comprehensive for those states which have not yet tested these weapons, while still opening the possibility for the possessing States to continue testing, using sophisticated techniques which cannot be banned by the treaty. The same case also applies to the cut-off treaty, on which there are some tendencies to narrowly interpret the report prepared by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the Special Coordinator on this issue, thereby nullifying the need to also discuss the existing stockpiles.

In this context, my delegation wishes to remind the members of the CD not to lose sight of the fact that the name of the Conference clearly spells out the objectives which we shall be striving to achieve, namely to conclude a series of legal disarmament agreements, especially those regulating weapons of mass destruction. Failure to do so will pose a serious challenge to the raison d'être of the CD. It would entail changing its name to the "Conference on Non-Proliferation", which my delegation believes none of us here present would readily agree to do.

Let me conclude on a positive note by saying that my delegation stands ready to engage in any positive dialogue in an attempt to safeguard the reputation of this Conference as the sole multilateral negotiating body dealing with disarmament, upon which the international community has placed high expectations. Accordingly, we will do our utmost to help ensure that the real objectives of the Conference are never lost from sight and stay within our reach, including the conclusion of the CTBT not later than 1996.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Before giving Ambassador Shannon the floor, I wish to express on behalf of the Conference, as well as on my own behalf, our regret at his impending departure from Geneva after an impressive tour of duty. I am sure we will all remember with gratitude Ambassador Shannon's contribution to the work of our Conference, in particular as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1990. More recently, he was instrumental in bringing about a successful conclusion to the difficult and protracted consultations which resulted in agreement on a mandate for the negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes or other nuclear explosive devices. Ambassador Shannon's commitment and integrity will be greatly missed. I am sure you all join me in wishing Ambassador Shannon and his family every happiness for the future.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, thank you very much for those kind words you directed to me. I do appreciate them greatly. As this is the first time I have had the opportunity to address plenary since you assumed the presidency I would like in return to congratulate you on your assumption of this office and on your efficient and effective handling of our deliberations, particularly during some difficult discussions in the final week of the first part of the Conference in April.

As I take my leave of the Conference on Disarmament, I trust you will permit me to make some personal reflections. The Conference is a very different place today than it was when I attended my first plenary in 1990. In fact, if memory serves me right, I think I sat in this chair when I first arrived. When I look back over the past five and a half years, three events in the world of disarmament loom large: one which took place within the walls of this impressive chamber, and two others which took place outside. As to the first, I am referring of course to the conclusion in 1992 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which took far too long to negotiate, but which should lead to the elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The other two events of pre-eminent importance to our work here were the end of the cold war and the recent decision in New York to extend indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The end of the cold war was astounding because of the swiftness with which it occurred once the tidal wave of change had begun to roll. I want to return later in these remarks to the direct consequences this event has for the working of this body. Initially, however, I would like to focus on the implications, in particular for the work of the CD, and other disarmament forums, of the indefinite extension of the NPT.

Since its entry into force 25 years ago, the NPT has been a cornerstone of Canadian security policy. What then are the implications of the indefinite extension for Canada, as a non-nuclear-weapon State? The single most important gain for Canada is that the Treaty is now permanent - not a collection of temporary and uncertain provisions we would revisit from time to time. At the same time, we have embedded in the Treaty accountability. This is an achievement of historic proportions in our view. The principal challenge now facing the Treaty is to push its near-global membership all the way to universal adherence.

As a result of the decisions taken in New York, States Parties to the NPT, including the nuclear-weapon States, are committed to a strengthened review process. This process will begin with Preparatory Commissions in 1997, 1998 and 1999 before the next formal review in the year 2000. This new commitment means an accelerated and more frequent review of accountability, the goal of which is to accelerate nuclear disarmament and prevent non-proliferation.

One of the significant achievements in the NPT Declaration of Principles was the adoption of a programme of action which requires the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons. This is a very welcome commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to a more concrete and structured engagement in nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the programme of action clearly commits all States Parties to the completion of the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996. We have long had the CTBT as a shared objective. But now we have all accepted that the negotiations will have a finite end. We must ensure that commitment is respected. The programme of action also commits us firmly to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a cut-off treaty in accordance with my statement to the CD of 23 March of this year and the mandate contained therein.

We have already made solid progress in the negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Much fruitful work has been done on the development of the international monitoring system. Further refinement is needed. Important decisions remain in the areas of organization, entry into force, scope, duration and withdrawal. These decisions must be made before the end of this year. Otherwise, our solemn commitment in New York will be in jeopardy.

It is the duty of all members of the CD to create the most favourable conditions possible for the successful conclusion of the CTBT negotiations. In that context, I must say that the regrettable decision of the People's Republic of China to proceed with an underground nuclear test at Lop Nor on 15 May is in no way consistent with this duty. We have heard the assertion of the Chinese Government that China has conducted relatively few tests compared with the other nuclear-weapon States. But how can nuclear testing, at the very time we are striving so hard to deliver what we have promised to the world, be reconciled with the "utmost restraint" in principle 4 (a) of the NPT declaration of principles? All the nuclear-weapon States are committed by their obligation to utmost restraint. They must behave responsibly if they are to meet that obligation.

Mr. President, I have, as you know, and as you have pointed out, a special interest in the progress of the negotiation of a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I have appreciated the opportunity given to me by the Conference to have had a direct involvement in our collective achievements to date. I have throughout my consultations and work as Special Coordinator appreciated the support and the assistance of delegations, both members and non-members. Last month in New York, States Parties to the NPT recognized the urgency of the need for a cut-off treaty in their adoption of the declaration of principles. I urge delegations to redouble efforts towards a cut-off treaty. Is there any reason why we should not conclude it as quickly as possible having secured the CTBT?

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

There obviously is work to be done in other areas as well. The security assurances offered by the five nuclear-weapon States at the closing plenary of the Conference on 6 April were welcome. But they were unilateral in nature, and, accordingly, subject to unilateral change. While Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 added to the formality of the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States, it did not meet the hopes of many States Parties to the NPT, who seek binding commitments. I note with satisfaction that the declaration of principles calls for further steps to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, we must continue to examine the functioning and effectiveness of this Conference. The cold war has ended. But is the Conference on Disarmament equipped for the job that lies ahead? Can it respond effectively to the changing needs of its members? Speaking personally, I am persuaded that a long hard look needs to be taken at some CD traditions, starting with the geographic group structure. While serving some purposes, the structure often prevents a real dialogue on important issues. It masks proponents and opponents, so that debate too often takes place in the dark. While perhaps a calming device during the cold war, the mechanism of presidential consultations - now the only formal forum for exchanges between groups - is artificial and unproductive.

I hasten to say that this is no reflection on past or present incumbents of the presidency. At some time or another, we all have served or will serve there. The group system is something we all inherited from a bygone era. Let us free ourselves from this relic of the past. Let us deal with our differences openly and directly.

I became most aware of the inadequacies of the group structure during the consultations on cut-off. But I also discovered some possible ways forward. For example, on three occasions, I convened members outside traditional groups. I think that participants found these meetings productive and useful to the work of the Conference as a whole. Certainly those are the comments that I have heard. I pay tribute to the participants who willingly engaged in that exercise with the results we were able to achieve.

In the NPT context, Canada has also convened meetings of non-traditional groupings, which again was a process welcomed by many and which produced solid results. These experiences indicated to me that we should all be receptive to new approaches, both procedurally and substantively, if the Conference is to remain relevant, effective and at the forefront of efforts to deal with the most pressing issues of international security.

I wish also to express our continuing and profound regret that our Conference has been unable to reach consensus on a list of countries to be added to its very limited membership; once reached, such agreement will make the Conference on Disarmament a more credible body as we move to finalize the important negotiations under way and embark on new ones. It will reflect more closely the disarmament environment at the end of this millennium. We continue to believe that exclusivity can no longer be justified. We continue to support the principle of including all States who formally apply to join by a certain cut-off date and in accordance with established procedure.

There are other questions we need to ask. Is the consensus rule still useful, especially in the context of an expanded CD? In most negotiating environments, consensus is the practice but States refrain from tying their hands by making it a rule.

I do not wish the CD to be diverted from the important work under way on CTBT or on cut-off by a dissection of our constitution and the rules and practices under which we operate. But let us re-examine why we do things the way we do. It is not good enough simply to say that that is the way we have always done things. Rules and procedures are tools, not objects in themselves. If they help our work, let us keep them. If they get in the way, let us throw them out.

Colleagues, I wish to end by thanking you all for your support and your encouragement throughout my tenure in the CD, and particularly in the last 16 months as Special Coordinator. I wish you all well in the work that lies ahead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to me.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to this opportunity to congratulate you formally, and on behalf of my delegation, I would also like to thank you for your untiring work to further the objectives of this Conference. Allow me also to welcome newly-arrived ambassadors and to express my deep regret at Ambassador Shannon's departure and to pay tribute to his sustained and skilful efforts to establish negotiations on cut-off.

On 9 February of this year I set before the Conference the elements of Australia's approach to the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations for 1995. As we approach the mid-point of our 1995 negotiating session, it is time for us to take stock.

The political environment in which we are working has changed markedly since the first part of our 1995 session closed on 7 April, with the series of decisions reached on 11 May amongst the 175 States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that participated in the Review and Extension Conference.

On that occasion the overwhelming majority of the international community - and all five of the nuclear-weapon States - unambiguously confirmed and renewed their commitment to the achievement of the vision set out in the Treaty of a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, nuclear non-proliferation was cemented in place as the standard for acceptable international behaviour in perpetuity. These historic achievements have positive implications for our work in the Conference on Disarmament.

There should be impact on the pace and effectiveness of the CTBT negotiations. For the first time, the five nuclear-weapon States have joined in agreeing a programme of action for nuclear disarmament which includes as its first substantive point "... the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996". The use of the word "programme" was deliberate. We are not speaking of mere hopes or aspirations, of things which might or might not come to pass. We are speaking of commitment to concrete steps.

The choice of the words "no later than 1996" was also deliberate. Our collective aim is to conclude the CTBT literally as soon as possible, with a firm implicit warning from the overwhelming majority of the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States, that 1996 is the latest to which conclusion can be allowed to slide.

In speaking of the CTBT I need to underline the importance to our collective endeavour of an atmosphere conducive to rapid progress and of a mutual trust as to our commitment to the objective. I have to reiterate in that context the very grave concern with which my Government views continued Chinese nuclear testing, including the latest test, conducted in the immediate aftermath of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. This act violated not only the positive spirit, but also the non-proliferation norm so clearly reaffirmed at the NPT Conference.

Australia is absolutely opposed to nuclear testing. Continued testing at a time when all other nuclear-weapon States are indeed demonstrating utmost restraint as called for in the NPT statement of principles and objectives cannot be readily reconciled with national positions of support for nuclear disarmament.

Turning to important aspects of the CTBT negotiating process, I would suggest that, if we are to be seen as serious in our intent to close as soon as possible and certainly no later than 1996, it is abundantly clear that we must have consensus before too much longer on what it is that we are seeking to ban, i.e. there must be agreement on the question of scope. Further long delay will court ridicule and unambiguously indicate lack of commitment to our objective.

My delegation believes closure on scope is eminently achievable.

We believe the negotiating Committee is beginning to see a plainly perceptible movement towards convergence. At the end of the last part of the 1995 session, I was pleased to note the wide in-principle support for the concept of a simple and clear-cut article on the scope of the treaty along the lines advanced by Australia in CD/NTB/WP.222 of 9 March 1995. We were gratified when first the United States and then the United Kingdom declared their support for this formulation.

On a related aspect, the review portion of the NPT Conference saw the recording of some important views bearing on the proposal that so-called peaceful nuclear explosions be exempted from the bans implemented under the

CTBT. In a conference which to a great extent comprised the wider international community on whose behalf we are negotiating the CTBT, consensus was reached on the following language:

> "The potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that serious concerns have been expressed on the environmental consequences that could result from the release of radioactivity from such applications and on the risk of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Treaty entered into force. The Conference further notes that no State Party has an active programme for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. The Conference therefore recommends that the Conference on Disarmament takes this situation and future developments into account when negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty."

Notwithstanding the fact that a final declaration on the review did not emerge from the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, the accepted language makes clear the lack of international support for making a special case to exclude peaceful nuclear explosions from the prohibition on testing.

I do not propose to repeat my remarks of 9 February on the sorts of ideas that emerged from the differences of opinion within this Conference which, in Australia's judgement would make consensus on scope impossible. I urge delegations, however, to reflect carefully before continuing to promote at this more definitive stage of the negotiations ideas which would either overextend or undermine the concept of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

My delegation recognizes the particular interest of the nuclear-weapon States in the issue of scope. Recognition of this specific interest is, of course, linked to these States themselves accepting a particular responsibility for agreeing on an approach to scope capable of gaining broad acceptance.

I put the view firmly that the need for such an agreement between nuclear-weapon States is becoming increasingly urgent and that these States should make a major effort over the course of the coming summer months to nail down scope issues. Unless this is achieved and the Conference is able to reach prompt agreement on scope, we will not reach a conclusion in line with our commitments.

I would suggest that the nuclear-weapon States re-examine their positions on scope in light of the new reality created by the indefinite extension of the NPT. The world is a more secure place as a result of the principled and courageous decision made by 170 non-nuclear-weapon States participating in the Conference. Those States now look for a contribution in a similar spirit to the elaboration of arrangements to secure the scope of a CTBT which powerfully reinforces the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and the now entrenched nuclear non-proliferation norm.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

With regard to ongoing work in the present part of the 1995 session, my delegation sees the work of the verification working group as a central focus. In the four remaining weeks of this part of the session, it is quite possible, and it is important for the strategic course of the negotiations, that we make a series of decisions relating to the international monitoring system (IMS) and on-site inspection (OSI). While text-cleaning work is necessary, the real progress we need will flow from decision-making in the working group itself. We wholeheartedly support Ambassador Norberg's intention that the group confront key questions as its central priority.

On IMS, as a result of textual and experts' work over previous months, we have before us in the rolling text a series of options for decision on the architecture of the IMS, including the numbers and combinations of monitoring stations to be included in the various global networks; on funding; and on the degree to which IMS-derived data is processed by the central Organization.

These issues are complex. But the options, their implications, and the positions currently adopted on them by delegations are sufficiently clear. If we are serious about progress on the treaty, it is incumbent upon us to move from restatement of positions to the less comfortable but more practical business of achieving convergence and negotiating agreed outcomes.

Likewise, on on-site inspections the work of the three convenors has highlighted a cluster of interrelated issues on which the working group needs to narrow differences further, issues such as: the possible role of a consultation and clarification procedure; the origins and basis of an OSI request; the possible role of technical evaluation after an inspection request; whether OSI is to be conceptually a single or a multi-phased operation; and how an OSI is to be triggered ("red" or "green-light" procedure and majority required). The Group now needs to find a way of exploring and developing a packaged conceptual approach in order to progress the textual work. Then delegations might find it easier to concede points which are currently protected in the rolling text but which are incompatible with a consensus outcome.

In both IMS and OSI discussions in the verification working group, it will be helpful if delegations are consistently represented at levels appropriate to their declared intention of striking agreements and encouraging rapid progress.

As is obvious from my remarks on scope, we do not suggest that we relax on legal and institutional issues. In particular my delegation agrees with those who see the treaty's provisions on the future CTBT Organization as being a promising focus of work. A number of organizational provisions - including those dealing with the seat of the Organization and with its functional relationship with the IAEA - are in our view ripe for convergence.

To conclude I wish to say that we have been encouraged by the business-like resumption of activity in this second part of the session. The quite complex, but flexible and focused structure of working and drafting groups developed in the first part of the session has got us off to a fair start. I would particularly like to record our appreciation for the work of the Chairmen and other office holders, as well as the efforts of supportive delegations which have given purpose to this structure. I have to note, however, that, while structure and activity are important, it is the achievement of convergence and agreed outcomes that are decisive. Our collective ability to manage this process over the next four weeks and beyond will be eloquent demonstration, I might say in one direction or the other, of our commitment and determination to see results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I wish to begin by congratulating you on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you every success in your task, particularly as you are a permanent representative of a sister African country which is a member of the Group of 21. I would also like to welcome other new colleagues who have joined us recently, namely, the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Brazil, Finland and Turkey, and I express my thanks and appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador Shannon of Canada for his initiatives and valuable contributions to the work of the CD, the most recent of which were his tireless efforts to reach a consensus on his report as Special Coordinator on the banning of the production of fissile materials, which was approved by the Conference during the first part of its session. His report actually constitutes the mandate of the ad hoc committee dealing with this issue.

The statement made before the Conference by His Excellency the President of Kazakhstan this morning is undoubtedly an important contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and it will be of benefit to us during our forthcoming deliberations.

Only a few weeks ago the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference came to a close in New York. While some are satisfied with the outcome of the Conference, as it succeeded in adopting three decisions and particularly the extension decision and a resolution on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, others are not satisfied with the outcome of the Conference as it failed to adopt a final declaration in its review process. During the preparatory stage for the Conference we had insisted that the review should be conducted first and that the Conference should consider the decision on extension later on. Egypt viewed the Conference as a rare opportunity to take decisive action to ensure a world free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats including at the regional level. Regrettably that opportunity was not seized and the post-conference disarmament scene is no different from the pre-conference one, except for the fact that today five recognized nuclear Powers have an absolute right to maintain that status for as long as any of them sees fit, while the other States which have voluntarily rejected the nuclear option are left without any effective and legally binding protection in the event of aggression or threat of aggression by the five declared nuclear Powers or the non-declared nuclear States which have not acceded to the Treaty. I am referring in particular to the situation in the Middle East. This situation is most unfortunate and is far from being compatible with the spirit and letter of the NPT. It leaves article VI not fully implemented 25 years after the Treaty's entry into force.

This, together with our anxiety concerning the situation in the Middle East, was among the main reasons why Egypt was not in favour of a decision for indefinite extension. We expressed this view in New York on 11 May after the adoption of the three decisions and after the adoption of the resolution concerning the Middle East. We continue to fear that the decision on the indefinite extension may lead to a certain laxity in the nuclear disarmament process, particularly as there was resistance on the part of some nuclear-weapon States to include in decision 2 on principles and objectives a time-bound commitment to make systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of totally eliminating those weapons, as stated in operative paragraph 4 (c) of the said decision.

Despite the misgivings that I have mentioned, Egypt will continue to support the nuclear disarmament process with a view to securing a more stable world. Our first priority will continue to be comprehensive nuclear disarmament in accordance with the decision taken at the first special session of the General Assembly, SSOD1. We will continue to pursue this objective at the global as well as the regional levels and at the same time we will continue to work for general and a complete disarmament.

The decision on strengthening the NPT review process, together with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, were elaborated in order to sweeten and facilitate the adoption of the decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT. The principles and objectives contained in decision 2, document NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2, have a direct bearing on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the forum which, in our view, should have the primary responsibility of translating the provisions of that decision into legally binding multilateral treaties. In the field of nuclear disarmament we have long maintained that the Conference on Disarmament should play a vital role in keeping with its mandate and agenda. I wish here, in the light of the outcome of the Review and Extension Conference, to remind the Conference of the request made by the Group of 21, including Egypt, for the inclusion of an independent item on the CD agenda on nuclear disarmament and the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a nuclear disarmament treaty without further delay. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, we hope that the CTBT negotiations will be concluded in 1995 in spite of the fact that the New York Conference set the end of the year 1996 as a deadline. Our position is that we should complete the negotiations concerning this treaty this year. This will not run contrary to what we agreed upon in New York, namely that these negotiations should be concluded before the end of 1996, and we hope that no artificial obstacles will be created by some delegations to justify any delay in these negotiations. We are gratified that the principles and objectives decision dealt with the issue of banning the production of fissile materials under the heading Nuclear Disarmament.

In this connection, the Egyptian delegation has repeatedly stressed the futility of negotiating on a fissile-material ban that would be confined solely to future production. We welcome the consensus, reflected in the decision adopted without a vote in the last NPT Conference to consider the fissile-material issue from a nuclear disarmament perspective.

In the field of security assurances we welcome the fact that the consensus decision on principles and objectives, which was adopted without a vote, recognizes the fact that steps taken so far in this field are not sufficient. The decision provides that "further steps should be considered to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Since there is also full agreement that these steps, and I quote from the same decision, "could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument", as has been requested time and again by the Group of 21, the Conference on Disarmament should no longer delay the re-establishment of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, which should promptly initiate negotiations on such an instrument. In this context it is important to point out that at the NPT Conference an overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States merely took note of, but did not welcome either Security Council resolution 984 or the unilateral declarations made by the five nuclear-weapon States in March and April 1995.

Since deadlock continues to prevent the Conference on Disarmament from achieving any progress on the issue of transparency in armaments, the delegation of Egypt would like to make a few observations. Egypt has always advocated and continues to advocate full transparency in armaments. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA in the previous sessions referred not only to conventional weapons but also in clear and unambiguous terms to weapons of mass destruction and I invite the distinguished members to read carefully General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, which was the basis for the mandate of this Committee. The NPT Review and Extension Conference decision 2 on principles and objectives referred in its operative paragraph 4 (c) to, "The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons", namely nuclear weapons, and by efforts "by all States" to achieve "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". This objective cannot be achieved without full transparency in the nuclear field and the registration of any reduction in the nuclear stockpiles as compared with the stockpiles which were declared at the beginning. Hence the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA should be clear with respect to the nuclear field, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, in addition to conventional weapons, since the said resolution calls for the establishment of a register of seven categories of conventional weapons to which should be added the stockpiles and national production and advanced technology with military applications. All members of the Conference on Disarmament should implement such a mandate fully without selectivity if they are seeking, in good faith, to make progress on this agenda item.

Since the General Assembly session in 1974, Egypt has been striving for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Our early adherence to the NPT and the numerous Egyptian initiatives in this regard are ample testimony to this fact. One obstacle, however, is preventing the achievement of this objective in the region. Israel is the only country in the Middle East which possesses nuclear facilities which it refuses to subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards. It also refuses to adhere to the NPT within a specific timeframe. No other country in the Middle East is in such a situation. This situation does not augur well for the future, particularly in view of the many difficulties and challenges that have to be overcome in the

Middle East peace process. We regard the establishment of such a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction as a confidence-building measure which is likely to speed up the peace process and provide the necessary guarantees to attain this objective. It is unacceptable that the countries which have clearly rejected the nuclear option should be driven towards regretting their decision and concluding that they were misled and that their adherence to the NPT has not actually served their security interests. We therefore from this rostrum urge a follow-up to the Middle East resolution adopted by the NPT Conference on 11 May 1995 and we hope that all States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will indeed, and I quote, "exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems". This resolution generally reflects the initiative taken by President Hosni Mubarak, concerning the establishment of this zone, in April 1990.

In keeping with what I have just said, please allow me now to briefly remind the Conference on Disarmament of the basic provisions of the principles and objectives decision adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference which have a special bearing on the situation in the Middle East and on the establishment of this nuclear-weapon-free zone. These provisions must be implemented and their implementation should be monitored, using the improved monitoring system, with effect from the year 1997. Firstly, paragraph 1 of the principles and objectives decision notes that "Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority". In the context of the Middle East this paragraph refers to Israel as it is the only country to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the region. Secondly, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the same decision deal with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and note that their development "especially in regions of tension such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority", etc. There are many other relevant passages which I will not refer to here. We can only hope that the consensus that apparently exists on the principles and objectives will lead to concrete steps and actions. Egypt for its part will continue to exert every effort to ensure that this happens.

Finally, I wish to express our disappointment as far as the deliberations of the last session of the Disarmament Commission in May 1995 are concerned. These meetings took place immediately after the conclusion of the NPT Review Conference. Those who supported an indefinite extension of the NPT on the grounds that it would give an impetus to nuclear disarmament were proved wrong on this first occasion after the conclusion of the NPT Conference. We regret in particular the poor performance in the Disarmament Commission on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

The coming months here at the Conference on Disarmament will show whether or not we can build on the results of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Our work in the Conference on Disarmament should be forward-looking and we should seek to implement in good faith all the relevant commitments adopted at the 1995 NPT Conference. The Egyptian delegation has the intention to cooperate with others to achieve the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament, as called for in decision 2, and to elaborate a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor just to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Parliament of Romania has recently ratified the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The respective ratification Law No. 40 was adopted on 24 May 1995. The Romanian authorities will shortly present the instrument of ratification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of this Convention.

This decision illustrates Romania's strong will to support the generous goals envisaged by the Inhumane Weapons Convention, as well as to responsibly join the political action aimed at securing the life and integrity of thousands of people who are being killed or wounded by these weapons, while avoiding substantial economic and social damages.

I would also like to inform you that the Romanian Government is in the final stage of examining the possibility to declare a moratorium on export of anti-personnel landmines and a decision in this respect is expected to be announced soon.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of China.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, I am very pleased to see you continue to preside over the work of the second part of the Conference. I am convinced that through the common efforts of all delegations this session will make significant progress. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the newly arrived Ambassadors of Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Finland and Turkey, and express regret at the imminent departure of the Canadian Ambassador.

Several representatives of countries protected by a nuclear umbrella and belonging to military alliances have just spoken, mentioning the recent nuclear test conducted by China. Here I would like to reiterate the position of the Chinese Government on this matter.

China understands the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of nuclear tests. It has always held that a ban on nuclear testing, like no-first-use of nuclear weapons, non-use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and non-proliferation measures, is a step towards the complete prohibition and total eradication of nuclear weapons. In this regard we are pleased to see that negotiations on the CTBT are making real progress. We hope these negotiations will proceed smoothly and the treaty can be concluded no later than 1996.

(Mr. Sha, China)

On the matter of nuclear testing, China has always exercised the utmost restraint, an attitude that has never changed in response to a particular time or event. Although in the history of its nuclear testing it has on many occasions applied a de facto moratorium, we have our own views on moratoriums and have therefore never declared one. Compared to the major nuclear Powers with the largest, most advanced nuclear arsenals, which have conducted thousands of tests, China's testing has been extremely limited and restrained. China has played a positive and serious part in the CTBT negotiations and given repeated undertakings that, once the treaty takes effect, it will abide by it and desist from testing. As always, it will work alongside the other members of the CD for the early conclusion of a good CTBT.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It is so decided.

I had hoped to be able to announce progress in our consultations regarding pending issues. However, it appears that more time is needed to overcome existing differences of views. I am sure that my successor, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, will spare no efforts to bring these consultations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

May I now make some closing remarks as we come to the end of Kenya's presidency of this Conference? Distinguished delegates and dear colleagues, it has been a great honour for my country, and for me personally, to preside over the Conference on Disarmament. The cooperation and assistance which all of you CD members and others, including in particular the members of the secretariat, have extended to me and to my delegation, has greatly facilitated our work and I thank you most sincerely and deeply for your positive disposition. Obviously, it had been my high hope that the various outstanding issues which the Conference had been tackling since the beginning of the first part of the 1995 session, would be resolved during my tenure. I must confess I had convinced myself that the CD would, before 9 June 1995, at least reach agreement on those issues in which I saw some heavy procedural content, like the establishment or re-establishment of negotiating mechanisms and expansion of membership of the Conference, so that substantive work could commence in various committees.

As it turned out, I was wrong - and very badly so - for we have not yet agreed on how to deal with some of the items on the agenda for this year, which makes the CD a really unique negotiating forum. I appeal to all delegations to seriously work towards the achievement of mutually agreeable solutions to these outstanding issues so that the Conference can concentrate on matters of real substance. We are, in fact, now half way through our current session and yet a lot of work still remains undone. The international community watches us as we sit here and will have very serious difficulty understanding that this forum, always attended - perhaps like no other international negotiating body - by very high-ranking government officials, mostly extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoys, is unable to start substantive work on the items on its agenda. As I said, the world is watching us and we must not be seen or understood to be negotiating mere words or language and/or group positions in Geneva. Our task is to do the real work of the CD's mandate in a flexible, progressive and determined fashion.

I therefore urge you once again, distinguished delegates and colleagues, to exercise judgement and common sense and to display the necessary political will and spirit of compromise in resolving your differences.

I wish my successor and incoming President, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, every success and pledge my delegation's fullest support and indeed my own willingness to cooperate with him and his delegation.

Muchas gracias and ahsante sana. Thank you very much for your attention.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.708
15 June 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 708th plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference.

Today I have the dual honour of assuming the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and of taking the floor here for the first time as head of the delegation of Mexico. I am aware that this dual honour brings with it a dual responsibility.

On the one hand, the international community expects concrete measures from this body in the year when we are celebrating the first half-century of the United Nations and the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the last world war. This obliges us to make additional efforts as to demonstrate our political will and our ability to reach general agreements so as to organize and conclude the tasks within our purview.

On the other, Mexico has always regarded disarmament as a priority item in our foreign policy and in this forum famous Mexicans have brilliantly promoted the best interests of the international community. Permit me feelingly to mention the names of Luis Padilla Nervo, Antonio Gómez Robledo and Alfonso García Robles, and to pay a well deserved tribute to my immediate predecessor, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch. The 1995-2000 National Development Plan that, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic, President Ernesto Zedillo submitted to the Congress of the Union on 31 May last, states that "The promotion of peace around us and in other parts of the world is both the realization of a principle and an instrument of national development. Peace presupposes respect and tolerance among nation States, adherence to international law and willingness to perform commitments entered into. Therefore, Mexico regards it as important to participate in processes of peace-making through dialogue, to build broad and viable consensus for disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, and to combat illegal arms dealings".

I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the way in which Ambassador Don Nanjira, Permanent Representative of Kenya, conducted our business in the last few months; we are grateful for his valuable contribution. I should also like to thank all distinguished colleagues who have welcomed me here.

I am convinced that the Conference must live up to the expectations of the international community. The recipe for successful multilateral negotiations is well-known: shared objectives, understanding on priorities, frameworks for debates and timetables and, of course, cooperation with the Presidency. Regarding objectives, we all share that of eliminating nuclear weapons and achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Regarding basic understandings, we have an agenda, rules of procedure and decisions on the organization of work adopted at the beginning of the year. It is time to rise beyond the differences that have prevented us from carrying through our programme and to respond to the trust placed in us by the international community. As for the presidency, I would like to thank you in advance for the patience you will show to me as someone who left this forum almost a third of a century ago. In terms of a human life, this may seem a lot; unfortunately, in terms of disarmament it is not much. For may part, I promise to do my best.

It would also be appropriate to meet the aspirations of the United Nations General Assembly, which every year calls upon this Conference to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and to consider the appropriateness of establishing an ad hoc committee to begin the major negotiations that we have been asked to undertake. In the same line of thinking, my delegation wishes to repeat the appeal it made at the recent NPT Conference to nuclear-weapon States to cease all production of those weapons within the framework of a truly verifiable ban.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue that has caught the attention of the international community in recent months. The results of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference are closely related to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and has a major influence on our agenda. Today more than ever consideration should be given within the agenda of the Conference to all facets of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, because it would be an opportunity to give continuity to this exercise and to move towards consolidating a genuine non-proliferation regime that would be wide-ranging in its objectives, non-discriminatory in essence and universal in its effects. José Angel Gurría, Mexico's Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the Review and Extension Conference and described the central elements of our participation. He stated that Mexico has given reliable proof of its commitment to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has therefore also stressed the need for those countries that hold nuclear weapons to commit themselves specifically and precisely to the shared objective of eliminating them. Mexico has further insisted, he said, on the need to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race through agreement on specific measures, beginning with the complete cessation of nuclear testing.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided to adopt, simultaneously and without a vote, principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament that include a programme of action, strengthening of the review process for the Treaty and the indefinite extension of its validity. Obviously, the indefinite validity of a treaty means that the rights and obligations contracted by the parties do not expire on a fixed date. This, of course, does not mean that, as it seems to me I have heard, the treaty has become permanent or eternal. Few things in nature or in life are that, and certainly not an instrument conceived as a step towards a broader objective, subject to periodic evaluation and susceptible of being denounced. The Treaty will be effective in so far as all the Parties fulfil their obligations. The international community gives priority to genuine non-proliferation - in other words, to a situation where there is no increase in the dissemination of nuclear weapons or in existing arsenals and where competition for their qualitative improvement ceases. Genuine non-proliferation is an indispensable first step towards nuclear disarmament and towards the abolition of those weapons whose mere existence constitutes a threat to the very survival of humanity. If my Government subscribed to the indefinite extension of the

Treaty, it was because it understood that decision as being linked to the decision to make concrete progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament through a programme of action and on the basis of principles agreed upon on that occasion. We were confident, as was the international community, that the decisions taken at the Conference would stimulate our efforts to attain our shared objectives. Contrary to what was expected, the NPT Conference did not achieve the consensus necessary to adopt a declaration. The session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission immediately after the NPT Conference also proved unable to achieve consensus, and in this Conference we seem bogged down in procedural matters.

Apparently the indefinite extension of the NPT did not have the positive effect we expected. The Conference was barely over when a nuclear Power carried out a new nuclear test, and another one has just announced its intention to carry out eight additional tests in the coming months. Both have ignored the call for an end to nuclear tests as the necessary basis for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the conclusion no later than 1996 of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that was unquestionably one of the Conference's most important achievements. We therefore once again exhort China and France to abide by the moratorium on nuclear testing because to hold more tests would undoubtedly cause justified concern in the South Pacific countries and, generally, in all countries.

These difficulties and events, which we regret, are disappointing, but they do not alter the fact that the present international scene is highly propitious to the consolidation of our disarmament objectives and realizing the goals we have set ourselves is only a question of political will. Foremost among those goals is the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Negotiations began early in 1994 and we have to settle the fundamental elements of the treaty. The rolling text makes it easier to express the political will that prompts us all to conclude the treaty successfully and soon. Finding a solution to the question of the scope of the treaty is urgent. It is evident that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should, as its name indicates, prohibit nuclear tests completely. During the spring session we achieved some progress and we must reach agreements that will result in the total banning of all nuclear tests irrespective of the purpose for which it is claimed they are made. With respect to the entry into force of the treaty, perhaps a simple formula like the one used in the Chemical Weapons Convention would offer the best chance of agreement. The key decisions on the verification system are still pending. There are still large differences of opinion regarding cost-sharing and the role the Organization would have in identifying a possible violation. These are political decisions within our powers. I have merely mentioned some of the most important problems we have to resolve if we want to fulfil our task. I would like to appeal here for the intensification of efforts to conclude the CTBT this year, and to express gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Lud Dembinski, and to the Chairman of the Working Group on Verification, Ambassador Lars Norberg, and the Chairman of the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Matters, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker.

Another of the commitments entered into during the Review and Extension Conference is the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissionable material for military uses. This was one of the key issues during negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has also been a fundamental element of many resolutions of the General Assembly. It is urgent for the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference to begin work immediately within the framework of item 2 of the agenda and on the basis of document CD/1299 of 23 March of this year.

Lastly I should like to refer to the question of the re-establishment of other subsidiary bodies of the Conference. We have an obligation to adopt measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, through a legally binding instrument, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Mexico made a proposal during the NPT Review and Extension Conference for the annexation to the Treaty of a protocol similar to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco so as to make negative security assurances universal. Likewise, together with several countries of the Group of 21 we have put forward a draft protocol here. We must ensure that the use of outer space is for peaceful purposes only and for the benefit of all humanity. The relevant committee must resume work as soon as possible. Lastly, we all agree that the enlargement and the agenda of the Conference deserve urgent decisions. I shall begin consultations in the next few days with a view to overcoming our difficulties regarding the organization of work.

The international climate is currently conducive to consolidating our disarmament objectives. Every effort must be made to build a consensus that will enable us to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the climate of cooperation that began early this decade. We should strive to find consensus precisely now that the danger of nuclear war seems further away. We should build on a minimal basis, which could be the elements of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament recently agreed upon by a large number of States. We should begin by achieving the practical measures that circumstances allow and that will take us closer to the common goal: the abolition of nuclear weapons and disarmament.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of France, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Ireland and Belgium.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to welcome you among us and warmly to wish you every success in your important mission here in Geneva. Your country has always made it a point of honour to be represented here by distinguished persons; your predecessor, our friend Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, is the latest example of that and we are delighted that the tradition is being continued with you. I would also like to congratulate you on taking over the presidency of the Conference at a particularly important point in its work. I would also like to hail the efforts made by your predecessor, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya. Lastly, I would like to bid welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Celso Lafer of Brazil.

The President of the Republic has just announced that France will be carrying out a final series of nuclear tests. The decision has to be seen in the light of the following considerations.

Firstly, the decision was taken because it was necessary. France suspended its tests in April 1992; that it to say, before the completion of the tests that would have enabled us to end them permanently. France was therefore obliged to carry out a final test campaign in order in particular to be able to embark determinedly on a policy of using simulation in order to guarantee the safety and reliability of its weapons. France has undertaken to end its tests permanently by 31 May 1996 and will thus be in a position to join before the end of 1996 in the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, in accordance with the objectives which the international community has set itself.

Secondly, the decision is not a surprise. On the day CTBT negotiations began we indicated clearly that we were keeping open the option of resuming tests. I myself said in this room on 7 February 1994 that "We have never agreed to establish a link between the continuation of the current moratoria on tests and the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty". I added that "for us, there is no incompatibility between the possible resumption of tests and our involvement in these negotiations". That position has been restated unambiguously since then.

Thirdly, the decision is consistent with our obligations and our responsibilities in the field of non-proliferation. I might remind you that no international text provides for an obligation definitively to suspend tests at the present stage. On the other hand, as we all know, the declaration on principles and objectives adopted at the end of the NPT Review and Extension Conference on 11 May last recommends, and I quote "utmost restraint" pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. France respects that constraint. This will be the final series of tests. It will be limited in number (eight in all). It will be limited in time (from September 1995 to May 1996 at the very latest). And, of course, like the previous ones, it will be conducted in the most stringent conditions of safety and environmental protection.

Fourthly, the decision confirms our commitment to the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The aim of this final series of tests is precisely to enable us to end our testing permanently, in accordance with the objectives of the CTBT. Without resuming our tests we would not be in a position to adhere to such a treaty in 1996. So, the decision which we have taken is intended to enable us to comply with the schedule set forth in the declaration on principles and objectives which was adopted at the same time as it was decided to extend the NPT indefinitely. It goes without saying that

France's commitment to join in concluding a CTBT before the end of 1996 is essential: a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty will only be meaningful if the five nuclear-weapon States adhere to it.

Fifthly, and lastly, the decision in no way affects our willingness to contribute to disarmament. As a nuclear Power, France has an essential aim: to maintain the credibility of its deterrent capabilities, the underpinning of its security and independence. It will continue to assume this responsibility. At the same time, France has a duty to take part in the movement towards disarmament. In this regard, the nature of the test series, and its end purposes, show clearly that France intends neither to design new types of weapons nor to increase the number or yield of its existing weapons, nor to develop miniature weapons, nor to modify the role of nuclear weapons in its defence doctrine. Our Prime Minister, Mr. Alain Juppé, who addressed the National Assembly yesterday, 14 June, was categorical on these points. This final series of tests fits strictly within our constant strategy of deterrence, which precludes nuclear warfare and seeks solely to prevent war. This strategy will remain purely defensive. Our means will be maintained strictly at the level of adequacy.

In introducing his Government's programme, the Prime Minister, Mr. Alain Juppé, said before the French Parliament on 23 May last, "Our duty is to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of our deterrence in all circumstances while preserving the aim of concluding a test-ban treaty by the end of 1996. Our country intends to contribute fully to the fight against proliferation, which was marked just recently by the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty". This is the meaning behind the decision which has just been adopted by the President of the Republic.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HO (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, allow me, at the outset, to extend my warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation is confident that under your able leadership and guidance productive results will be achieved.

I have requested the floor today to elaborate on my Government's position concerning nuclear-related disarmament issues. First of all, the Government of the Republic of Korea welcomes the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was adopted in New York last month. My Government's assessment is that such a decision is a great success. All peace-loving countries have demonstrated a concerted harmony in making permanent the legally-binding international norm of delegitimizing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, whether it be horizonal or vertical. We believe that the indefinite extension of the Treaty will enhance its role and status as an international non-proliferation norm. Indeed, the exercise of international pressure and sanctions against any State failing to comply with obligations under the Treaty will be more legitimized with further strengthened justifications.

My delegation holds the view that the most important task at this stage is to continue to move with determination toward the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, my Government deems it necessary to devote our utmost efforts to implementing the decisions on the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and on "strengthening the review process for the Treaty". In order to maximize the benefit of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, it is necessary to, first and foremost, demonstrate our strong will to implement such decisions in good faith. The Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body. A significant portion of the follow-up measures for the effective implementation of the Treaty are to be dealt with promptly in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. The document on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament elaborates on the main elements of the follow-up measures as follows: (a) the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996; (b) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the cut-off negotiations; (c) the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

It is my Government's firm belief that the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and to substantial progress in the fields of nuclear disarmament. Given this, the early conclusion of CTBT negotiations at the latest by 1996, will constitute a strong stepping-stone in the effort to strengthen the NPT regime in the coming decades. In this regard my delegation would like to extend again its sincere appreciation to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and its subsidiary working groups for their unswerving efforts in having produced the second version of rolling text of the future treaty (CD/NTB/WP.235) during the first session of this year. I hope that such efforts will be continued at the same pace as before pending the eventual conclusion of the Treaty.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Any nuclear testing at this stage would set back the on-going test ban negotiations. I regret very much the recent recurrence of the nuclear explosion test and the proposed tests. The Government of the Republic of Korea calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from testing, and strengthen their efforts to consolidate nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures.

With respect to cut-off issues, I would like to express my appreciation to the Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador Shannon, for their dedicated efforts in having achieved a consensus last March on the negotiating mandate for the cut-off Ad Hoc Committee, which is based on resolution 48/75 L of the

United Nations General Assembly. Taking into account the fact that the cut-off treaty is expected to play a significant role in the further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, my delegation is prepared to provide its full support for the successful negotiation of the treaty in the coming months ahead, in the hope that the cut-off negotiations will be commenced as soon as possible during this session.

As regards our efforts to strengthen the NPT regime, my delegation is of the view that the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is also important for the future development of the regime. In this connection, transparency and accountability in nuclear-related export controls should be reinforced, thereby leading to greater opportunities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an essential ingredient in securing peace and security in north-east Asia. The United States and North Korea issued a joint press release in Kuala Lumpur on 13 June after three weeks of negotiations to implement the Agreed Framework reached in Geneva last October. They have agreed on the major principles for providing light-water reactors (LWRs) to the North. My Government considers the Kuala Lumpur agreement as a meaningful step forward in resolving North Korea's nuclear issue, in view of the fact that the agreement has laid the basis for implementing the LWR project. According to the agreement, the LWRs will be provided to the North by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) on a turn-key basis. The Korean Government, therefore, supports the accord with the understanding that the early resumption of dialogue between South and North Korea is indispensable to the complete resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue, as provided for in the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework signed in Geneva last October. We firmly believe that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be greatly conducive to creating peace and security in north-east Asia as a whole. In this regard, we urge North Korea to come forward to South-North dialogue as soon as possible for the implementation of the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Before concluding my statement, I would like to touch upon the issue of CD expansion. My delegation believes that we must now focus our efforts on devising a formula by which the issue of CD expansion could be solved without further delay. The decision was reached on the indefinite extension of the NPT. The remaining tasks before us should be to intensify, globalize, and revitalize our common efforts to strengthen the NPT regime in the coming century. We need to act quickly before it is too late. It is deeply regrettable that since the O'Sullivan report on this issue failed to be adopted in August 1993, we have never seen tangible efforts by the member States to find a solution to the deadlocked situation of the issue. The restructuring of the Conference on Disarmament is long overdue. The countries which have a strong will and capability to make contributions toward multilateral disarmament should be given the opportunity to join the CD as full member States. Once again, my delegation would like to draw the attention of all CD member States to the urgency and importance of concluding the issue of CD expansion.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. AMANO (Japan) (translated from French): Mr. President, permit me first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. I am certain that, with your personal ability and your long experience as a diplomat, you will help to resolve our problems by making good use of the time remaining to us in this second part of the 1995 session.

It was with profound disappointment that Japan learned of the decision by France to resume nuclear testing. It is, obviously, our country's firm conviction that nuclear testing must be stopped. Japan deeply regrets that France should have decided to resume nuclear testing although we came to an agreement at the recent NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, an agreement which stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise "utmost restraint" in the sphere of nuclear testing. Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, stated clearly in the conversation he had with Mr. Hervé de Charrette, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, that "The decision by France signifies the betrayal of the trust that non-nuclear-weapon States had in the nuclear-weapon States".

Japan would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its position concerning the moratorium on nuclear tests. It is that the moratorium must be maintained and observed by the nuclear-weapon States, including France.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words to me.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): Mr. President, let me first warmly welcome you to Geneva and congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Mexico and New Zealand share a strong friendship, and you may be assured of my delegation's full cooperation in all your tasks over the coming weeks.

New Zealand and Mexico have for many years worked together in this Conference and in other United Nations organizations to bring an end to all nuclear testing. That goal is within sight. For the first time the nuclear-weapon States have agreed to a deadline for the conclusion of the CTBT negotiations, to exercise utmost restraint pending its entry into force, and to pursue with determination the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. These commitments were made in the context of the decision in May to make the NPT permanent, a decision which New Zealand believes enhances the security of all countries.

Days after these commitments were entered into China conducted a nuclear-weapon test. I informed the Conference of the strong protest of the New Zealand Government and people in a statement made at the beginning of this session, which can be found in document CD/1318.

France has now announced a decision to resume testing in September at its test site on Moruroa atoll in the South Pacific. I wish to inform the

Conference today of the outrage expressed by the New Zealand people and Government at this announcement, which runs counter to the direction in which the world is moving and counter to efforts to advance the cause of non-proliferation. New Zealand rejected the arguments advanced in the CTBT negotiations for a provision on so-called "safety tests" in the body of the treaty, and we reject now the argument that further tests are required to ensure the safety of France's nuclear arsenal before the treaty enters into force. There is no justification for a resumption of testing that can be consistent with the commitments notably, to "utmost restraint" that France made at the NPT Conference, or with its responsibility not to jeopardize progress in the CTBT negotiations.

In taking this decision France has ignored the strength of opposition to testing voiced most recently by representatives of South Pacific countries at the NPT Conference and embodied in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. At that Conference France agreed that the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The decision to resume testing contradicts that position and is a serious setback to France's relations with the South Pacific region.

The New Zealand Government has announced a number of measures, mainly affecting defence cooperation, which it has taken in response to the French decision. At the same time it has urged the French authorities to reconsider their decision. I make the same call here today, for the sake of both the CTBT negotiations and of France's international standing. I will be asking the secretariat to circulate my Prime Minister's statement to the New Zealand Parliament on this question.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to welcome you to this Conference and to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency. I can assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation in addressing the formidable procedural issues facing your presidency.

It is with regret that I ask for the floor today to address the decision by France to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific. In line with Australia's absolute opposition to nuclear testing, the Australian Government unequivocally deplores France's decision. Australia's Prime Minister, Paul Keating, has made the following statement:

> "Australia deplores France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific, announced by President Chirac on 13 June. Australia is adamantly opposed to nuclear testing by any nuclear-weapon State. In recent months we have made our opposition very clear to the French, including to President Chirac. France's decision is all the more regrettable given that the moratorium it had observed on nuclear testing, together with those of the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom,

was an invaluable contribution to the strengthening of global non-proliferation. France last conducted a nuclear test in July 1991 and announced a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme in April 1992.

The actions of both France and China (which conducted a test on 15 May) run counter to the undertakings they made at the recent nuclear non-proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference to exercise 'utmost restraint' in nuclear testing.

Australia has welcomed the commitment made at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to the completion of the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. Any further test by any of the nuclear-weapon States would inevitably cloud the positive and constructive atmosphere of the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations in Geneva. While I note that President Chirac's announcement foreshadows that the number of nuclear tests will be limited to eight between September 1995 and May 1996, I emphasize that the international community is looking to the nuclear-weapon States to desist from further testing as the CTBT negotiations enter this final and critical stage.

As Chairman of the South Pacific Forum I will be in contact with my South Pacific colleagues about registering our strong objections to France's decision to resume testing and our concern about its implications, including for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Australia has repeatedly urged France to accede to the protocols of the Treaty. During the negotiations at the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in May, France undertook to give early consideration to doing so.

In the present circumstances the Government has decided to freeze cooperation between Australia and France in the defence field at its existing level while any new testing programme continues. The Australian Embassy in Paris has been instructed to convey Australia's protest to the French Government."

As the Prime Minister's statement indicates, a range of implications flow from this serious and most regrettable decision. The essential issues to address here in the Conference on Disarmament however, are the implications which bear on the Conference, and in particular on its negotiations towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Australia has placed high importance on the attainment of this objective and, in the light of French intentions and continued testing by China, now regards its achievement with even greater urgency.

In support of those negotiations and as an expression of their commitment, we have expected restraint from the nuclear-weapon States. Indeed, the nuclear-weapon States themselves endorsed the principle of "utmost restraint" only last month. As the Australian Prime Minister said, we do not consider initiation of a new programme of nuclear testing explosions as consistent with the notion of "utmost restraint". We do note, however, the commitment expressed yesterday by President Chirac to conclude these tests by the end of May 1996 and his commitment, without reservation, to sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the Autumn of 1996. We recognize the importance of those commitments and expect France to honour them.

Honouring the first commitment is solely within the hands of the French Government. As we all know, however, the second depends on there being an agreed text available in good time for signature. Only one week ago, in speaking to this plenary, I addressed key issues facing us if we, the negotiators, are to be seen as serious in our intent to conclude the CTBT as soon as possible, and certainly no later than 1996. The President of France has said he will stop testing in May and sign by the Autumn. That is by the time of the 1996 United Nations General Assembly, by September, or October at the latest. This would mean this Conference would have to complete its work by summer, by July at the latest. I emphasize, this is not what we had, or have in mind by the commitment to conclude "as soon as possible". We would hope for an earlier conclusion and will work for that. But even to guarantee completion by this mid-year target will require significant movement on key issues as we detailed in my statement last week, particularly on the scope of the Treaty. Given this decision on testing and the commitment of President Chirac, we look to France in particular to take concrete steps in the CTBT negotiating process to enable its conclusion in good time.

The answer to nuclear test explosions which have plagued the planet for decades is for the international community to adopt a verifiable, effective and comprehensive test-ban treaty, and we need more than rhetoric to achieve this. France, all nuclear-weapon States, indeed all participants in these negotiations, must combine to provide concrete results which will achieve this outcome. Quite obviously, given recent events, the need is pressing.

I would also like to bring a further development to the attention of the Conference. As a result of consultations between Heads of Government of South Pacific Forum countries, the Forum has issued a statement through the Prime Minister of Australia as the current Chair of the Forum which I would like to read to the Conference:

> "On behalf of South Pacific Forum Heads of Government, as current Chair of the Forum I condemn France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Individual Forum Governments have already issued statements and protests that reflect the depth of their disappointment. The immediate widespread public antagonism to France's decision right across the South Pacific reflects the resentment felt by our peoples. Forum Heads of Government understand and share these feelings. On their behalf, I express our unequivocal opposition to France's decision.
>
> The statements that have been issued by other nuclear Powers and by other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world are welcome. Forum leaders hope that France will hear and take note of what the world is saying.

France has exercised a choice about the nature of its engagement in the South Pacific. Forum members had welcomed the improved relations between France and countries in the region. France's decision is a major setback to this trend, which was partly founded on its 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The wider implications of France's decision are also of deep concern to Forum Heads of Government. France's decision undermines the outcome of the recent nuclear non-proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC). The decision is particularly regrettable in the light of agreement reached at that Conference, including by France, that negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) should be completed by no later than 1996 and that, pending such a treaty, nuclear-weapon States would exercise the utmost restraint. The South Pacific Forum remains strongly committed to a CTBT as a key step in global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. It offers the prospect of ending testing completely - in the South Pacific as elsewhere. The Heads of Government have noted President Chirac's commitment that France would sign such a treaty. They will hold France to that commitment. Heads of Government also call on France to abide by the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

I am in contact with my fellow Heads of Government about arrangements for a Forum delegation to convey to the French Government the depth of the Forum's concern. I envisage that the delegation would be led by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished Ambassador for the statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, permit me to congratulate you on your appointment to preside over our discussions and to assure you of the full cooperation of the Chilean Mission. The friendship between our peoples and Governments and my personal esteem for your extensive diplomatic career strengthen the feeling of a shared vision that emerges from your important statement here today.

In the process of nuclear disarmament, in the development of a universal non-proliferation regime and in the expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones we are moving within an ever wider horizon. The negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty are making headway, we have a mandate to begin negotiating an international instrument to ban fissionable materials produced for weapons purposes and the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been indefinitely extended and strengthened by a set of principles initially proposed by South Africa with contributions from other countries, including yours, Mr. President, that will undoubtedly contribute to the progress towards nuclear disarmament with effective international commitments and goals. We look forward to the entry into force of the treaty on the denuclearization of Africa and, in my own region the accession of Cuba to the Treaty of Tlatelolco opens a new and positive phase for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). My country has associated itself with deep conviction and in its own fashion with these trends, playing a substantial role in the updating of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, completing its negotiation of broad safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Within the picture that I have sketched there also appear, as clear retrograde steps the continued nuclear explosions by the People's Republic of China and the explosions just announced by the President of France. It is true that both nations have joined fully in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have repeated that these tests, of strictly limited duration, do not in any way alter their political will to conclude a universal convention to ban future testing, as Ambassador Errera was at pains to emphasize. But let us be precise and recognize that the tests announced will serve to delay the signing of the agreement, that they constitute a bad example incompatible with the spirit of non-proliferation, and that they offend the deep feelings of the peoples of the South Pacific, who were not consulted and do not want these tests in their geographical or natural environment.

The Ministers of the countries members of the Permanent South Pacific Commission are holding permanent consultations on this matter. My Government has issued a public statement that I will ask to be circulated in the Conference on Disarmament.

Going beyond the immediate bounds of the controversy that separates us, we should concern ourselves with the different perspective with which we approach negotiations of such far-reaching importance as those on the future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We need to mobilize in pursuit of a project for world coexistence that will inspire all the players in the system, we need to cross the threshold that leads from confrontation to monitoring and mutual trust. As you yourself have perceived, Mr. President, and as Ambassador Ho of the Republic of Korea has reiterated, the prevailing structure and methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament are not favourable to these lofty purposes but the Government of Chile will always be ready to move forward towards binding agreements that reduce to the utmost the nuclear risk and the risk of weapons of mass destruction by increasing the rhythm of the negotiations, as all speakers today have stressed, within the context of timetables and programmes of action that will make it impossible for us to elude responsibilities that have become unavoidable.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. SINCLAIR (Canada): Mr. President, first of all let me join others in congratulating you, a NAFTA partner of Canada's, on your assumption of the presidency. I am certain we are in capable hands and that the Conference will make sustained progress under your leadership.

I have been instructed to address this plenary on the matter of nuclear testing. It was with regret that we learned of the decision of France to resume its nuclear testing programme. We recall the decision made only one month ago at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely. We also recall the commitment made by all States Parties to the Treaty to a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. In these Principles and Objectives, France, along with the other nuclear-weapon States, reaffirmed its commitment to article VI of the NPT to pursue "in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament". In these Principles and Objectives we agreed that we should complete our negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty "no later than 1996" and we all agreed that, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should "exercise utmost restraint". In the short time since these historic events we have already had one nuclear test by the Chinese. We now have the French decision. Both are regrettable. But they show us that our work here is even more pressing. We must redouble our efforts to conclude the CTBT and we must begin work immediately on a cut-off convention. We have noted President Chirac's firm commitment to sign, without conditions, the comprehensive test-ban treaty in the fall of 1996. We must all work together to ensure that the historic commitments we undertook at the NPT Review and Extension Conference are fulfilled. For its part, Canada is committed to a new global reality: one without nuclear testing. We must speed our work toward that goal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, first I would like to express my delegation's warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. I also take this opportunity to join other colleagues in welcoming you among us and I wish you every success in your present duties.

I have asked for the floor to inform the plenary that on 1 June 1995 the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Ingwar Carlsson, made a statement following the announcement by France that it will resume nuclear testing. I quote the statement of the Prime Minister:

> "Sweden deeply deplores the fact that France has decided to resume its nuclear testing. This we have also communicated directly to the French Government. The French decision is even more shocking since it comes only a month after the NPT Review and Extension Conference during which the nuclear-weapon States promised to exercise 'utmost restraint' with regard to further nuclear testing. The Swedish Government is anxious that the ongoing negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive test-ban treaty not be negatively affected by the French decision. Our goal is for the treaty to be concluded at the latest in 1996. This treaty will, for all times, prohibit nuclear testing and all other nuclear explosions. I take it for granted that the United States and the Russian Federation will uphold their moratoria. It take note of the fact that France has declared that the tests that have now been decided upon shall cease in the spring of 1996. I trust that the negotiations in Geneva will be concluded as soon as possible and that France will sign the treaty".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Mr. President, may I also welcome you to Geneva and congratulate you on your assumption of this high office? We feel confident that you will provide able leadership at a time when the Conference faces crucial challenges.

In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament just one week ago, State Secretary Siri Bjerke set forward the views of the Norwegian Government on current issues before the CD and related disarmament issues. On that occasion she too pointed to the successful conclusion of the NPT, which emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint in regard to nuclear tests. All nuclear-weapon States should refrain from further nuclear testing.

We are therefore greatly disappointed about the French decision to resume nuclear testing. I have been instructed to convey to you the reaction of the Norwegian Government after the announcement in Paris. Norway strongly deplores the French decision to resume nuclear testing. This decision represents a set-back in relation to the progress that has been made in disarmament efforts in recent years. It may put a strain on the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We fear that the French decision will complicate efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it will not be conducive to the efforts to significantly reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the world community. The Norwegian Government therefore urges the French authorities to reverse their decision.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. SWIFT (Ireland): Mr. President, to begin, may I offer you my double congratulations, first on your taking up the office of President of the Conference for the present period, and secondly, even if 33 years is not, unfortunately, a long period in disarmament terms, it still has certain reverberations in human terms, and I congratulate you for being back with us once again.

I have asked for the floor this morning to inform the Conference of a statement made by the Irish Deputy Prime Minister yesterday on the question of resumption of nuclear testing. I quote:

> "The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland today expressed his deep concern at the announcement that France intends to resume nuclear testing later this year. This decision will be viewed as a setback to the efforts to bring about an early and complete ban on nuclear testing.

At the recent NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, the nuclear Powers undertook to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. The Conference called on the nuclear-weapon States, pending the entry into force of a CTBT, to exercise utmost restraint. In the light of the outcome of the Conference, it is particularly disappointing that two nuclear Powers, France and China, have decided to continue testing".

Lastly, I would like to associate my delegation with the views of the Korean Ambassador that the expansion of the membership of this Conference is now long overdue.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Ireland for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to bid you welcome to this assembly and to say how pleased we are to see you presiding immediately over the outcome of our work. You have arrived at a crucial time for the Conference and you will need all your authority to ensure that it at last makes progress in fields other than the CTBT. You can be assured that you will receive full cooperation from my delegation.

I have asked for the floor this morning to express to you my Government's reaction to the announcement by President Chirac that France is resuming nuclear testing. Belgium is disappointed at the French decision to resume its nuclear tests in the Pacific. It understands the disappointment of those who, in the wake of the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, were counting on the non-resumption of testing. Belgium takes note, however, of the statement by President Chirac of limiting the tests to eight, the last of which should take place at the latest next May, and of his undertaking to sign the future nuclear test-ban treaty in 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. GOOSEN (South Africa): Mr. President, like previous speakers, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you to Geneva. With the imminent arrival of our new Permanent Representative, my delegation will soon have an opportunity to congratulate you formally on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference. We would also like to use this opportunity to thank your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya, for his contribution to the work of the Conference. It was a great pleasure to see a fellow African in the Chair.

I have asked for the floor in order to express the deep regret of the South African Government at the decision of the Government of France to resume its nuclear testing programme in the South Pacific. We have noted the reactions of States in that region and endorse their strong opposition to the resumption of the French testing programme on the Moruroa Atoll. South Africa declares its solidarity with these countries in their opposition to the proposed tests.

The French decision is of particular concern coming as it does during sensitive negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and so soon after the successful conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. At that Conference, the nuclear-weapon States undertook to exercise the utmost restraint in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a CTBT. The international non-proliferation regime was strengthened and added to by the adoption without a vote of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament on 9 May 1995. We would expect all States to honour both the letter and spirit of the Principles and Objectives which they negotiated and agreed to. France in particular played an active role in these negotiations.

The South African Government urges the Government of France to reconsider its decision and to retain its moratorium on testing until the entry into force of the CTBT. Similar views have already been conveyed directly to the Government of France at a meeting with the French Chargé d'affaires in Pretoria on 14 June 1995. It is my Government's intention to have further meetings with the Government of France both in Pretoria and in Paris to express our views on this matter.

South Africa's opposition to nuclear testing was also made clear to the People's Republic of China when it conducted a nuclear test explosion on 15 May 1995. We believe that this decision by the Government of France is a step backwards in the endeavour of the international community to ban nuclear testing. In addition to urging the Government of France to reconsider its decision, we also wish to call on the other nuclear-weapon States with moratoria to continue to "exercise utmost restraint".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it is an honour for me to congratulate you on taking over the presidency of the Conference. I am sure that we shall benefit from your valuable contributions, as we have in the past from the long list of illustrious predecessors from your country. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank the distinguished Ambassador of Kenya for his efforts when presiding over the Conference and to associate myself with previous speakers who have formally welcomed the ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament.

I have asked for the floor this morning to make a general statement. The second part of the Conference on Disarmament began against the background of the decision adopted a few weeks ago in New York whereby the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided to extend that instrument indefinitely. Almost all the speakers this morning have made reference to that fact in one way or another. As you are aware, Cuba is not a party to the Treaty, which it feels does not cover its fundamental strategic interests. This does not mean, however, that we have any difficulty with the idea of non-proliferation when viewed from a comprehensive, non-discriminatory approach and applied both vertically and horizontally. Those are requirements that we see as a sine qua non to the achievement of universality and the consolidation of the credibility of the instrument. For Cuba and for other countries represented here, non-proliferation must serve as a stimulus to nuclear disarmament, which is its fundamental objective, and not to sanctify the possession of nuclear weapons. For that reason, we subscribe this morning to the appeal made here last week by the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan for the nuclear Powers to state in this body that the indefinite extension of the NPT is not synonymous for them with legitimization of the indefinite possession of such weapons.

The links that it has recently been sought to make, whereby the legitimate right of some countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy would be held subject to their membership or otherwise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, are unjustified and unacceptable. That is all the more so if we look at the public and warranted complaints by many States Parties to that Treaty regarding the way in which the relevant provisions of its article IV are applied to them.

Until very recently it was exceptional for any statement made here not to welcome the end of the cold war and to recognize the opportunities that offered for irreversible progress in the sphere of disarmament. Gone were the reasons that gave rise to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the circumstances seemed ripe for realizing the aspiration of so many of the world's great figures, including Don Alfonso Garciá Robles, of his country, to achieve an agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Sadly, there is no denying that events have not followed the course that then seemed so clear to logic and to reason. Today we are seeing not only difficulty in ratifying even modest arms control agreements that were once put enthusiastically before this body, but also the continuation of efforts to improve the performance of nuclear weapons. In other words, it is largely the case that there is still not the political will necessary not only to conclude nuclear disarmament agreements but also to establish a subsidiary body of this Conference to deal with this issue. We cannot but regret this state of affairs, which is adversely affecting what all here agree are our priority negotiations, namely those aimed at the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Permit us to refer briefly to our aspirations for the future treaty on a total end to testing. As far as we are concerned, this would be an essentially political instrument whereby States parties would commit themselves not to continue tests to improve nuclear weapons. It would be a first step on the right path towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The treaty's verification system must be appropriate and adequate and clearly cost-effective and the organization should be a discrete body responsible for seeing that the fundamental objectives of the agreement are met. Having an overly elaborate verification system that was 100 per cent operational on the conclusion of our negotiations does not seem essential to us.

Others have said that they do not want the future treaty for the halting of testing to be a fresh partial test-ban treaty or to set new thresholds for testing so that, in the final result, horizontal proliferation continues. We share that opinion and that it is therefore of the utmost urgency that our negotiations move on to the question of the scope of the future treaty.

There is another very urgent topic in our discussions. It is the future negotiations on fissile material. Here, the first thing I want to do is to express my delegation's appreciation of the work done by Ambassador Shannon as special coordinator on this item. It is clear in our minds that negotiations on this item that did not aim at the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles would never be negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but would rather tend to perpetuate the prevailing unequal and risky situation. It would be in the common interest for the Committee to deal with these matters to begin work. We are of the view, however, that it would not be beneficial in the long term for the Conference to begin consideration of this issue without there also being functioning subsidiary bodies on other items to which many delegations attach importance, namely negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Early agreement in this regard would not only promote the trust necessary to any negotiations and dispel any doubts there might be as to the future aspirations concerning the items of negative security assurances and the arms race in outer space, but would also break the deadlock we have been in for the past few weeks, which cannot be allowed to continue.

I purposely exclude from the remarks I have just made on the question of establishing a subsidiary body on the topic of transparency in armaments. As we see it, the repeat of the context in which this item has been dealt with for the past two years holds out no hope of progress at all. To avoid a repetition of the scenario we have already lived through, which was of no benefit whatever in advancing the item, we need joint agreement on the mandate of a new ad hoc committee. We are grateful for the consultations on the future of the mandate on this item that were held at the beginning of the current session by Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, to whom we made known our substantive positions on this issue. We are therefore in favour of the earliest possible appointment of a special coordinator for this item, so that consultations can continue until a satisfactory outcome is reached.

In our opinion, the decision must also be taken to establish committees and begin work in the areas I mentioned earlier and we must decide to appoint special coordinators on the questions of the agenda, the functioning of the Conference and enlargement, so that consultations can be held until agreement is reached on these matters.

Before concluding, I should like to dwell a little on the question of the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament and to restate the national position that is already known to this body. We remain convinced that the best proposal yet put before us was that made a while ago by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia. That was a just, fair, balanced and equitable and sensible proposal concerning the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament because it does not establish unsuitable precedents in the form of special treatment or conditions for any candidate and because it provides a comprehensive response to the aspirations of a large number of observer States that perhaps have already had too long a wait for a decision from the Conference. These are the reasons that prevent us from accepting a case-by-case approach to resolving this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and for her kind words to me.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, may I join others in expressing to you welcome and congratulations? You spoke of your double honour of assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and of representing Mexico here for the first time. I and my delegation extend to you double salutations. The warm relations between our two neighbouring nations are well known.

The United States also regrets that France intends to resume nuclear testing. The United States continues to urge all the nuclear Powers, including France, to join in the global moratorium as we work to complete a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible time. In this regard, we take particular note of President Chirac's strong commitment to end the French testing no later than May 1996 and to sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than the fall of 1996. We will continue to work with France and all other States participating in the comprehensive test-ban negotiations to ensure that a treaty is ready for signature as early as possible.

These remarks are drawn from a 13 June statement made by the Press Secretary of the White House. I will request that the text of that statement be made a CD document as was our statement last month in reaction to the most recent Chinese nuclear test.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to welcome you and the other new ambassadors to the Conference and to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. We are certainly at a crucial point in the work of the Conference and we shall need your experience and wisdom. I would also like to thank the Ambassador of Kenya, Mr. Don Nanjira, for the work that he did as President.

I have asked for the floor after listening carefully to all the goals stated by the delegations that have spoken today. Everybody, including you yourself, Sir, has emphasized the work awaiting us and the fact that the international community expects a lot of this body and you made a number of

very interesting suggestions. For my part, I would like to be a bit more down to earth, if I might put it that way, and to say that, while I believe traditions are worth respecting and we have every confidence in our regional coordinators who meet with you once a week, I nevertheless feel that, since the Conference has not yet done much and there are real logjams, all of us around this table are aware that there are problems and that we need very serious consultations on the matter. I think that, if we were to go on as we are every week, it would be very surprising if by the autumn we had accomplished anything at all.

Permit me to make two suggestions to you. I think I have mentioned them already. They are that we either hold an informal meeting after a formal plenary to try to discuss this issue or set up under your chairmanship a group that would, of course, be open to all in order to discuss these matters and try to find some way to unfreeze the situation, to reinstate the working groups, to be able to appoint special coordinators and to get the Conference working on the objectives which we hold dear. I personally do not think that if we continue to make fine, pre-prepared speeches about what we expect of our work we will produce any result between now and the end of the session. So, I appeal to you to try to find what may not be an orthodox or conventional solution for, after all, we are not at a conventional or normal point in the work of our Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Morocco for his kind words in my regard and for his suggestions. Rest assured that I am working on them.

Mr. OLADEJI (Nigeria): Mr. President, please allow me on behalf of my Chargé d'affaires to convey the warm compliments of the Nigerian delegation to you on your assumption of the Chair and also to express his apologies for his absence. I am sure on his return he will express formal compliments to you in a much better way.

I would like to seek the indulgence of my colleagues in the Group of 21 and inform them that there is a need for us to meet for a short time after this plenary, if this is agreeable to them. We also thank the Ambassador of Morocco for his previous suggestion and want to say that we already have that in mind for our Group.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. NASSERI (Iran): Mr. President, I wish to express my deep pleasure to see a distinguished personality from Mexico conducting our work. I do assure you, Sir, of the fullest cooperation of my delegation.

I am taking the floor simply to reflect on some of the statements that have been made today with regard to nuclear testing and also I will have a brief remark with regard to the suggestion that has been made by the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco.

On the first matter, on the question of nuclear testing, I wish to say, first, that the understanding and agreement at the outcome of the NPT Conference was that, following the indefinite extension of the Treaty, all member States would pursue with determination systematic efforts towards nuclear disarmament. I believe it is absolutely clear that attempts at nuclear testing run contrary to the basic objective of the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Second, I recall that there existed, throughout the time of the preparations, as well as at the Conference itself, two distinctively different views. One which argued that only through an indefinite extension of the Treaty could there be a climate of confidence which would lead, and be conducive, to faithful pursuance of the goal of disarmament. And there was, of course, another view, which maintained throughout that, with an indefinite extension of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States would enjoy much more freedom in following their own agenda on the basis of their own objectives. The fact that attempts at nuclear testing are being made after the NPT Conference, and not so much before it, signifies, I believe clearly, that it was not only the moratorium that kept nuclear tests at bay but that the concerns about the outcome of the NPT Conference also served as a very essential deterrence to nuclear testing.

I note that most of the statements made today in protest of the announcement made by France have been coming from States which were amongst the principal and most active proponents of an indefinite extension of the NPT. This group of States believed that the independent extension of the Treaty was the gate to heaven. Many non-nuclear-weapon States did not share that optimism. They were, I must say, not disillusioned. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find today this second group restrained and silent on this issue.

As regards the suggestion that has been made today by the Ambassador of Morocco, I wish to state that I find it very useful and that we wish to express our support for it.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement and for his kind words to me.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor a second time. I have listened most attentively to our colleagues' comments. It is naturally not my intention to respond to each and every one of them. I would simply like, if you will allow, to share a few brief thoughts which come to mind; they are three in number.

First, some people have spoken of a breach of trust, or a betrayal of trust, after the results of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Since that is a conference which we took very seriously, I do not think, as I said just now, but I would like to make the point again, I do not think that things can be put in those terms. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, we subscribed to principles and objectives which we negotiated in a spirit of seriousness, in a spirit of responsibility, in a climate of trust and transparency, often with participants many of whom are in this room today and some of whom have been kind enough to recognize the active role that we played there. We negotiated these principles sincerely, without ever - and I emphasize the point - without ever concealing what our imperatives were, what our limits were, what our constraints were, first and foremost as regards the question of tests. Those who were present at the negotiations there will need no reminding of that: nothing was hidden at the time, and if some wording was adopted and some not, it was precisely because everyone was aware that there was uncertainty regarding the resumption of our tests. I would like to emphasize that we take these principles seriously, we respect them and we will respect them, on the question of tests and on the other questions, whether it be a matter of substance, of the timetable for the negotiation of a CTBT or, more generally, of the discharge of our non-proliferation and disarmament responsibilities.

The second point follows on from the first and relates to the link that several of our colleagues have made between the announcement made by the President of the French Republic and the negotiation of a CTBT. I said just now that for us there was no link, and that we stated on the very first day of the negotiations a year and a half ago, between either the continuation or the resumption of nuclear tests and the negotiations. If there really has to be a link, then I would say that there is a reverse link today. As my authorities at the highest level of the State have said, as I myself emphasized this morning, the announcement by the President of the Republic two days ago contains not one decision, but two. The first is the announcement of an ultimate series of tests. The second is that France has undertaken to sign before the end of 1996 a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The point emphasized on several occasions by the French Government, and by myself this morning, is that this second important decision on the commitment to sign a CTBT would not have been possible without the first.

Thirdly and lastly, I would like to remind you as regards the concerns voiced here this morning that we have listened to them carefully, that we tried to the fullest extent possible and in advance to take account of them and meet them, which is why we have in this matter done our level best to be transparent to international public opinion - transparent in the way the decision was announced, transparent in announcing in advance the number of our tests and the deadline for them and lastly, transparent in the proposal made publicly by the President of the Republic two days ago to the effect that, in the context of the completion of our tests, arrangements could be made for all the eminent scientists with knowledge in the field who so wished to come and see on the spot that there are no consequences for the environment in these tests.

That is what I wanted briefly to say in order to reassure the Conference that we shall continue to follow this course, we shall continue to follow the course of discharging our international responsibilities, we shall continue to follow the course of transparency with our partners, we shall continue to participate actively in the negotiating of a comprehensive test-ban treaty so that next year we end up with a good treaty, that is to say, a treaty acceptable to everyone.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): No one else has asked for the floor.

The secretariat has circulated a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable, with the reservation that it is probable that we shall be able to take up the very timely suggestion of the Ambassador of Morocco and that the President will convene consultations, the framework and details for which have yet to be determined.

It was so decided.

I have no other business and therefore I shall adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on 22 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.709
22 June 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 709th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Austria, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland and Mexico. Once the list has been completed, I propose to put before you for decision a request by Swaziland to participate in our work.

Mr. LANG (Austria): Mr. President, let me, first of all, welcome you as well as the other new Ambassadors to the CD and sincerely congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of this Conference. Allow me also to commend your predecessors' efforts in guiding this body smoothly through historic and sometimes tense moments and in doing so to extend my Government's best wishes to you and your successors that the negotiations within the CD this year achieve the progress we all strive for and the international community expects from us. Moreover, I should like to express the sincere appreciation my delegation feels for the most valuable assistance that is given to our work here by the secretariat under the competent and effective leadership of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky.

If we take a look back on the past few months, we become aware of the fact that weapons of mass destruction have been first and foremost at the very centre of world interest. Let me briefly recall two examples: first, the Review and Extension Conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty in New York; second, the first part of this year's session of this Conference on Disarmament, during which the negotiations concerning the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on fissile material cut-off dominated the agenda. Austria fully shares the top priority given to questions of nuclear non-proliferation in general and the CTBT negotiations in particular. Austria also firmly endorses the target set by general consensus of the international community for the conclusion of these negotiations at the earliest possible moment before the end of 1996. The Lower Chamber of the Austrian Parliament has recently passed a resolution to that effect which has been duly taken note of by the Austrian Government. My delegation therefore wishes to express its disappointment and concern over the fact that one of the nuclear-weapon States has conducted a further nuclear weapon test recently and that another nuclear-weapon State has publicly announced its intention to give up its test moratorium later this year, albeit with the declared objective of then being able to sign the CTBT in 1996. Austria hopes that these events will not cause any delay in the ongoing negotiations and urges all nuclear-weapon States to exercise the maximum restraint with respect to nuclear-weapon tests they have committed themselves to at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York.

Coming to the main subject of my intervention today, my delegation notes with regret that very important items on the agenda of the CD have not yet been treated during this year's session: it is a novelty, and a very disappointing one, that until now the lack of consensus has not allowed to re-establish all of last year's ad hoc committees, amongst which Austria attaches special importance to the Committee dealing with transparency in armaments. It so happens that substantive work on questions of conventional armament has only been done within the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

It is fully justified to give the latent threat that weapons of mass destruction pose to international peace and security a high priority. But this high attention shall not conceal the following: no international war since 1945 has been conducted by nuclear, chemical nor biological weapons. Since 1945, however, well over 150 conflicts have been fought with conventional weapons that caused over 20 million deaths, amongst which a horrifyingly high rate of civilians. This has been reason enough for the United Nations Secretary-General to recall "the need to deal squarely with the mounting toll of death, destruction and human suffering inflicted by the use of conventional weapons in conflicts around the world". As regards such weapons, there already exist legal restraints on the use of some of them, as enshrined for example in the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. These restraints imposed for humanitarian reasons do, however, not affect the security situation. Thus, when considering restraints on conventional weapons, special attention has to be paid to their transboundary movement, and in particular towards developing countries: in 1993, 65 per cent of the global value of arms transfer was due to agreements with developing countries. Although one has to admit that after the end of the cold war such transfer agreements dropped from 70 billion dollars in 1987 to 31 billion dollars in 1993, it cannot be denied that regional conflicts throughout the world continue to fuel trade in conventional arms.

The facts that I have just stated underscore the urgent necessity for the international community to seek remedies to this situation. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which has already been in operation for two years now, has - despite its shortcomings - served as an appropriate starting point. As the most important shortcomings of the Register which could easily be improved we should like to mention the following: in 1994, for example, only about 90 States reported to the Register, which is only approximately 50 per cent of all States, even if a relatively high percentage of the most important arms exporting and arms importing States are included therein; the Register itself restricts reporting to only seven main categories of conventional weapons; background information regarding the military holdings and procurement through national production is only recorded and made available for consultation by United Nations member States at their request. Therefore: firstly, the lack of universality of the Register should be remedied and the number of States reporting to the Register should be further increased; the aim of the Register to contribute to world-wide confidence and security among States could thus be enhanced significantly. Secondly, at present the information provided to the Register is not sufficient nor representative of the real threat to peace posed by the military potential, especially with regard to other categories of conventional weapons. Austria, as a consequence, would be in favour of giving further in-depth consideration to the question whether to widen the scope of the Register by including those conventional weapons that cause, for example, unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Thirdly and finally, only a minimum degree of openness presently applies to the above-mentioned background information on holdings, a fact which disadvantages countries not having an appropriate arms production in their territory or under their jurisdiction and control. Information on military holdings and procurement should therefore also be included in the yearly reports of United Nations member States to the Register. We urge all member States to report to the Register, to provide all appropriate information concerning the present seven categories of conventional weapons and to provide useful background information on military holdings and procurement through national production. As a next step we propose that the scope of the Register be widened to other categories of conventional weapons, and we could imagine that in the long run it would be possible to transform the Register into a full "military capabilities" register.

The points that I have just touched upon were the subject of very fruitful and intensive discussions last year within the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Under the very able chairmanship of our distinguished colleague and friend, the Ambassador of Hungary, György Boytha, to whom we unfortunately have to bid farewell already, this Committee has identified a whole range of very pertinent issues which are, beyond any doubt, worthy of further elaboration. Among these issues - apart from those referring to the Register of Conventional Arms - I should like to mention proposals concerning guidelines for international transfers of conventional arms, openness with regard to the size and organization of armed forces and the declaration or closure or conversion of military production facilities. In this context I do not hesitate to thank the distinguished delegation of Romania for their working paper which contains the proposal of a code of conduct for international transfers of conventional arms, as well as Ireland which already at the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly proposed such a code.

I shall be amiss if I do not mention the efforts undertaken on a regional level by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its "Principles governing conventional arms transfers" adopted by the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (Vienna) in 1993 on the one hand and the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the "Vienna Document" as revised at the Budapest Summit last autumn on the other hand go beyond what has been globally achieved and could serve as an example of well-founded transparency on a global as well as on a regional level. At a still lower and narrower level, the "Common criteria for EEC Member States' policy on arms exports to third countries" closely reflect the concerns in respect of recipient countries already expressed in the aforementioned CSCE text. In general, my country holds the view that the establishment of regional registers would not only correspond to the new emphasis being put by the United Nations on the role to be played by regional arrangements, but also be a proposal which deserves serious consideration.

I should like to dwell briefly on a proposal made by the Commission on Global Governance in its 1995 report on "Our Global Neighbourhood". This commission suggested the conclusion of an international convention on the curtailment of the arms trade which "should, among other things, make the reporting requirements under the existing Arms Register mandatory". According to the view of Austria, such a convention could be built upon the following elements:

> Firstly, a code of conduct to be signed by as many arms-producing, arms-exporting and arms-importing countries as possible and which, after a 10-year trial period, would be transformed into a formal treaty;
>
> Secondly, the entitlement of exporting countries to transfer conventional arms only on the basis of a "certificate" of the importing country that it will use those arms only for purposes of self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter), or for purposes of peace-keeping (under a global or regional mandate) and that those arms will be used in full conformity with international humanitarian law. These "certificates" would constitute binding unilateral commitments under international law;
>
> Thirdly, a central control body would be needed to administer and supervise the above-mentioned code and its instruments. Regional control-bodies - a role to be performed by regional arrangements already existing such as OAU, OAS, OSCE - would be needed for compliance-control;
>
> Fourthly, an additional element could be a formal link between a country's gross national product and its military expenditure. This would entail the duty that its military expenditures should not be higher than a certain percentage of its gross national product.

Subsequently, such a convention on the curtailment of arms trade could be developed into a full-fledged regime: on the one hand, its scope could be broadened to include military holdings and on-site inspections after a review of its operation has taken place; on the other hand, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (with all its Protocols) could be linked to or incorporated into this broader convention. This regime would then deal not only with the quantitative aspects of arms control but also with its qualitative humanitarian dimension, namely prohibitions and restrictions imposed because of the extremely injurious consequences of certain weapons' use.

Where shall we go from here? Each and every one of the aforementioned proposals would constitute a further legal restraint on conventional arms "diffusion", if it were possible to achieve a political consensus on them which then could be transformed in a step-wise manner into a legally binding instrument. The appropriate institutional framework for the forging of such consensus and elaboration of the legal instrument is, according to our conviction, the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. We therefore strongly support every effort to re-establish immediately this so important Committee, bearing in mind how much time has already been lost since the beginning of this year's CD session.

I am closing to a close. I should also take this opportunity to reiterate the remarks made before this Conference by the Secretary-General of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs earlier this year concerning the absence of any progress whatsoever as to the enlargement of the CD. My country judges that it is high time the CD comply with General Assembly resolution 49/77 B and take, without further delay, appropriate steps to increase the number of CD members to at least 60. By doing so, the Conference would better reflect the political realities after the end of the cold war.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): Mr. President, to begin with, I should like to warmly welcome you in your capacity as head of the delegation of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament, where your country has always played an important role. You had to start your work by assuming the presidency of this body and we could already witness your skill and sense of humour in performing your difficult task: congratulations! You are facing high expectations, at a crucial stage of this year's session, to overcome the present procedural deadlock and to exploit the potential for further progress in our work resulting from the successful conclusion of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. I am confident that under your guidance the CD will be able to meet the challenges we have been considering since quite a long time. I would also like to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya, for his efforts to master our lasting problems.

The Conference on Disarmament has never conducted its work in a vacuum. We are responsible to act on behalf of the international community as a whole in finding solutions to acute problems within our competence and also to translate into practical terms the results achieved during relevant deliberations in other international fora. This is especially true with regard to the near-universal nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and its last Review and Extension Conference. The Government of Hungary is deeply satisfied with the results and historic achievements of this major international event, which in our assessment help to preserve the momentum of the profound and favourable changes in the global strategic situation after the end of the cold war. The Conference not only succeeded in extending the Treaty indefinitely, but also called for more accountable and more effective implementation of it. As a result, the role of the NPT as the cornerstone of international efforts to invigorate nuclear non-proliferation and to promote disarmament has been strengthened and revitalized. The set of concrete measures stipulated in the document entitled "Principles and Objectives" and the improved review process will significantly facilitate the full realization of the provisions of the Treaty.

In the light of the decisions of over 150 States Parties having attended the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, it is obvious that the most important task ahead of us consists in completing our negotiations on a universal and internationally as well as effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty by no later than 1996. Hungary fully subscribes to this objective and sees its attainment as realistic and fully within the possibilities of this body. The well-structured discussion taking place under the guidance of the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, and the chairmen of the two Working Groups, Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden and Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, bodes well in this direction. Having said this, we also realize that the necessary and mutually acceptable compromises are not always easy to find. They are, however, inevitable if we are to succeed. We may need strengthened political will, prospective insight and further initiatives aimed at speeding up the course of negotiations. This applies first of all to such issues which are generally considered as focal ones from the point of view of the architecture of the treaty. Allow me to sum up this delegation's views on some of them.

Any early agreement on the scope of the CTBT is likely to facilitate progress on other contentious issues as well. The relevant treaty provisions should not allow for nuclear explosions on the pretext of peaceful purposes or exceptional circumstances; they should avoid, however, extending the ban to activities which are difficult or impossible to verify. As a successful attempt to strike balance between these requirements and to move the positions towards the middle, we appreciate the proposal by the delegation of Australia, submitted in Working Paper 222. I would like to take this opportunity to put on record my delegation's support for it.

Efforts to bridge the gap between the positions on the entry into force have also proved to be elusive until now. This delegation advocates a simple numerical formula, with the understanding that diplomatic efforts, undertaken in parallel with the signature, shall be instrumental to ensure the almost simultaneous adherence of all relevant countries whose absence would render the treaty meaningless. The consultations of the Powers concerned could be well served and formalized by a waiver conference as proposed by the delegation of the United States. For this reason, the Hungarian delegation considers this initiative as a useful one and a good basis for further work to finalize the article on entry into force.

The last CTBT-related issue I would like to elaborate on is the question of the funding of the International Monitoring System (IMS). We consider the two approaches, namely to finance the establishment and the operation of the IMS facilities entirely either through the budget of the Organization or by the host countries as extreme solutions, both of them ignoring the difference in the burden-sharing capabilities of the future States parties. Putting all the burden of funding the IMS on the Organization would raise its costs and increase the contribution of the States parties. In this context we welcome the readiness of some of the major countries hosting IMS facilities to cover the related costs; the system of national funding, however, should not be expanded to the extreme. On the basis of mutually-agreed criteria for economic potential, a great number of countries hosting the facilities might be rendered beneficiaries of international funding. Such a combined pattern would reduce the budget of the Organization without putting excessive burden on those States which, due to their geographic situation, are expected to host a great number of stations and other facilities in the interest of the international community.

As a result of intensive and fruitful consultations and in the spirit of compromise, last March this body was able to reach agreement on the establishment and mandate of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Hungarian delegation considers this issue closely related to the cause of the CTBT and warmly welcomes the establishment of the new Committee. We commend the efforts of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, which made it possible to create the organizational framework for the future work. It is my Government's firm belief that the cut-off of the production of all the weapon-grade fissile materials, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium for weapons and other explosive devices, which has been discussed for long years, should be achieved soon. We therefore, urge the Conference on Disarmament to solve the outstanding issues, mainly of procedural nature, impeding the immediate commencement of the negotiations on a "cut-off" as required by the programme of action adopted at the NPT Extension and Review Conference.

Besides the most important nuclear issues I have touched upon, realities on a worldwide scale are increasingly urging us not to lose sight of the timely problems relating to conventional weapons, either. The delegation of Hungary attaches great importance to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, the only Committee we brought about so far with respect to weapons permanently claiming enormous death tolls all over our globe. I cannot but thank the distinguished Ambassador of Austria for his well-structured and detailed argumentation in favour of pursuing our efforts to have this committee re-established. The continuation of a substantive discussion fits into the general trend of multilateral diplomacy aiming at the prevention of armed conflicts as a priority of the security agenda. The CD has been dealing with this complex agenda item in a special committee since 1992 only. This is but a short initial phase as compared to the enormous challenges raised by the unsettled armed conflicts, still rampant in many regions and erupting in ever new places. Our possibilities are far from being exhausted and we are obliged to continue our work in pursuit of enhancing confidence and easing tensions. The negotiations we had last year on the basis of a mutually agreed and comprehensive mandate, as well as the relevant report of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA, brought to the surface a great number of pertinent issues calling for further elaboration.

Our far-reaching responsibility towards the international community, illustrated by the few items I just singled out of the wide-ranging agenda of the CD, clearly calls for adequate representation of that community in our work. The solution of problems relating to the membership of the CD should not be further delayed. We hope that the vacant place of the former Czechoslovakia will be filled during this session by accepting the only application for it, submitted to the CD by Slovakia in January 1993 and which has not been opposed by any member State but rather supported by a great number of delegations as well as by two regional groups of the Conference. At the same time, the Special Coordinator for the expansion of membership, to be appointed hopefully soon, might try to find new approaches to resolving the problem of membership without being influenced by any past proposal which failed in reaching adoption under the given circumstances. Each member of the CD can be expected to ponder over new solutions which may have a chance to be accepted by consensus. I hope for collective imagination that might help the future Special Coordinator in catalysing a proper solution.

Since it is most probably the last opportunity for me to have the honour to address this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, may I express sincere words of thanks and gratitude to my colleagues for their help and cooperation over the years during which I had the honour to represent my Government here. May I also pay tribute to our distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, as well as other members of the secretariat whose devoted support and expertise greatly helped me to perform the duties of the Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee last year. I had in my work in the Conference great satisfaction and I am convinced that this major international forum has the potential to meet the non-proliferation and disarmament challenges of our age.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and his kind words to the Chair and should like to express to him my personal regret at his coming departure and also my best wishes.

Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I should like to announce that we have among us Ambassador Ralph Earle, Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Welcome, Sir.

Mr. MARTINEZ MORCILLO (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to say how pleased my delegation is to see you presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament. With our pleasure go our warm congratulations on your assumption of this task. Your abilities as a negotiator and long-standing specialist in disarmament problems are known to us all. Furthermore, your presence at the head of the Conference has the special meaning that derives from your country's tradition of active participation in multilateral diplomatic life. All of this justifies our highest expectations for the success of your action as President of the Conference.

It is, we believe, no coincidence that the common point in the statements so far made in the plenary during this second part of the session has been the taking of the results of the Conference on the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as the starting point and indeed core of our deliberations. My delegation agrees with this approach because it too thinks that it is inescapable, not only because of the significance of decisions adopted in New York at the end of the Conference, but also and above all because those decisions have outlined the framework for future negotiations on disarmament. The importance of the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty for international affairs lies both in the consolidation through it of a structure for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and in the circumstances in which the decision was adopted. In an ideal description of the consequences of the indefinite extension of the NPT in the global context of the arms control and disarmament process, the fact that would stand out would be that the attention should henceforward be focused on exploring more thoroughly other areas of this process such as the reduction of nuclear weapons, the prompt entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention through a verification system. All without forgetting the work undertaken by this Conference with regard to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the treaty on ending the production of fissile material for military purposes. These areas taken together definitely constitute the present framework for the efforts to achieve the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

As I said earlier, perhaps one of the greatest achievements of the NPT Conference was that the decision to extend the Treaty was adopted by consensus and not by a majority, however large. The extension of the system thus has the support of the entire international community. The circumstances which led to the adoption of these decisions also resulted in the setting of a series of objectives for the future as regards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Undoubtedly the most important is the strengthening of the Treaty's role as the instrument for preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons on a global scale. Universality of the Treaty is consequently an urgent priority for the international community, which must pursue the early achievement of this objective through joint action.

Together with this, the references to the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty and the objective and principles for disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation shape and complement the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. We refer especially to the backing for the activities of IAEA and the application of its safeguards system, to the support for the creation of denuclearized zones and to the importance attached to technology exchange and to the transparency of export controls, which, while preventing proliferation, must in no way hamper the development of the peaceful use of atomic energy. Special reference must be made in this context to the questions relating to security assurances and nuclear disarmament, two issues of direct relevance to the matters dealt with by this Conference. Especially noteworthy are the recent decisions by the nuclear countries concerning the granting of both positive and negative security assurances and, in particular, the action by the United Nations Security Council, initiatives which could be broadened and deepened in the future.

Again within the framework of the aforementioned principles and objectives, special mention must be made, in the context of article VI of the NPT, to the references to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996 and to the treaty to end the production of fissile material for military purposes. My delegation has been following very closely the progress of the negotiations in the Conference on the first of these matters. That is why, in view of recent international events in this sphere, I would like to reiterate the appeal to the nuclear Powers to act with utmost restraint in the matter of nuclear testing. Likewise, my delegation attaches great importance to the creation of an ad hoc committee to study the drafting of a treaty on the cessation of fissile-matter production. Within the limitations inherent in its presence in the Conference as an observer, the Spanish delegation will continue to follow attentively the nuclear questions I have mentioned.

My delegation considers that the negotiation of a nuclear test-ban treaty turns around two questions that constitute the basis of the exercise: on the one hand, the definition of the scope of the treaty, and on the other, the realization of a verification system. Relative to them, the rest of the questions under negotiation appear de facto to be instrumental both in nature and in purpose. Consequently, my delegation believes that Spain's interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament regarding a nuclear test-ban treaty is given full expression by Spain's active participation in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Spain has made its facilities and experience in seismology fully available to the GSETT-3 experiment, so that it is contributing to the test on all the latter's three levels. Spain is indeed, participating in the alpha, beta and gamma networks of the intended system.

It is beyond doubt that the participation of our network of seismological stations in the experiment has a number of purely scientific implications and consequences that cannot be disregarded. For Spain, participation in the experiment has led to our establishing links for scientific cooperation at a strictly bilateral level that could in some cases form the basis for fruitful and intensive collaboration in the future. It is no less true, however, that participation in the test by countries that are not full members of the Conference on Disarmament creates an extremely paradoxical situation, one I believe to be unique in international life. I am referring to the fact that such countries find themselves participating in and contributing financially to something in which they cannot participate when the time comes to take political decisions. Irrespective of the significance this may have for the future decisions on the financing of the treaty's international verification system, which will logically have to be along the lines of international financing through the Organization, at present it shows the increasingly paradoxical nature of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, given the Conference's present membership.

This leads us to consider one of those issues that are already overshadowing the negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament. The absence of decision on the issue of expansion of the Conference on Disarmament is going to have ever more numerous wide-ranging consequences for the future of this body. The recent adoption of a resolution by consensus by the

United Nations General Assembly highlights still further the present paradoxes and the need for an urgent solution to this issue, inasmuch as principles determining the agreed bases on which this Conference can and should find a rapid solution already exist. This solution entails taking into account the work already done by the Conference and updating it in the light of prevailing circumstances. My delegation very much hopes that a sense of reality and political will on the part of Conference members will soon lead to a response to the request of the international community that the Conference adapt to the new historical circumstances. Notwithstanding, my delegation feels that it would be wrong to link the question of expansion and the negotiations on the nuclear test-ban treaty in any way whatsoever. Enlargement of the Conference has a meaning of its own quite independent of considerations of the moment.

My delegation is also hopeful that a prompt solution will be found to other matters before this Conference that also require urgent implementation. In this context we should like to make specific reference to the work on transparency in armaments that is meant to complement in the sphere of conventional weapons the final objectives of the overall process of arms control and disarmament. The progress made and still to be made in the sphere of chemical and biological weapons and the course embarked upon in the nuclear sphere highlight the urgent need not to forget the generic treatment of conventional weapons, which continue to be the main, and not merely a potential source of problems in the world in a context that goes beyond the needs of actual defence.

Given the task before you, Mr. President, may I again wish you every success in coordinating and moving forward the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and in particular for his very kind words in my regard.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all, permit me to welcome you to Switzerland; I wish you a pleasant stay in this exotic country which does not have a government, just a Federal Council and 26 cantonal governments. Many congratulations on your assumption of the post of President. We listened to your inaugural statement with keen interest; I am especially grateful to you for your words on the enlargement of the Conference.

(continued in French)

The Swiss Federal Council profoundly regrets the new nuclear explosion and the recent decision no longer to keep up the moratorium on nuclear testing that France, the United States and the Russian Federation had been respecting until then. First of all, we observe that experts are not unanimous on the technical need to conduct tests in order to maintain the safety of these weapons. We also wonder to what extent deterrence is likely to be further strengthened by such tests. Moreover, the resumption of testing may complicate the difficult negotiations under way on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing, which we expect for 1996 at the latest.

We understand the anxiety of the Asian countries and the countries around the South Pacific, which fear adverse effects for the marine environment. At the same time, the new test and the announcement of fresh testing are a grave disappointment to all the non-nuclear-weapon States which accepted just a few weeks ago the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States committed themselves in New York to exercising the utmost restraint regarding the continuation of testing. The countries which, like Switzerland agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT in the firm expectation that all the nuclear-weapon States would keep their disarmament promises are therefore bound to feel disappointed. As we see it, there is at least a moral incompatibility between the resumption of nuclear tests and the commitments entered into in New York.

Lastly, the prospect of new tests deals a serious blow to global non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts. It creates a disturbing precedent and could prompt other nuclear Powers to resume their testing and thus to re-launch the arms race. A threshold State could, for its part, use it as an excuse to pursue its nuclear ambitions. We are convinced that it is not in anybody's interests to trigger such a reaction. It would not at all contribute to strengthening international security.

The Swiss Federal Council ventures to hope that, in the face of this eventuality, the President of France will reverse his decision and that China will also refrain from further testing. We venture to hope that the President of France, Mr. Jacques Chirac, will announce the good news to us during his visit to Geneva, for it would be the right occasion, the right date and the right place, and there would be a world audience at the highest possible level.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me in my own language. I take note that Switzerland does not have a government, but is very well governed. That is not the case of our Conference, which does not have a government as such and is not very well governed.

(continued in Spanish)

As I do not have any other speakers on my list, I shall now, as the representative of Mexico, read a statement issued by my country in Mexico City on 20 June:

> "The Government of Mexico has communicated to the Governments of the nuclear Powers its concern at the decision by some of them to resume nuclear tests despite the exhortation by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that they should exercise utmost restraint in this regard.

It will be recalled that Mexico, supported by a large majority of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted at this recent Conference in New York a concrete proposal not only for the designation of 1996 as the time-limit for the conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning all nuclear tests without exception but also for the adoption of an immediate moratorium on this type of tests.

While Mexico's first proposal was adopted by consensus, the proposal to declare an immediate moratorium on nuclear tests was not accepted, precisely because of the opposition of some nuclear Powers. Instead, as we observe above, a paragraph was included in which the nuclear States are asked to exercise the utmost restraint in this regard.

Mexico feels that the nuclear test carried out by the Republic of China on 15 May last, the announcement by France of a series of nuclear tests to be carried out in the South Pacific and the statement by a senior United States representative to the effect that his country might also resume nuclear testing do not create a propitious climate for the performance of the series of important agreements adopted by consensus at the aforementioned Conference and jeopardize not only future disarmament negotiations but also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear testing is the most direct method of improving military arsenals. That being so, it is inconceivable that anyone should wish to continue the arms race now, when the nuclear arsenals already in existence are estimated to be equivalent to one million times the yield of the Hiroshima atomic bomb, energy enough to wipe out the world's population forty times over.

In this context, Mexico reaffirms its decision to continue fighting in the international forums responsible for negotiating the various aspects of disarmament, to ensure that the goals that have been set are achieved and has, to that end, begun consultations with other countries that share its point of view".

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, I have taken note of the statement just made by the representative of Switzerland and, if you would allow me, I should like to make a few brief remarks.

I explained last week the reasons that prompted the decision by France concerning nuclear tests. I said that the decision was taken because it was necessary, I said that it was not and could not be a surprise, that it was consistent with our obligations and responsibilities in the field of non-proliferation, that it confirmed our commitment to the negotiation of a nuclear test-ban treaty and that it in no way affected our willingness for, or policy regarding disarmament. I also said last week that the French decision was in fact not one decision, but two: a first decision, that to carry out a final series of tests limited in time and limited in number, and a second, essential decision, that to commit ourselves to signing the nuclear-test-ban treaty next year, in autumn 1996. The first decision is temporary, the second decision is definitive. The second would not have been possible without the first.

Lastly, I should like to say a word about the statements made by the representative of Switzerland. Our colleague wonders, and I quote, "to what extent deterrence is likely to be strengthened by such tests". It is not a matter of strengthening deterrence, it is a matter of maintaining credibility and of maintaining it on the basis of the strict concept of sufficiency to which we have subscribed and will subscribe as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world. Secondly, our Swiss colleague maintains that the resumption of tests might complicate the negotiations now under way on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. As I have already had occasion to say, but I will say it again, the reverse is true. Our decision bears out our commitment to the negotiations, it helps and will help to put us in a position to sign the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty next year. I should like to recapitulate or repeat what I said last week: a test-ban treaty that was not signed at the same time by the five declared nuclear Powers would be meaningless, and it is that, we feel, that gives our commitment to signing the treaty next year its full significance.

To go further - and I have nearly finished - in reading the statement by our colleague from Switzerland: regarding the concerns of the South Pacific countries, I should like to remind you that concomitant with our decision are a desire for transparency and a spirit of dialogue - dialogue with the countries concerned, as is borne out by the working meeting on 20 June, that is last Monday, between the representatives of the South Pacific Forum led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and our Minister for Foreign Affairs, transparency in the offer made by the President of the Republic for experts and scientists to come and see on the spot that these last tests, like the previous ones, will be carried out in the most stringent conditions of safety and environmental protection. Finally, as I observed last week, it is hard for me to allow it to be said that there is incompatibility between the resumption of tests and the commitments entered into by France in New York. I say again that we never disguised either in New York, in Geneva, or elsewhere the fact that the resumption of our tests was an open option. That is why, and everyone here is aware of this, we would not have been able - and I think you, Mr. President, mentioned this in your own statement - we would not have been able to subscribe in the declaration of principles and objectives to an appeal for the continuation of the present moratoriums. The countries that negotiated the declaration on principles and objectives know this very well and they understood it clearly in our discussions. It is not our custom to cover up our problems or to speak with a forked tongue; it is not our tradition, nor will it be any more so in the future. The undertakings that we have given, the texts that we have subscribed to, that we have negotiated seriously and sincerely, we will abide by. Not in order to please this country or that, but because it is part of the exercise of our international responsibilities and we shall continue to meet them to the full.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): this being perhaps the last plenary meeting at which we shall have the pleasure of hearing Ambassador Boytha, I would like to begin by expressing to him the great esteem I have for his as a colleague and for his professional abilities and his courtesy, both essential to make a good diplomat. I should like to add that they were of particular help to him when he had to chair a difficult committee on transparency in armaments last year. I wish him good luck for the future.

I asked for the floor because I would like to react immediately to the statement just made by our Austrian colleague, Ambassador Lang. To be brief, I shall just make two points. Firstly, I can but support his appeal to all countries which have not yet done so to report to New York, to the United Nations Register on armaments. While the experiment has so far been encouraging, it will only be possible to consider it positive when a sufficient number of countries participate in it. I would like to add that an additional effort is needed to try to expand the Register. That is for New York. In Geneva, I am gratified by the stress that our Austrian colleague laid on the need to have in the CD a committee exclusively reserved to conventional weapons. It is true that since 1945 there has not been a single war in which nuclear weapons have been used. On the other hand, the numbers of conflicts and victims there have been are impressive. All these conflicts have been waged with conventional weapons. What has the CD been doing for all this time while the eyes of the world are turned towards the Yugoslav, Somali or Rwandan dramas? Nothing, or rather, it has been losing itself in procedural discussions to make sure that nothing is done in the conventional field. This is unacceptable. It is unacceptable to my delegation, it ought to be unacceptable to the entire CD, and in any case it is at all events hardly defensible in the eyes of public opinion. Mr. President, you yourself have undertaken intense consultations to try and get the CD out of the current deadlock. I can only encourage you in those endeavours and assure you of my full support for all you do to establish in the CD a committee on conventional weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement.

Mr. STARR (Australia): I have asked for the floor to refer just briefly to the comments by the distinguished Ambassador of France. In his comments he mentioned the fact that there had been dialogue in Paris between a mission led by the Foreign Minister of Australia and the French Government. I would like to emphasize that dialogue is important, but I think delegations should be clear that the purpose of the delegation from the South Pacific Forum that was led by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, was to protest at the decision by the Government of France to resume testing in the South Pacific and to request the Government of France to reverse that decision. That request was rejected.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): There being no more speakers on the list, the plenary should now take up the request of Swaziland to participate in the work of the Conference. Consultations have shown that it would be acceptable for delegations to examine this request directly today, without any informal meeting, on the understanding that this does not create a precedent for future such requests. The request has been distributed to all delegations in document CD/WP.465, which you all have before you. As there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference accepts this request.

It was so decided.

The secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual, it in indicative and can, and I expect will, be changed. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference approves the timetable.

It was so decided.

Concerning the Conference's next plenary meeting next week, on 29 June, we have as the first speaker on the list the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia. As I took the opportunity to mention during the presidential consultations, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, would like to make a statement to the Conference on the same day. However, his heavy schedule will not permit him to address this body in the morning. Accordingly, with the permission of you all, I propose to resume the plenary meeting at 3 p.m. so that the Minister can make his statement.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 29 June, at 10.00 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.710/Corr.1
3 August 1995

ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

Corrigendum

Page 20, first full paragraph, lines 2 and 13

For SALT-2 *read* START-2

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.710
29 June 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 710th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, his Excellency Mr. Juraj Schenk, who will be our first speaker in this plenary meeting. Last year the Conference was honoured by the presence of his predecessor, His Excellency Mr. Eduard Kukan, and at the beginning of the first session of 1995 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Josef Seskák, made a statement in this forum. The presence today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic is a further indication of his country's ongoing and sustained interest in the work of our Conference. I am sure that the Conference is very keen to hear his statement.

On the list of speakers for this morning we have the representatives of Slovakia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Myanmar, India, Sri Lanka and Australia. As I announced last week, we will resume the plenary meeting this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. to enable the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, to make a statement in this body.

I now call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, Mr. Juraj Schenk.

Mr. SCHENK (Slovakia): Mr. President, to begin, allow me to congratulate you on the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament which you have assumed at a crucial stage of this year's session. I am confident that your experience and extraordinary ability will help the Conference to overcome the present deadlock and pave the way for the successful accomplishment of its 1995 session's tasks. I would also like to use this opportunity to assure you of full support by the Slovak delegation in these endeavours.

Regarding the paramount effort devoted to universal disarmament I am deeply convinced that in cooperation with the other peace-loving countries it shall be allowed to the Slovak Republic to exercise its preparedness for collaboration within the group of full-fledged members of the Conference on Disarmament in order to avoid the tension provoked by an excessive accumulation of arms in the current world.

The Slovak Republic considers the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the decision which was adopted without a vote, as an important prerequisite for international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for a ban on nuclear weapons as well. We consider it an important step in the process of designing the architecture of global security.

We have noted with satisfaction that the NPT Conference reaffirmed the functioning of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system as a fundamental element of the Treaty which plays a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials and helps to strengthen mutual confidence.

We do believe that the results of the recently concluded review and extension Conference will have a positive impact on the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Such treaties should be considered as a matter of urgency in practical applications of the outcome of that conference.

The progress that has been achieved during the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was an important prerequisite of the decision of States to extend the NPT. From this point of view the Slovak Republic considers the CTBT to be one of the most important issues the Conference on Disarmament is dealing with. The Slovak Republic is in favour of concluding a treaty which would outlaw all nuclear-weapon tests without exception and forever. We do believe that the remaining political issues will be settled in an expeditious manner in order to narrow the existing gaps and enable the completion of CTBT at the latest in the year 1996.

Besides the CTBT the question of a treaty banning fissile materials production for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices is regarded by the Slovak Republic as the most important issue of the Conference on Disarmament. The Slovak Republic supported the idea that the forum to contemplate this issue should be the Conference on Disarmament. In this sense we are in favour of an early start to negotiations based on the so-called simple mandate, to which framework has been constituted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L. By the same token, a future possibility to widen the perception of the matter in order to cover existing stockpiles should not be excluded.

The Slovak Republic welcomed recent declarations of the nuclear Powers to provide the non-nuclear States with guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, together with the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 984. We do believe that these intentions shall find their reflection in an appropriate international legal instrument.

The Slovak Republic has also greeted the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and their voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons. We have noticed with satisfaction the contribution of the above-mentioned countries to nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of both regional and global security.

The termination of the cold war and the reduction of the nuclear threat made possible an important redistribution of the international public's attention. Besides nuclear arms, the issue of conventional weapons has become a high priority. The excessive accumulation of conventional weapons keeps causing innumerable economic losses and horrendous human suffering. That is why the Slovak Republic is of the opinion that it is of the highest importance to pay due attention to the issue of conventional weapons' transparency and reduction. The Slovak Republic fully supports a further strengthening of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and its amendment comprising

(Mr. Schenk, Slovakia)

information on military holdings, procurement through national production, defense budgets, organizational structure and size of national armed forces which are also important complementary elements.

At this stage, I should like to thank the Austrian delegation for the valuable ideas on this subject forwarded at the last plenary meeting.

The Slovak Republic highly appreciates both the existence and the activity of the Conference on Disarmament. The best expression of this consideration has been the attempt of the Slovak Republic to gain full-fledged membership in this single multilateral negotiating forum. Regretfully enough in this regard, the Slovak Republic is forced to say that during the year 1995 the Conference on Disarmament has not used either its possibilities or its time to the maximum of its capacity. For this reason the Slovak Republic is in favour of the idea that it is time to reconsider the future work of the Conference on Disarmament and to look for ways to increase both its flexibility and effectiveness.

Having in mind both the civilized way of separation and consequent peaceful co-existence of the two States, the Slovak Republic, hand in hand with the Czech Republic, have hopefully set a precedent in a peaceful way of solving crucial political problems. This fact has been highly appreciated by the international community. This example of calm partition has been successfully carried out in contradiction to the ongoing horrifying armed conflicts within the borders of Europe, thus underlining the prudence of the Slovak and Czech politicians. Let me mention that, following these lines, we recently also succeeded in concluding a "core treaty" with our southern neighbour, that means Hungary. This foresight has resounded its success in the affectivity of the independent diplomatic representations of the two new States, helping a prompt and full integration into the international community. In this connection it is indispensable to recall that the only international forum of greater importance that has not so far evaluated this particular feature of Slovak diplomacy remains the Conference on Disarmament.

The claim of the Slovak Republic for full-fledged membership in the Conference on Disarmament is based on the uniqueness of its situation. It consists in the request to fill in the vacancy in the Conference on Disarmament left after the dissolution of the former Czecho-Slovakia. According to the mutual agreement concluded between the Slovak and the Czech Republics, only the Slovak Republic was and remains entitled to apply for the above-mentioned vacancy. In the year 1993 this was officially announced to the members and observers of the Conference on Disarmament and confirmed by the note of the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic.

Within its short independent history, the Slovak Republic has repeatedly proved its approach to the arms control and disarmament agenda within different international bodies, be it the United Nations, OSCE or NACC. The Slovak Republic has radically reduced its arms production within a short time to an unprecedented low level. This step is considered to be the best sign of our sincere attempt to contribute effectively to efforts of the international community to achieve universal and complex disarmament. We have also reduced our conventional arms holdings and personnel strength of the armed forces. Within OSCE we made public information on the organizational structure and the size of the Slovak armed forces. We co-sponsored the United Nations resolution on the export of anti-personnel land-mines and immediately, in April 1994, the Slovak Government declared a comprehensive moratorium on the export of all types of land-mines.

Relating to what has so far been said and known, we find it necessary to stress that up till now on every conceivable occasion the Slovak Republic has undoubtedly proved its ability to successfully employ the policy of consensus. It is all the more astonishing that despite the relative simplicity of the problem the member States of the Conference on Disarmament have not yet come to an appropriate solution of Slovak membership in the Conference, which has been supported by a great number of States, including the Czech Republic. At this stage I should like to convey our gratitude to all States that have supported the Slovak request. Your support will never be forgotten. On the other hand, I have to say that we feel embarrassed assuming that the failure to grant membership to the Slovak Republic has not resulted out of a fair attempt to solve the problem but, instead, a political trade-off has prevailed. We believe that the present situation does not fall in full conformity with the spirit of the period and the nature of the Conference. Otherwise, the ethical point of view would have determined a solution of an unambiguous character. Let me point out again that Slovakia has in fact always been an integral part of the Conference through the participation in international activities of the former Czecho-Slovakia. Thus only full-fledged membership in the Conference would create the conditions for the Slovak Republic to actively contribute to the previously experienced and mutually beneficial extent. By the admission of the Slovak Republic, the Conference would gain another valuable member who once belonged to the founders of this distinguished organization.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia for his statement as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, at the outset, I would like to extend my warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency in the Conference on Disarmament this month. I am convinced that your able leadership will contribute to making fresh progress in the current session.

This year marks never-be-forgettable 50th year, the year of end of holocaust sweeping the world. The number 50 reminds all of us of war and peace and at the same time, it makes us feel strong the necessity for the security for a nation, the world as well as for ourselves.

This year brings about greater national anguish to our people: they were liberated from colonial rule 50 years ago and began the building of new Korea, but, again, suffered a lot through the war: they are still uneasy about war.

For the Korean people, 50th anniversary represents great tragedy of half-a-century-long national division throwing untold sufferings and misfortunes to them rather than a happy event with liberation.

The artificial partition of the land and nation by foreign forces is lasting 10 years longer than the colonial period, during which not a single moment have the Korean people freed of danger of war.

The Korean question assumes very complex and peculiar characters with the intervention by great Powers and United Nations and its solution is directly linked with peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

With cold war over, disarmament and détente has become the trends in the world, but it is exceptional on the Korean peninsula. The policy of confrontation and force during cold war still exists on the Korean peninsula and no way is found to alleviate the tense situation.

The solution to the "Korean question" means removing the legacies typical of cold war; it is the urgent task of putting an end to the sufferings and misfortune of the Korean people.

The only way for easing the tension and removing the confrontation on the Korean peninsula is, at the moment, to terminate instable state of armistice and set up a new peace mechanism.

Modern history witnesses no case like on the Korean peninsula where armistice has been continuing in such a dangerous state that huge armed forces stand face to face and a war may break out, again, any moment.

The Korean armistice was made, envisaging the eventual termination of state of war, ensurance of durable peace and political solution to the Korean question. The armistice has, however, failed to fulfil its own mission in the last several decades.

In the middle of 1950s, the most essential components of this agreement stipulating the prohibition of shipment of armed equipment from outside was scrapped by the other party, with the result that large quantities of armed equipment including nuclear weapons were shipped into south Korea and inspectors of neutral States expelled therefrom.

The invalid character of this agreement has recently been emphasized by the fact that western European countries were vying in selling their sophisticated weapons and operational equipment into south Korea.

In 1991, the Military Armistice Commission was paralysed by the replacement of the United States chief negotiator with a south Korean who is not legally relevant to the armistice agreement, since south Korea is not a signatory to this agreement and it was opposed to this agreement when concluding. In a nutshell, the Korean armistice agreement has turned out impotent and armistice mechanism is in nothing but the name. Such being the case, my Government made a proposal to replace armistice with a peace agreement and set up a new peace mechanism in order to lay a new foundation to prevent war and ensure peace.

Not all but parties to the armistice are able to replace the outdated and impotent armistice with a new practical mechanism, because the replacement envisages the establishment of a peace agreement and implementation for its consolidation of peace agreement.

An attempt to put up as real party to the Korean armistice south Korea who are opposed of armistice and has no military prerogative and real power and the intention to do so - all these attempts cannot be construed otherwise than opposing the establishment of a new peace mechanism. (United States commander is legally and practically possessed of military prerogative over all armed forces including south Korea's).

The agreement committed to non-aggression made by the north and south should be implemented by the two sides while Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States should hold responsible for the armistice as competent parties.

If an unexpected incident takes place at the moment, there is no way to prevent such danger as to develop into war.

It is well known that when United States helicopter intruded our territory last December, its solution turned out extremely complicated with armistice mechanism paralysed.

This question was resolved through political negotiation between us and United States. With this incident, the United States side also recognized the need for dialogue and contacts are made in Panmoonjom.

All this patently proves that the armistice agreement was reduced to a piece of paper.

The establishment of a new peace mechanism will open up a new road to build confidence between warring sides, for realizing disarmament, and promoting security on the Korean peninsula.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and unpleasant relations should be abolished between the United Nations and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

It was 20 years ago that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly made a resolution to replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement and dissolve "United Nations Command" in south Korea. This resolution, however, could not be implemented in the context of the cold war.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

At present, there exists no practical ground for "United Nations Command" in south Korea in that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to sever the hostile relations and our country has become a member in the United Nations.

It was long ago that "United Nations Command" should have been dissolved.

"United Nations Command" in south Korea should immediately be dissolved in accordance with the United Nations resolution and the relations be normalized between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

The significant global disarmament largely depends on the nuclear disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons.

My Government and people strongly oppose nuclear weapons as they are surrounded by nuclear Powers and threatened by 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea nearly 40 years.

Accordingly, my Government made a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and did its best for its realization.

The historic Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework made last year provided the way to ward off deep-rooted nuclear threat and remove "nuclear suspicion" imposed on us, thereby shaping the prospect for fundamentally resolving nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Agreement reached in Kuala Lumpur on 15 June between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States made it possible to do away with stumbling-block in the way of implementing the Agreed Framework and clearly reconfirmed the responsibility and duty of the parties.

The course of nuclear solution between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States explained that even a very grave issue raised in the hostility could come to political solution through negotiation ahead of confidence-building.

When we look forward to the completion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996, a dangerous tendency is growing among the nuclear power States. This is greatly disappointing the international community.

The recent decision by France of resuming nuclear test is unanimously protested and condemned, which clearly shows how strong is the demand of the international community for the nuclear disarmament.

The arbitrary practice on the part of a great Power like France who denies the majority's demand to stop nuclear tests constitutes great concern and fear by humankind. We cannot but concern through this kind of behaviour that they do, at any time, not hesitate to take any action if they deem it necessary.

As a State in the Asia-Pacific, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deplores the decision by France of reopening the nuclear test and strongly demands that she withdraw its decision.

In order to prevent a nuclear arms race and realize disarmament, it is necessary to abolish the nuclear umbrella policy for its "allies", the legacy of the old time of confrontation; it is also essential to remove all "justifications" for nuclear weapons.

In addition, the nuclear States should provide non-nuclear States with unconditional negative security assurance; they should also conclude treaty on non-first use and complete prohibition of use of nuclear weapons.

The postponement of solution to the extension of CD member States gives negative impact on the disarmament negotiations and overshadows the efforts to establish a new, fair and equitable international order.

We hope that proper measures should be taken so that all States desirous of participating in the multilateral disarmament negotiation and discharging their duties could become its members.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement as well as for the kind remarks addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Mr. President, may I begin by extending the warmest congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? Your wealth of experience and wisdom in the field of disarmament has already proven to be an invaluable input to the work of the CD. Please be assured of the continued support and cooperation of my delegation in the advancement of the work of the CD under your presidency. I would also like to convey to the delegation of Kenya the deep appreciation of my delegation for the commendable work done by Ambassador Nanjira during his tenure as President.

I take this opportunity to welcome most warmly Ambassador Lafer of Brazil, Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan and yourself, Mr. President, who have recently joined us in the CD. I look forward to working closely with you all toward the success of our collective endeavours. My deep appreciation also goes to Ambassador Shannon of Canada, who has just left us, and Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, who is leaving us very soon. Both of them have made significant and substantive contributions to the work of the CD. We wish them all the best.

The recently concluded NPT review and extension Conference took a momentous step to extend the Treaty indefinitely. I should like to stress here that this important decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely carries with it a greater responsibility for the nuclear-weapon States (NWSs) to take effective steps in fulfilment of their obligations under article VI of the

Treaty. The fact is that this decision forms part of the package, comprising three decisions. They are decisions on the extension of the Treaty, on strengthening the review process and on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, respectively. The decision on principles and objectives clearly states, among other things, that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitments to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and that these States pursue with determination systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons: that the CD complete negotiations on a CTBT not later than 1996; that the CD immediately commence and achieve an early conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and that these steps could take the form of an internationally and legally binding instrument; and that every effort be made by all States parties to achieve the objective of universality of the membership of the Treaty.

Undoubtedly, these are very important and solemn commitments by the States parties, particularly by the NWSs. It is imperative that the NWSs honour in letter and spirit these commitments, contained in the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.

We believe that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are like two sides of the same coin, and are interrelated. We cannot conceive an effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without the effective implementation of concrete measures for nuclear disarmament. In the aftermath of the historic NPT review and extension Conference, it is therefore incumbent on the NWSs to display their greater political will by exercising maximum flexibility both in the context of pursuing the NPT follow-up measures, and in the ongoing negotiations in the CD.

In my statement in the plenary of the CD on 16 February last, I advocated the option of extending the NPT for rolling fixed periods with an automatic renewal mechanism and a strong review procedure. We did so, because we believe that such an option is more supportive of nuclear disarmament, and is more likely to induce greater political will on the part of the NWSs to move forward in multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues. Now that the Treaty has been extended indefinitely, there appears to be even a lesser degree of flexibility, displayed by NWSs in these negotiations. The aforementioned point of view taken by my delegation has now been proven to be correct by the stances espoused by the NWSs in the post-NPT-Conference period. But these nuclear disarmament issues are of immense importance; and the larger interests of the security of the international community are at stake. I should therefore like to urge the NWSs to exercise greater flexibility in these negotiations in the CD in the larger interests of the international community, which are indeed also consistent with their own national interests.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

In the aftermath of the NPT review and extension Conference, there are three crucial tests for the political commitments of the NWSs: they are CTBT, nuclear disarmament and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiating stances taken by the NWSs in the CD on these questions will clearly mirror the depth and seriousness of their commitments on these issues. In the light of the above, the question of nuclear disarmament has now assumed greater importance. It is indeed high time that the CD commence its substantive work on this question. As such, my delegation wishes to call for the speedy establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The very minimum we should like to have on nuclear disarmament is the appointment of a special coordinator. He can thus be entrusted with the task of carrying out consultations on a possible draft mandate, and the necessary preparatory work with a view to establishing the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the 1996 session.

Another question that has acquired a high degree of maturity for serious negotiations is that of security assurances for NNWSs. We urge that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons be re-established as a high priority to carry forward its work.

Resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council and the unilateral declarations made in April by the NWSs on security assurances constitute significant steps in the right direction. It is the first time that all NWSs have collectively accorded security assurances in a United Nations Security Council resolution. Notwithstanding these significant steps, my delegation feels that they have not gone far enough for the following reasons. First, they lack a legally binding character. Resolution 984 could have a positive impact on the crystallization of an international legal norm banning the use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs, were it crafted in such a way as to create a new legal norm in this respect. But resolution 984 is not tailored to meet this requirement. Second, there is not much substance in them, for they are not comprehensive enough in scope to satisfy the concerns of NNWSs. Third, they are not multilaterally negotiated. It is essential that international legal instrument or instruments on security assurances be multilaterally negotiated to ensure that they fully meet the requirements of the NNWSs, and that they are not subject to unilateral denunciation or withdrawal by the NWSs. For these reasons, there still exists an urgent need to conclude a legally binding international instrument on security assurances. Such an instrument should cover both negative and positive assurances. We must stress here, however, that it is negative security assurances that are of primary importance. Any legal instrument - or for that matter any resolution - on security assurances that is weak in negative security aspects like the United Nations Security Council's resolution 984 will be of limited value only.

Our immediate objective in seeking legally binding security assurances is to create a powerful international legal norm banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs. Our ultimate objective in this regard is to

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(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

put in place eventually an international legal regime of no first use of, and a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons. These measures constitute important steps in the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, which contributes to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war. These measures, including NSAs, will thereby contribute towards the enhancement of international security, while also serving regional and national security interests of all States.

My delegation believes that we can pursue two parallel courses of action in this respect. The first is to pursue negotiations on security assurances in the CD, and the second is to pursue these negotiations in the context of the NPT. We should take up this question at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the next NTP review Conference, and should pursue it further at a conference of States parties to the NPT, to be convened at an appropriate date thereafter for the specific purpose of addressing this question.

I would like to express the deep appreciation of my delegation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, Chairman of the Working Group I, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, Chairman of the Working Group II, Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands, and the Friends of the Chair for their untiring efforts to carry forward the CTBT negotiations. Much as we have advanced so far in the CTBT negotiations, the amount of work that lies ahead is substantial; we need to step up the momentum of negotiations considerably, if the target time-frame of 1996 set by the NPT Conference is to be met. There remain several outstanding substantive issues, yet to be resolved, such as the issues of scope, organization, entry into force and some verification provisions.

One of the most crucial outstanding issues before the Ad Hoc Committee is that of the scope of the future treaty. There have been disturbing reports that discussions have been going on in certain quarters to set a certain threshold of nuclear tests to be permitted under the future CTBT. If conduct of such low-threshold nuclear tests were to be allowed under the future treaty, I am afraid that we are going to end up with another partial threshold test-ban Treaty. This is not what we want and what we are striving for. We require a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty, banning all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time, and no less.

Bearing this in mind, we believe that the scope of the future treaty should clearly set out that each State party undertakes not to carry out nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion at any place, to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place. Such a comprehensive scope will provide a basis for achieving an agreed text on this crucial issue.

Some three months have already elapsed since the CD established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Explosive Devices. We should like to see the immediate commencement of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Group of 21 has provided a most appropriate candidate to chair the Ad Hoc Committee.

Transparency in armaments is a relatively new issue, introduced into the CD just over two years ago. The CD had an Ad Hoc Committee working on this issue in 1993 and 1994. The mandate or the basis for the CD to carry out its work on TIA, emanating from United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36/L, has been exhausted. Resolution 49/75/C, adopted at the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, does not renew this mandate; nor does it bestow any specific task to the CD. Hence, we have a new situation with regard to TIA. We must therefore take a fresh look at this issue.

We have frequently heard some views to the effect that the CD ought to have an ad hoc committee on TIA in order to balance nuclear items on the active agenda of the CD with an item on conventional arms control. We do not share such views for two reasons. First, the Final Document of SSOD-I, which may well be characterized as the most significant document for multilateral disarmament efforts, rightly accorded priority to nuclear issues. Such assignment of priority is still valid today, and should be maintained. Second, TIA covers the whole spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, and is not related exclusively to conventional arms. If the aim is to balance the CD agenda with a new item on conventional weapons, TIA is not the right answer. Finding the right subject in this respect is crucially important. We shall certainly need to reflect more on it.

We are now almost two thirds of the way through this year's current session. We have only one Ad Hoc Committee functioning; there still remain several outstanding issues before us. We admire your great efforts, Mr. President, to resolve these outstanding issues through Presidential open-ended informal consultations, in addition to your regular rounds of consultations. We hope that, with your guidance and diplomatic skills, you will be able to make good progress in your endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement, as well as the kind words addressed to me and his perhaps excessive confidence in the presidency. I now call on the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, since this is the first occasion on which I am taking the floor under your presidency I would at the outset like to congratulate you on your assumption of this important office. My delegation is particularly glad to see you in the Chair at this crucial stage in the work of the CD given your country's well-known commitment to the cause of disarmament and to the signal contributions made in this regard by your illustrious predecessors, in particular Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch. We have full confidence that the work of the CD will progress well under your able guidance and I would like to assure you of the fullest support of the Indian delegation in all your endeavours.

I am taking the floor today to read out the following statement in my capacity as the G-21 Coordinator on NTB:

"The Group of 21 is extremely disappointed and fully shares the concern expressed by the international community at the decision recently taken by a nuclear-weapon State to suspend its moratorium and resume nuclear-weapon testing soon, as well as at the nuclear test recently conducted by another nuclear-weapon State. The States parties of the NPT of G-21 are deeply concerned that such developments run counter to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference, in particular, the decision on 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament' and jeopardizes the credibility of the NTP regime. This is a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) and undermines its successful conclusion. The Group of 21 urges that a moratorium on nuclear testing should be observed by all nuclear-weapon States during the CTBT negotiations and until the entry into force of the CTBT.

"Conducting or intending to conduct nuclear-weapon tests over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted raises serious questions about the nuclear-weapon States' real intentions with regard to continued development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear-weapon States on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern. The Group holds that consistent with the terms of the mandate of the Ad Hod Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the CTBT should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. To admit low-yield nuclear testing or to permit testing below a certain threshold by using any technique would defeat such purposes. The Group of 21 reiterates that the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. No tests should be allowed for any reason or justification including the so-called safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons and perfecting the techniques to further develop nuclear weapons. The ban should be comprehensive. The nuclear-test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD. In this context, the Group of 21 calls upon the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to take appropriate measures to ensure that negotiations are held for a clear understanding on the scope of the future CTBT.

"The Group of 21 has already expressed its concern in its earlier working papers on the possible use of national technical means (NTMs) for verification purposes. The Group stresses that the NTMs should not be used on a case-by-case and selective basis. The Group also reiterates that the organization should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data. The judgement by the organization in this regard should be based on data received from the IMS. Moreover, it should be the exclusive responsibility of the organization to carry out on-site inspection in areas both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of States parties. The Group is also not convinced of the logic of any 'voluntary' funding for the international monitoring system (IMS) since the cost of the verification activities of the organization shall be borne by the States parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the organization of the CTBT.

"In view of the above, the Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in 1995".

I request that the above statement of the G-21 may be issued as a working paper of the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kinds words addressed to me. The secretariat will circulate the statement by the Group of 21 as a Conference document. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, my delegation is taking the floor for the first time since you took over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. May I, therefore, take this opportunity to warmly welcome you and congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency? My delegation is convinced that under your able stewardship we will be able to achieve success in the important matters that are being dealt with by the Conference.

The purpose of my statement today is to express the position of Sri Lanka on the resumption of nuclear testing. In doing so, I should mention that my delegation subscribes fully to the statement just made by the Ambassador of India on behalf of the Group of 21.

Sri Lanka notes with deep concern the continuation of nuclear testing by one nuclear-weapon State and the recent decision made by another to resume testing. These developments are all the more regrettable, taking place so soon after the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension Conference during which the nuclear-weapon States undertook, inter alia, to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing.

Sri Lanka, however, is pleased to note the undertakings given by these nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1996.

While expressing its concern at these unfortunate events, Sri Lanka urges the members of the Conference on Disarmament to conduct their negotiations with renewed vigour to ensure the early conclusion of a CTBT by 1996. In this regard, Sri Lanka wishes to reiterate its strong conviction that the treaty should be comprehensive and without any provision for exceptions; universal; and internationally and effectively verifiable. The CTBT should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments, for all time.

I would be grateful if the text of this statement is issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind remarks addressed to the Chair. The secretariat will distribute the text of the statement of the Government of Sri Lanka. I now call on the representative of Australia, Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE (Australia): I have asked for the floor today, briefly, to draw delegations' attention to a statement made by the Prime Minister of Australia on 23 June relating to French nuclear testing. This statement announced a series of further measures agreed to by the Australian Government on 22 June, further measures, decided against the background of French rejection of the efforts of a delegation from the South Pacific Forum, led by Australia's Foreign Minister Senator Evans, to persuade France not to proceed with the tests.

Our response has been measured. Our response has been strong, unequivocal and concrete, as has been the case for all nuclear testing regardless of the State perpetrating it.

Most importantly for this forum, this response contains a number of specific measures focused upon achieving a universal moratorium on nuclear testing and the earliest possible conclusion of an acceptably formulated comprehensive test-ban treaty by this negotiating forum. We look forward to the further energization of our negotiating effort to achieve this objective and to responsible leadership by the nuclear-weapon States in making this objective, to which all are unequivocally committed, a reality. My delegation will be seeking the distribution of the Prime Minister's statement as an official document of the Conference.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you our satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the work of our Conference after your recent arrival in Geneva.

The Argentine Republic regrets that France, a country to which we are bound by major political, economic and cultural ties, has deemed it necessary to resume its nuclear tests. We hope that this will be the last time that nuclear tests are announced to the international community. This concern is based on my country's well-known policy regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, illustrated by the efforts we have made to secure the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the early conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty now under negotiation in this Conference.

The Argentine Republic takes note of the fact that the announcement made by President Chirac on 13 June refers to a last series of tests which are limited specifically in time, and views positively the Presidential commitment made on behalf of France to sign the test-ban treaty without reservations in the autumn of 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Yong-Shik Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, once again my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the presidency of this august body. With regard to the statement made earlier by the representative of North Korea, I would like to make a few brief remarks.

First of all, we are disappointed by the remarks of the North Korean representative today. The major part of his remarks, relating to the Korean peninsula, is totally unfounded and groundless, based on unilateral political propaganda. Certain remarks have been repeatedly made in the past also, but to make it clear, I shall make only two points. One is: the North Korean representative said that the Armistice Agreement, concluded in 1953, should be replaced by other peace mechanisms, and the second point I want to raise is the assertion that South Korea has many nuclear weapons. I think nothing could be further from the truth. First of all, it is North Korea which has flagrantly violated the Armistice Agreement since 1953. My Government is of the view that what we should do now is to strengthen the Armistice Agreement and to find out every possible means conducive to creating confidence-building measures. In doing so, my Government recently suggested to give 150 tons of rice free of charge to North Korea. The second point I want to raise is that it was North Korea which was found under great suspicion to make nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA found a big discrepancy between what North Korea reported to IAEA and what the IAEA had expected. It is my delegation's understanding that this Conference is a multilateral forum, designed to make a contribution to the development of multilateral disarmament through productive and forward-looking statements. Based on this understanding, my delegation again urged North Korea not to repeat political propaganda in this Conference, but to show us a positive attitude towards the common effort in the direction of enhancing world peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I have already had occasion several times to explain the reasons behind our decisions relating to nuclear tests, and I would not wish to tire the Conference with a repetition. None the less I think it would be helpful and even necessary to recapitulate a number of points that I have already mentioned. In the past few weeks, I have in particular stressed the fact that it was not one but two decisions that France had adopted. I think everyone is now aware that the decision to conduct a last series of tests, restricted in number, limited in time, is inseparable from the commitment entered into by the President to sign in the autumn of 1996 the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that we are currently negotiating. The fact that some are pretending to overlook this commitment or minimize its scope does not detract from the fact that this commitment has been entered into and that its scope is considerable, as a number of speakers this morning pointed out, or emphasized. From that standpoint, as I have already indicated, the French decision, far from jeopardizing the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or making it more difficult, more complicated, on the contrary is contributing and will contribute to its successful conclusion. I have also stressed, but I must once again reiterate this, that the decisions we have adopted are fully consistent with international instruments, in particular and including the texts that we signed at the review and extension Conference for the non-proliferation Treaty, notably the declaration on principles and objectives. These texts, if I may once again repeat, are texts that we negotiated with seriousness of purpose, with a completely transparent approach as regards the constraints to which we were subject, and specifically, at no stage did we conceal the fact that the option of a resumption of testing was open. We respect those texts and we will continue to comply with them.

Finally, we are naturally attentive to the concerns that are expressed and we are doing our best to respond to them, to respond to them, as I have also indicated, through a concern for dialogue and a concern for transparency. None the less, it goes without saying that among the statements made on this subject, there are some that are of particular importance, some have a particular flavour. It goes without saying that lessons in virtue carry all the more weight if they are delivered by countries whose conduct in the field of non-proliferation is beyond reproach. Those same statements bring a smile to one's lips when they are selective or when they come from countries whose respect for international commitments in the field of non-proliferation continues to be a genuine source of concern for the international community.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of France for his statement. I now have no further speakers on the list.

The secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As is customary, the timetable is indicative and may be amended if necessary. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. As you are aware, in keeping with the decision taken by the Conference on 21 August 1990 (CD/1036), there is the possibility of holding a plenary in the morning of Tuesday, 4 July. The secretariat will inform the Conference in due time if this meeting is to take place. The same applies to the informal consultations scheduled for Wednesday, 5 July.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Coordinator of the Group of 21 has asked me to announce that that Group will be meeting in this room immediately after the conclusion of this meeting.

I would like to inform you that intensive consultations and fruitful negotiations have been held on the organization of work. The Chair is of the impression that we are very close to reaching agreement. I think that differences remain on only one out of eight items, and they are ancillary rather than substantive. I have convened the group coordinators for a meeting this afternoon after the plenary meeting we will be holding, and I would like to appeal personally to all delegations to give their group coordinators sufficient leeway and sufficient flexibility to allow us to reach an agreement in which all delegations have participated and to which all have made significant and very imaginative contributions.

We have no further business before us, and therefore I shall now suspend this meeting until 3.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 710th plenary meeting is resumed.

In reopening the meeting I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Andrei Kozyrev. The personal interest which Mr. Kozyrev has displayed for years on the subject of arms control and disarmament, and his thorough knowledge of the matters on our agenda, are well known to us all. Three years ago, in 1992, Mr. Kozyrev addressed this body on the eve of the final phase of the negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons. His presence among us today augurs well for the success of our work in the Conference on Disarmament as we approach the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am sure that his statement will contribute to the attainment of that objective.

As my predecessor announced in the Presidential consultations held on 7 June, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held in the afternoon of Thursday, 6 July at 3.30 p.m., to allow the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to deliver his statement to this forum, as well as the speakers on the list.

I invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, to take the floor.

Mr. KOZYREV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I welcome you as the representative of the friendly Government of Mexico to this responsible position of President of the Conference. I sincerely wish you success in guiding the work of this important forum. I also thank you for the warm words you addressed to me.

In past years I have indeed had the opportunity to familiarize myself with the diplomatic inner workings of the Conference of Disarmament and the United Nations, and I must say that only a layman would consider this work easy, and the task of leading such a forum something like a sail on the peaceful waters of Lake Geneva. In fact we know, like the Secretary-General of the Conference, my fellow-countryman Petrovsky, who also has vast and ever greater experience of multilateral diplomacy, that this is a difficult task which causes sea-sickness in all but very experienced sailors and captains. They do not lose their bearings, and, like you and the Secretary-General, steer the ship in the right direction. Of course the Conference has a considerable amount of confidence in the experience of those gathered here. I could say that it is a kind of council of wise men in the area of disarmament and international security. At the same time, I feel that today there is a need to open up new horizons in moving the international community to a genuinely secure world.

Without exaggeration, two closely related events have marked a historic breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament: the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty and the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The partnership between Russia and the United States, to which there is no alternative, and which is gathering strength in a practical, not always easy but nevertheless constant movement forward, has made it possible to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, in other words, to achieve something which even 10 years ago, let alone at the time when the Conference on Disarmament was established, seemed unlikely. Moreover, in only seven or eight years' time, the level of strategic arsenals will stand at only a third of the level possessed by two nuclear States, the United States and Russia, as recently as 1990. I should like to emphasize that the President of Russia and the Government are firmly committed to the goal of ratifying the SALT-2 Treaty. As the President's representative in Parliament on this subject, I can confirm that we will do everything in order to resolve this issue. It goes without saying that we can ratify the Treaty only if there is strict observance of the ABM Treaty based on agreement with the United States concerning the delimitation between tactical and strategic systems. There is understanding of this issue, and work is under way on these problems in accordance with the declaration issued during the visit to Moscow by the President of the United States on 10 May this year.

The indefinite extension of the NPT has provided a firm basis for further efforts by States in the area of nuclear disarmament. There is a possibility of further reductions and ultimately the elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction. Let me repeat what I said recently at the Conference in New York: indefinite extension of the NPT is not a mandate for the five nuclear Powers to continue holding weapons forever, but a stimulus for them to make further active efforts towards disarmament. However, a new threat of unprecedented scope has been emerging with increasing clarity in the recent period, standing in contrast to these efforts by dozens of States arising from their concern about international security. I am speaking about the increase in terrorism on an extensive scale and in extremely cruel forms. The tragic events in Buddenovsk, Oklahoma City and Tokyo have shown that the world must sharply step up its struggle against the demon of terrorism and also erect a reliable barrier to attempts by terrorists to gain access to weapons of mass destruction: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Closely related to this is the initiative put forward by the President of Russia at the Halifax meeting for the "group of eight" to hold a summit conference in Moscow to discuss the entire range of issues relating to nuclear security. This is another vital issue of international security, a matter of current concern both to State leaders and to ordinary citizens. It is therefore natural that President B.N. Yeltsin's initiative was supported by all our partners in the "group of eight". We intend to embark on consultations regarding the format and the agenda of the meeting without wasting time. The Kremlin leadership has just sent a letter on this subject to the other leaders in the "group of eight".

All of these trends in security and disarmament, both those which are promising and those which are alarming, point to a new agenda for the Conference for Disarmament, the main elements of which, I believe, should be the following.

First, new tasks in the area of nuclear disarmament. The end of the "cold war", and the emergence of a world in which Russia, the United States and other international factors are no longer on opposite sides, have posed the key questions of the role of nuclear weapons on the eve of the twenty-first century in a new light. They need joint thinking both by governments and by legislative bodies in the democratic countries, which have limited budgetary resources, and indeed by taxpayers too. Russia is committed to the ultimate goal of the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We suggest to all our partners that we should move jointly towards this goal, stage by stage, taking into account the specific approaches of each of the nuclear Powers. A good framework for discussing and resolving all these issues could be provided through the conclusion of an agreement on nuclear security and strategic stability, the drafting of which has been proposed by the President of Russia.

The fact that this session marks a milestone should also be displayed through the inclusion of an item on nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the Conference. I would stress - an item on disarmament. We deem it important to appoint a special coordinator entrusted with the task of producing proposals on the contribution which our multilateral forum could make to solving this global issue.

There is another priority for our agenda - the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban-treaty. Russia is doing everything to ensure that such a treaty is drawn up as quickly as possible, especially since the progress of the negotiations is making it possible to reach consensus on the key elements and conclude the treaty next year. The current national moratoriums on nuclear tests must be strictly observed. During the Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty the nuclear Powers agreed that pending the entry into force of the CTB treaty they will display utmost restraint. Consequently we find it hard to agree with those who allege that the continuation or resumption of nuclear tests is not in contradiction with that provision. "Utmost restraint" in this matter should be the same for all.

And another urgent issue - prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons. The adoption of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD has created the necessary conditions for an immediate start to negotiations on a treaty on this subject. The recently adopted resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council on security guarantees for non-nuclear States, and also the harmonized declarations by nuclear Powers on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the NPT, constitute a new and genuine contribution to the strengthening of international security. Russia holds dear the concerns of the non-nuclear States and proposes that we go further and draft a legally binding international instrument on this problem.

Secondly, substantial progress towards the elimination of chemical and biological weapons is vital. As a depositary of the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, Russia has an interest in the creation of effective machinery for ensuring compliance. In this connection, it is important for the Ad Hoc Group of States parties to the Convention to proceed without delay to negotiations on the substance of a draft protocol on verification of the Convention, which could be submitted to the fourth conference for the review of the operation of the Convention in 1996, or later to a special conference of States parties.

The Russian Government is actively preparing to ratify the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We support the efforts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague to prepare for the implementation of the Convention. However, it is essential to take account of Russian interests, particularly in matters relating to the conversion of former chemical weapons production facilities.

Thirdly, the Conference must address in earnest the problem of conventional weapons. The tragic events is Bosnia, and before that in the Persian Gulf and other crisis areas, have underlined the close interrelationship between the process of disarmament and the settlement of local conflicts. It is extremely urgent, in particular, to develop regional and subregional model agreements for the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. The Conference cannot stand on the sidelines when it comes to these burning issues. And as a minimum there is a need for strict observance of the regimes introduced by the United Nations Security Council prohibiting supplies of weapons to areas of conflict, and first and foremost to the warring parties in Bosnia. There must be no double standards here. The many victims of local conflicts constitute convincing evidence of the fact that the problem raised by the United Nations Secretary-General of "micro-disarmament", as it has been called, is in fact global in nature. Therefore we propose that the Conference should step up its efforts in this direction, and in particular continue the work carried out in the CD last year to reach agreement on definitions of the concepts of military holdings and procurement through national production. The Ad Hoc Committee of the CD on transparency in armaments should be re-established. Initially perhaps a special coordinator could be appointed to secure agreement on a new mandate for the Committee. This would be better than a continuation of the deadlock affecting the transparency issue.

Fourthly, the effectiveness of the work of the Conference itself must be increased. The current membership to the Conference does not fully reflect the new realities. Following the end of the "cold war" it is worth reflecting also on issues related to "balance" in the membership of the CD, especially since all the members have what amounts to a veto. In this connection, perhaps as soon as the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament in 1997 we could discuss ways to improve the entire disarmament process. Primarily, we believe, we could consider focusing efforts in this direction in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the single forum for multilateral disarmament and an important link in the emerging system of international security. For these purposes there is a need not just to expand the membership of the CD but also to make its mandate more comprehensive. We also need to think about ways of overcoming unnecessary fragmentation of the disarmament process and concentrating it under the CD. This will also make it possible to outline ways of improving the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Just under 100 years ago, in 1898, Russia was the first to put forward an initiative for limiting and reducing armaments on a global scale and to suggest the convening of an international conference on this issue. The concept of the harmful effects of the arms race on the economic well-being of States and the immorality of using scientific and technological achievements to create ever newer ways of destroying people took shape for the first time on the lips of my fellow-Russians. However, mankind had to go through two world wars and the decades of the cold war before these ideas started to become really integrated in world politics.

I should like to express the hope that this year of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the most destructive war mankind has ever seen will constitute a milestone at which the Conference on Disarmament will formulate a new agenda for the establishment of a truly secure world in the twenty-first century.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for his important statement, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Before I adjourn this meeting I wish to remind you that Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be meeting immediately after this plenary here in this room and that the coordinators of the groups are invited to Presidential consultations.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.